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Lemology Pure and Applied
Győrgy Lukács’s book about young Hegel has 606 pages in a classic English edi-
tion, and 1,011 pages in the Polish edition.1 A book about the life and work of 
Faulkner by Joseph L. Blotner consists of two volumes amounting to 1,846 pages 
of the main text, supplemented by 269 pages of references with separate page 
numbering.2 A biography of Thomas Mann, written by Klaus Harpprecht in its 
one volume edition consists of 2,253 pages of very fine print,3 while Sartre’s unfin-
ished work on Flaubert takes up 2,801 pages (in three volumes).4 So how many 
pages would it take to write exhaustively about the life and works of Stanisław 
Lem? A comparable number perhaps. Such an exhaustive description is not what 
this work is after though.
The readers’ response to Lem’s works has gone through a number of phases. 
His novels and short stories started being talked about and appreciated in the 
1950s in communist Poland, as well as in other countries of the Soviet Bloc, 
especially the USSR and East Germany. By the late 1960s they gained renown 
in West Germany and the United States as well. For a long time, however, he 
was perceived as a sci-fi author, and the genre was seen as inferior literary pro-
duction by institutions in a position to determine literary value. The label did a 
lot of evil to Lem, because for years there would be no appreciation of intellec-
tual values of his works. And once they eventually started being noticed, they 
left many critics puzzled, as the intellectual input made by Lem by far exceeded 
the competence of most literary scholars, while scientists representing particular 
disciplines explored by Lem did not deem his literary works and essays worthy 
of a thorough discussion.
This somewhat schizophrenic state seems to continue until today really. In 
the 21st century the intellectual circles appreciate Stanisław Lem, but the appre-
ciation is often conventional. He is being praised for some vague achievements 
bordering on literature and science, for accurate predictions of technological 
 1 Győrgy Lukács, The Young Hegel:  Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and 
Economics, trans. by R. Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT, 1977). Idem, Młody Hegel: o 
powiązaniach dialektyki z ekonomią, trans. by M. J. Siemek (Warszawa: PWN, 1980).
 2 Joseph L. Blotner, Faulkner: A Biography (London: Chatto and Windus, 1974).
 3 Klaus Harpprecht, Thomas Mann: eine Biographie (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1995).












development – but it is not easy to tell what that in fact meant. Every once in 
a while his work is still seen as “not quite serious.” His situation as a writer is 
peculiar: his work as a whole is not “literary” enough for literary circles, and it is 
not “scientific” enough for scientists. Therefore, it is very difficult to classify him 
into any literary or philosophical current. On the other hand his work cannot 
be qualified as “science.” From the very beginning Lem would take up topics 
in-between two disciplines – which has become a scientific practice only several 
decades later (apart from the episode of cybernetics). So to any specialists he by 
necessity appeared to be an amateur. The unlucky proximity with trashy sci-fi 
and pseudoscientific charlatans, combined with the seeming abyss separating 
his work from the pantheon of literature and philosophy have contributed to 
the unfortunate image of Lem as a sort of technology prattler. Only as late as in 
the 1970s have there emerged a thorough criticism and interpretation, both in 
Poland and abroad, which would place him among the most eminent contempo-
rary authors. Decades of being underestimated had grown in him into a lasting 
sense of frustration, which only became stronger in the last years of his life.
This book will be primarily devoted to Stanisław Lem’s two discursive 
works: Dialogues and Summa Technologiae. I will try to prove that they are the 
author’s most significant input in the process of understanding civilizational 
changes in the West in the late 20th and early 21st century – even though they 
were in fact written several decades earlier. Lem’s fiction will be referenced here 
often, but marginally, as a detailed analysis would complicate the argument 
excessively. Lem’s two later theoretical treatises are wilfully omitted here:  The 
Philosophy of Chance and Science Fiction and Futurology. They are devoted to 
completely different issues and employ different theoretical and interpretation 
methodology. They deserve a separate monograph.
Both Dialogues and Summa Technologiae are presented here against a broad 
theoretical background, as this approach helps unveil the intellectual sources 
that inspired them. Part One is devoted to Dialogues, which constitute Lem’s 
interpretation of cybernetics. After outlining the history of the discipline and its 
significance in world science in the 1950s and 1960s, I proceed with an analysis 
of Dialogues, where I show that by writing the book Lem attempted to apply the 
system of categories provided by cybernetics to build his own anthropological 
project. However, being aware of philosophical contradictions inherent to the 
attempt, he could not coherently complete the plan.
Within Lem’s oeuvre, Dialogues prepare the ground for a much bolder 
work: Summa Technologiae. The scope and the open structure of the text make 
it impossible to come up with unequivocal interpretation. In Part Two, I offer an 
interpretation according to which Summa Technologiae is an elaborate utopian 
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project of autoevolution of the human species, of transition from a phase of hap-
hazard biological evolution toward a planned phase of controlled regulation of 
human biological and physiological features.
Part Three, which takes up most of this book, is devoted to contemporary 
intellectual currents, which take up on Lem’s project of autoevolution. The most 
important among them is posthumanism, which was established in the United 
States in the 1980s.5 Similarities it shares with Lem’s thought, while significant, 
are in fact accidental. Yet, it does not change the fact that Summa Technologiae 
and posthumanism belong to the same intellectual process.
My main task when analyzing both Lem’s texts and the works of other authors 
referenced here is to reconstruct their covert assumptions. By revealing and ana-
lyzing them, I offer and further prove a thesis that both Lem’s and posthumanists’ 
anthropology have traits of utopian liberalism, based on an assumption of human 
rationality. In order to interpret Lem in a way that will not be limited to a narrow 
range of linguistic and genre-related issues, I need to refer to a wide range of 
disciplines. Therefore, this book will invoke tools of literary criticism, sociology, 
history of ideas, philosophy, science studies, bioethics and a few other disciplines, 
which means that as a whole this work cannot be classified as belonging to any 
single of the disciplines listed above. It can be its disadvantage, but it may also 
open a broader perspective on Lem’s works.
 5 In this book I use the notion of “posthumanism” in a different sense that is prevalent 
today – I do not mean an intellectual current, which developed from a rejection of 
anthropocentrism in the humanities, but a technocratic ideology of sorts that allows 










1  The Genesis and Growth of Cybernetics
The intellectual climate of the 21st century is not particularly favorable to the 
so-called “grand narratives”  – intellectual approaches that aim to explain the 
entire reality available to human mind, or at least a large portion of it. It is 
commonly accepted that structuralism was the last such grand narrative, which 
seemed to serve as a metatheory of the humanities in the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, its predecessor in that regard – cybernetics – is rarely mentioned, even 
though it was even more prevalent between the end of the 1940s and mid-1960s.
Part One of this book is to be devoted to Dialogues – the one among Lem’s 
works in which his fascination with cybernetics is the strongest.6 In fact, Dialogues 
cannot be understood without referring to the swift career of the discipline. 
Therefore, before discussing cybernetics itself, I should outline briefly its history. 
This description of what cybernetics is will, however, come from an amateur. 
The mathematical tools and vocabulary used by the creators and proponents of 
cybernetics remain unavailable to me. I will be treating cybernetics as a phe-
nomenon in the history of science and ideas, leaving mathematics in a sort of 
“black box,” which is not to be opened, but which is being observed focusing 
on its location and functioning. It is justifiable, as the cyberneticists never lim-
ited themselves to producing mathematical arguments. The founding father of 
cybernetics himself, Norbert Wiener showed the path here (I will return to it). 
In fact, some branches of cybernetics detached themselves completely from sci-
ence. And these branches happened to wither the earliest.
Cybernetics is commonly described as “a scientific study of control and com-
munication in complex systems” – this is how it was defined by its creator, Norbert 
Wiener.7 The general character of this description is quite significant, indicating 
not only a broad background and a variety of sources of the discipline, but also 
its broad scope. Wiener gave it a name derived from Greek.8 “Kybernetes” means 
 6 “This book […] comes from a captivation with cybernetics.” Stanisław Lem, 
“Przedmowa do drugiego wydania,” in: Dialogi, 3rd edition (Kraków: WL, 1984), 5. 
All translations from Dialogues, which have not been translated to English in full, have 
been made for this work by Olga Kaczmarek.
 7 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the 
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“helmsman” and is derived from the verb “kybernao”, meaning “to steer.”9 The 
term “governor” has the same root.
Cybernetics was largely born from war-time needs and was related to tech-
nologies of building quick counting machines – in both cases the purpose was to 
facilitate calculating trajectories of missiles targeting bullets. In an introduction 
to his book Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the 
Animal and the Machine,10 which became the founding work of the entire disci-
pline, Wiener describes in detail how the ideas of cybernetics were born during 
seminars he participated in at Harvard’s Vanderbilt Hall in 1941–1944 together with 
mathematicians (including von Neumann), engineers, biologists and doctors.11 This 
interdisciplinary gathering observed that there are numerous analogies between the 
functioning of new calculating machines and biological organisms when it comes 
to mechanisms of steering and control. It turned out some processes within cal-
culating machines and human nervous systems can be described with the same 
mathematical formulae – that is, processes that include feedback and oscillations.12 
Research continued after the end of the war was conducted simultaneously in engi-
neering and biology. This duality of research directions is characteristic of the entire 
cybernetics, and it will be important for the argument that follows.
Wiener himself played a pivotal role in shaping the new discipline – he stood 
behind its laws and ideology. As a child this versatile scholar and intellectual 
was fascinated by nature, and traces of such interests are clear in his works, 
which combine mathematics with physiology. It must have tickled the imagina-
tion of a young physician Stanisław Lem, when he read his books in Mieczysław 
Choynowski’s seminar; learning English from them.13 Wiener was not only a 
 9 A Greek-English Lexicon compiled by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott (LSJ) ed. 
1996 s.v. (s. 1004). Both words can be found in Homer (Il. 19, 43; Od. 9, 78; 3, 283). As 
early as Aeschylus (Suppliants 750, “shepherd of the ship”) and Plato (Phaedrus, 247 c, 
“charioteer”), the word “kybernetes” is used metaphorically.
 10 Idem, Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine 
(Cambridge:  MIT Press, 1948); all quotes and references from the 2nd edition 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1961).
 11 Wiener, Cybernetics, 21 and following.
 12 Such processes include movement disorders in Parkinson’s disease.
 13 Stanisław Lem, Stanisław Bereś, Tako rzecze ... Lem (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie 
2001), 43. “Choynowski set up Science Seminar for Jagiellonian University Research 
Assistants and on behalf of the group he approached innumerable research institutions 
in Canada and United States requesting books for the starved Polish academia. Seeing 
all these treasures, unavailable to me because of the language, I sat down to learning 











The Genesis and Growth of Cybernetics 17
mathematician, but also an engaged social critic, which can be best seen in his 
book The Human Use of Human Beings. Cybernetics and Society (1950), which is 
not a scientific work, but a collection of essays about science for a general public, 
oftentimes with a journalistic air to them. The fact that this particular book 
has become a popular guide to cybernetics shows that unlike other disciplines, 
cybernetics was tied to its social context from the very beginning – its creator 
himself has positioned it that way, and he did it on purpose. This was certainly 
aided by his powerful, authoritarian personality, which emanates from his deter-
mined arguments admitting no opposition and densely marking his texts, as well 
as from his very critical remarks about the postwar American society.14
Apart from contemporary needs and an intellectual osmosis between 
biologists and engineers, for Wiener the sources of cybernetics lied primarily in 
the development of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics in the late 19th 
century. He had especially great respect for one of the men behind both these 
disciplines  – Josiah Willard Gibbs, whose long underestimated works greatly 
enriched statistical interpretation of energy transmission processes.15 Information 
transmission is part of these processes, as Wiener and his colleagues remarked – 
and the information is treated as a physical quality here. In Cybernetics, Wiener 
provides basis for a mathematical description of information,16 which was then 
developed further by his disciple, Claude Shannon. This is where physics and 
biology meet: according to Wiener a biological organism is an energy and infor-
mation processing system.
Later cyberneticists developed the discipline much further and found some 
much earlier antecedents for it. They saw all thinkers and engineers involved 
in combinatorics and building calculating or moving machines as early 
cyberneticists, from Ramon Llull and Jaquet-Droz to Pascal and Leibniz (Wiener 
presented the latter as the “patron saint of cybernetics”). Even cabalist mystics 
it started with Wiener’s Cybernetics, which I read almost like Champollion deciphering 
the hieroglyphs […] slowly […] with dictionary in my hand.”
 14 Cf. Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings. Cybernetics and Society 
(Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1950), Chapters  2, 7 and 9; quoted from the edi-
tion: (London: Free Association Books, 1989); idem, Cybernetics and Communication…, 
Chapter 8.
 15 Ludwig Boltzmann is usually seen as the main creator of thermodynamics, but Wiener 
hardly ever mentions him. About Gibbs see The Human Use…, “Introduction,” 7–15; 
and Cybernetics…,  chapter 2, “Groups and Statistical Mechanics,” 45–59.







The Genesis and Growth of Cybernetics18
with their search for Golem were listed in that context.17 Mathematical roots 
of cybernetics were largely impacted by early game theory and von Neumann’s 
theory of automata,18 Turing’s works on computability and the probability theory, 
which was being developed at the time by thinkers such as Andrey Kolmogorov 
and Ronald Fisher (all these names come up both in Wiener’s and Lem’s texts).
It was soon observed that
certain kinds of machines and some living organisms – particularly the higher living 
organisms – can, as we have seen, modify their patterns of behavior on the basis of past 
experience so as to achieve specific antientropic ends. In these higher forms of commu-
nicative organisms the environment, considered as past experience of an individual, can 
modify the pattern of behavior into one which will in some sense or other will deal more 
effectively with the future environment.19
It was another step toward conceptually placing humans and machines on a par. 
A theory of “learning machines” started being developed, together with building 
such machines, initially quite primitive, and then increasingly complex.
In 1948 William Ross Ashby made the first Homeostat – “a physical model 
imitating the phenomenon of homeostasis [i.e. physiological balance in a var-
iable environment] and the self-organizing capacities of the brain.”20 The 
Homeostat was in fact the first practical success of cybernetics. In the 1950s and 
1960s cybernetics developed swiftly and had its big entry into such disciplines as 
biology, economy, technical sciences (including telecommunication), sociology, 
political science and other.21 The marriage of cybernetics and biology gave rise 
to a discipline sometimes called bionics (usually biocybernetics) – and this was 
when for the first time there were publications on systems that combine bio-
logical and mechanical components, based on thorough research on the func-
tioning of human nervous system.22 I  emphasize that so much, because such 
 17 Henryk Greniewski (1903–1972), one of the Polish cyberneticists referred to the myth, 
labeling his own theory of machines imitating humans as “the Golems theory.”
 18 John von Neumann’s last unfinished work was titled The Computer and the Brain (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1958).
 19 The Human Use…, 48.
 20 Mały słownik cybernetyczny, ed. by M. Kempisty (Warszawa: WP, 1973), 147; it includes 
a detailed description of Ashby’s Homeostat.
 21 Cf. G. R. Boulanger, “Prologue:  What is Cybernetics?,” in:  Survey of Cybernetics. 
A Tribute to Dr Norbert Wiener, ed. by J. Rose (London: Illiffe Books Ltd.), 7–12. The 
text is one of the manifestos of the omnipotence of cybernetics.
 22 Cf. Michael A. Arbib, The Metaphorical Brain. An Introduction to Cybernetics as 
Artificial Intelligence and Brain Theory (New York-London-Sydney-Toronto: Wiley, 













The Genesis and Growth of Cybernetics 19
systems (cyborgs) will be one of the main topics of Part Three of this book. For 
some time it seemed like creating a structure that would combine features of a 
biological organism and a machine is close. Research in economical cybernetics 
looked promising. New subdisciplines were formed too, such as socio- and 
psychocybernetics and military, medical, pedagogical and linguistic cybernetics 
(the latter producing the first attempts at machine translations). Researching all 
types of steering processes, scholars focused on problems such as the impact of 
steering signals and feedback on the quality and stability of control, the impact 
of the structure of the systems on their reliability and the resistance of steering 
systems to interference. It needs to be emphasized, given the liberties with ter-
minology taken by later epigones of cybernetics, that all these notions originally 
had precise mathematics determinants, formed on the basis of advanced fields 
of the science. In the 1970s it was further enriched by linking cybernetics to the 
general system theory,23 which made it possible to research complex steering sys-
tems, among other things.
While creating cybernetics, Norbert Wiener saw it not only as a new, revealing 
discipline of science but also as a remedy to the increasing atomization of sci-
ences24 and as a major tool shaping social life.25 Very soon, however, in the 1960s 
it became clear that neither of these “metascientific” goals of cybernetics is or 
scientific implications of two views: the evolutionary one according to which humans 
are animals, and the cybernetic one, according to which they are mechanisms.
 23 It is a theory formed in 1930–1960 by an Austrian philosopher and biologist Ludwig 
von Bertalanffy (1901–1972), who claimed that a biological organism is not a simple 
sum of components, but constitutes a system characterized by unity and integrality, 
coordinating functions and processes, the organization of which is an important fea-
ture of life. The theory was to be an alternative to mechanistic and vitalist approaches 
in biology. It became an important argument for those who opposed reductionism in 
philosophy of science.
 24 “For many years … I had shared the conviction that the most fruitful areas of the 
growth of the sciences were those which had been neglected as a no-man’s land between 
the various established fields. Since Leibniz there has perhaps been no man who has 
had a full command of all the intellectual activity of his day. Since that time, science 
has been increasingly the task of specialists, in fields, which show a tendency to grow 
progressively narrower. A century ago there may have been no Leibniz, but there was 
a Gauss, a Faraday, and a Darwin. Today there are a few scholars who can call them-
selves mathematicians or physicists or biologists without restriction. A man may be a 
topologist or an acoustician or a coleopterist.” (Cybernetics…, 2)
 25 Significant part of The Human Use of Human Beings is devoted to discussions of the 
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can be achieved. Instead of quickly becoming a mathesis universalis, it started 
dividing into subdisciplines, which were losing connection with one another. 
The attempts to apply cybernetics to social sciences, which were in fact under-
taken against Wiener’s will,26 soon failed, as they turned cybernetic terminology 
from a precise vocabulary into a set of blurry metaphors with no heuristic value 
(I shall provide examples of that later). The purely technical fields of cybernetics, 
such as the theory of automata, of adaptive control systems and of optimal and 
hierarchical control, as well as the more specialized biocybernetical research, 
met the same fate as all other subdisciplines: this atomization and formal sophis-
tication have made them completely inaccessible for those who specialize in 
slightly other fields (not to mention amateurs). What happened was exactly what 
Wiener was trying to save the science from.
There are innumerable texts about cybernetics. Globally there are hundreds 
of monographs and dozens of thousands of articles. It is impossible to pin down 
the moment when all this production got relegated to the margins of real sci-
ence, because naturally the cyberneticists themselves have never admitted it had 
happened. It can be said that the 1970s brought the final fading of classic cyber-
netics, even though it is also the moment when Heinz von Foerster announced 
the end of “first-order cybernetics” and the beginning of “second-order cyber-
netics” in a work titled Cybernetics of Cybernetics. He defined the former as 
cybernetics of observed systems, while the latter as cybernetics of observing 
systems (which means the discipline has not avoided the self-referentiality, 
which became overwhelming in social sciences and the humanities at the time). 
This “second-order cybernetics” is now represented by sociocybernetics, which 
investigates the so-called autopoietic  – or self-reproducing  – systems.27 The 
 26 “Drs. Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead have urged me, in view of the intensely 
pressing nature of the sociological and economic problems of the present age of confu-
sion, to devote a large part of my energies to the discussion of this side of cybernetics … 
the human sciences are very poor testing-grounds for a new mathematics technique: as 
poor as the statistical mechanics of gas would be to a being of the order of size of a 
molecule, to whom the fluctuations which we ignore form a larger standpoint would 
be precisely the matters of greatest interest.” (Cybernetics…, 24–25).
 27 The term was first introduced in the 1970s by two Chilean biologists Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela. It is a distant consequence of the notion of homeo-
stasis and of learning machines, as well as of the general system theory. Niklas 
Luhmann incorporated it into his vocabulary. For more on sociocybernetics, see 
under “sociocybernetics” in: International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral 
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highly abstract character of these inquiries situates them beyond the main scope 
of sociology and social sciences, although such theories did have considerable 
impact on, for instance, biology of ecosystems for a while (there existed a branch 
called cybernetic ecology).
There still exist professional associations such as the American Society for 
Cybernetics (www.asc-cybernetics.org, the website includes numerous links to 
other sites of similar character), as well as journals, such as the monthly Biological 
Cybernetics.28 Today’s cybernetics is largely related to contemporary antireduc-
tionist theories, such as constructivism. The term includes attempts undertaken 
mostly by German scholars to encompass the entire human mental activity in 
one general theory, centered on the notion of “construction” (construction of 
reality in human cognitive apparatus) and employing the achievements of con-
temporary epistemology, system theory and system biology.
None of this means that cybernetics has not contributed anything to the 
mainstream world science after the period when it was one of the consti-
tuting disciplines. Fields such as IT, robotics, artificial intelligence (AI) (which 
cyberneticists wrote about as early as in the 1950s), the theory of automata, orga-
nization theory, telecommunication and system engineering also owe a lot to 
cybernetics. Economic cybernetics contributed to the development of manage-
ment theory (including managing “human resources”), optimizing theory and 
decision theory. The specialists in neural networks, which were the thing of the 
time in the 1980s and 1990s, are especially indebted to cybernetics. The problem 
of complexity, which was in fashion at the time, investigated by both physicists 
(such as Stuart Kaufmann) and biologists (such as Ilya Prigogine), has a lot in 
common with system theory combined with an indeterminist philosophical 
orientation.
A detailed investigation of the growth of cybernetics in specific countries 
would be very time consuming. Nevertheless, it is important to glance at what 
happened with it in Poland, which is, I believe, a good sample, illustrating in 
detail the process of degeneration, which I have outlined earlier.
 28 The subtitle is Communication and Control in Organisms and Automata. The edito-
rial team is international, mostly German, and the publisher is Springer-Verlag. The 
examples of titles from 2001 are: “Mathematical models of the eye movements in 
reading,” “Synergetic analysis of spatio-temporal EEG patterns: Alzheimer’s disease” 
and “Noise-inducted transition in excitable neuron models.” The profile of these articles 




2  Cybernetics in Poland
The situation of cybernetics in Poland was peculiar. Up until 1956 it was seen as “a 
reactionary pseudoscience … a form of contemporary mechanicism … targeted 
against materialistic dialectics, against contemporary scientific philosophy estab-
lished by I. P. Pavlov, and against a scientific approach to the laws of social life.”29 
After that date, the political pendulum swung to the other side and very quickly – 
within a few years – cybernetics was made one of the main disciplines in the USSR, 
which was certainly connected to the utopian endeavors in social engineering 
undertaken there. Wiener and Ashby were translated into Russian in the 1950s.30 
Many volumes of translations from Western languages were published, as well as 
Russian works. The boom lasted until the 1970s and it quickly spread into USSR’s 
satellite states.
First, in 1957, a number of translations of minor books were released; 
in 1959 Henryk Greniewski published his Elementy cybernetyki sposobem 
niematematycznym wyłożone [Elements of cybernetics laid out in a non-
mathematical manner],31 in 1960 Wiener’s Human Use of Human Beings came 
 29 Krótki słownik filozoficzny, ed. by M. Rozental and P. Judin (Warszawa: Książka i 
Wiedza, 1955), 76–77.
 30 For example:  Wiener’s Kibernetika i obshchestvo, 1958, and Ashby’s, Vvedenie v 
kibernetiku, 1959, with an introduction by Kolmogorov; Wiener’s autobiography was 
also translated, as well as his minor essays, such as “God and Golem, Inc. A Comment 
on Certain Points where Cybernetics Impinges on Religion,” was translated as: “Tvorets 
i robot. Obnizdenie niekotorych problem, v kotorych kibernetika stalkivaetsja s 
religiej.”
 31 Henryk Greniewski (1903–1972) was a logician and a mathematician, a professor 
at the University of Warsaw, a disciple of Tadeusz Kotarbiński; cf. Elementy… 
(Warszawa:  PWN, 1959); his other books on cybernetics include Cybernetyka z 
lotu ptaka (Warszawa: KiW, 1959), 2nd edition amended and co-authored by Maria 
Kempisty (Warszawa: KiW, 1962); or Cybernetyka niematematyczna (Warszawa: PWN, 
1969). In the latter book, part one repeats the text of Elementy…, while part two 
consists of Greniewski’s original input to the theory of complex systems, while part 
three includes his theory of Golems, that is, “models imitating humans in at least one of 
the following areas: (1) imagination and dreams; (2) mastering language or languages; 
(3) conceptual thinking (especially deduction); (4) introspection”; this part is accom-











out, and in 1961 – Ashby’s Introduction to Cybernetics.32 The dates are impor-
tant: they clearly show that Lem’s Dialogues, which were first published in 1957 
and were largely based on works by Wiener and Ashby, which Lem read in orig-
inal English, were bound to fall on deaf ears.33 It could hardly have been other-
wise in a country where a year earlier the word “cybernetics” would have been 
used in the context defined by Krótki słownik filozoficzny [“A short dictionary 
of philosophy”]34 – if at all. In Lem’s essay Niebezpieczne związki [“Dangerous 
liaisons”] (1962), devoted to vain attempts to apply Shannon’s theory of informa-
tion in the humanities, there is a following remark: “Eleven years ago I sat in the 
Czytelnik café in front of a learned gathering who were to decide about the pub-
lishing of The Magellan Nebula. This harmless book aimed for teenagers, was ac-
cused of smuggling, among other things, cybernetics, which I have not managed 
to successfully camouflage with a pompous term ‘mechaneuristics’.”35 Moreover, 
as usual, Lem never provided any of the most basic explanations, instead drop-
ping the reader right into the middle of his own observations, which constituted 
a very unorthodox approach to cybernetics. I shall try to prove how unorthodox 
it was later, for now suffice it to say that it could not have made understanding 
Dialogues any easier for the readers of their first edition (or the following ones).
 32 William Ross Ashby, Wstęp do cybernetyki, trans. by B. Osuchowska and A. Gosiewski 
(Warszawa:  PWN, 1961); 2nd edition 1963 [original edition:  An Introduction to 
Cybernetics (London: Chapman & Hall, 1958)]. It is an extensive, formal description 
of the functioning of a general model of a machine as a complex system (automaton), 
with a transition to biological systems in part three; it includes numerous references 
to Shannon’s mathematical theory of information.
 33 “I have probably written this book too early, so all these issues seemed outworldly and 
did not resonate as a whole, it went to waste completely” (Tako rzecze … Lem, 84).
 34 It is telling to read Dialogi o cybernetyce [“Dialogues on cybernetics”] by Stanisław 
Bogusławski, Henryk Greniewski and Jerzy Szapiro from that perspective. The text 
was published in a quarterly Myśl filozoficzna [no. 4 (1954), 158–212]. In the introduc-
tion the authors write: “Dialogues are between a supporter of cybernetics – Z., and its 
critic – K. They are both conceived as members of the contemporary academic circles 
of the Polish People’s Republic. The critic wants to subject cybernetics to a judgment 
from a Marxist point of view, whereas the supporter is a person of good will who wants 
to follow the progress of science, but he does not always choose the right path.” The 
last sentence from Z. is: “After all, you are inviting an ex-follower of cybernetics [to 
join you in a thorough research – PM].” There are six dialogues. Lem probably read 
them and they might have influenced the form of his own Dialogues to some extent, 
but certainly not their content.
 35 Trans. by Olga Kaczmarek from the Polish edition: Stanisław Lem, Mój pogląd na 
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Lem should then be located outside the entire Polish cybernetics  – and it 
needs to be emphasized right away here. It is telling that one would search in 
vain for references to texts by Polish cyberneticists in his works, or even for their 
names. From the Annexes to Dialogues, it is clear that Lem saw the fall of cyber-
netics a few years before others saw its greatness.
Let us not get ahead of ourselves though. In 1962 the Polish Society of 
Cybernetics (PTC) was set up; its first chairman was Oskar Lange. The same year, 
he published a treaty titled Calość i rozwój w świetle cybernetyki [“Totality and 
development in light of cybernetics”], which includes an attempt at a cybernetic 
interpretation of Marxist laws of social development.36 Summing up his very 
mathematical arguments, Lange suggests that cybernetics allows for discarding 
earlier philosophical interpretations of development processes:
All these qualities, characteristic of biological processes, occur in a variety of phys-
ical and chemical processes, as well as sociological and economic ones. They occur in 
automata built by humans too. The intellectual apparatus provided by cybernetics allows 
us to explain them without recourse to the notion of an immaterial being, which would 
regulate the dynamics of nature and social development: to any “life force,” “entelechy,” 
“elan vital,” “soul”, “spirit of the time” or “spirit of a nation,” Adam Smith’s “invisible 
hand,” etc. At the same time this explanation does not negate the empirical fact that 
systems have a way of operating which cannot be derived from the ways of operating 
characteristic of its constitutive elements; they have their own law of development, and, 
finally, under certain conditions the development of any system is an ergodic process,37 
in which developmental disorders disappear with time, and the period of a process’s 
ergodicity may be limited, the pace of disorders retraction and their scale which does 
not affect the system, can change over time, etc.38
This passage follows the same line as other attempts at determining the philo-
sophical context of cybernetics (to which I will return later), and it is certainly 
the most intellectually thorough among Polish authors (Lem excluded).
After Lange’s death (1965), Henryk Greniewski took over as a chairman of 
PTC – the most famous popularizer of cybernetics at the time. PTC initiated 
 36 It was included in the last volume of Lange’s collected works: Oskar Lange, Dzieła, vol. 
7, Cybernetics (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1977), 375; part 
one: Cybernetyka a filozofia [“Cybernetics and philosophy”] and part two: Cybernetyka 
i ekonomia [“Cybernetics and economy”].
 37 Ergodic process – a process during which information about the system’s initial state 
disappears; ergodic theory, one of the fields of statistical mechanics, studies ergodic 
processes.








a publishing series at PWN titled Information and Control. A  Series Devoted 
to Cybernetics. Wiener’s first Cybernetics was published in the series in 1971. 
A year earlier it published a book by Józef Konieczny titled Cybernetyka walki 
[“Cybernetics of combat”]. The conclusions of chapter two (Łańcuch niszczenia 
[“Chain of destruction”]) are as follows:
Summing up all that has been said so far about the chain, system and destruction, one 
can provide a few precise conclusions that will be pertinent for a military cyberneticist.
 (1) Targeted destruction is a peculiar kind of action, which can only take place as part 
of a chain of destruction.
 (2) A destroyer consisting of a shooter, crew, weapon and missiles is a crucial compo-
nent of any chain of destruction.
 (3) A theory of destruction based on at least four axioms: self-destruction, common 
sense, shield and sword, as well as universal destructibility seems close to reality …
 (6) Any object belonging to the chain of destruction can be in any state among three 
categories: vitality, readiness or activity …
 (8) Connections between elements are an important immaterial element of any chain; 
connections human-human and human-machine have a primary role.
 (9) History of any chain of destruction can be divided into three separate phases: com-
position, implementation and use …
 (11) Chains and their surroundings form systems of destruction, among which we can 
distinguish specifically destroying and destroyed systems … (78–79)
The author defined each notion in the fragment quoted above (such as “destroyer,” 
“weapon,” “shooter”) precisely, using algebraic formulae. However, the explana-
tory power of these definitions is no bigger than that of the “conclusions” I have 
quoted here. The fact that works of Wiener and Józef Konieczny fill the same 
shelf is a clear symptom of the backwardness of Polish cybernetics.
In 1973 Mały słownik cybernetyczny [“A small dictionary of cybernetics”] was 
published, resembling similar publications in the USSR and East Germany.39 It 
brought together the knowledge about complex systems and controlling them 
available at the time. It included information about computers available at that 
point, about neurophysiological processes (to the extent to which they had been 
researched by then) numerous entries on the theory of probability and game 
theory, as well as a mention that Norbert Wiener had family roots in Poland.40
In 1978 PTC started publishing a quarterly Postępy Cybernetyki [“Developments 
in Cybernetics”], which would come out up until 1993. The Institute for Research 
 39 Mały słownik cybernetyczny, ed. by M. Kempisty (Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 
1973), 533.
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on Systems at the Polish Academy of Sciences still publishes a quarterly Control 
and Cybernetics. Both periodicals mostly consist of detailed expert treaties on 
various aspects of control in technical systems.
Oskar Lange and Henryk Greniewski treated cybernetics the way scientists 
usually treat their fields: as a tool to describe reality, but not as a key to the ulti-
mate truth and theory of everything. Unfortunately, other Polish cyberneticists 
failed to follow this path.
The most famous among them at some point was Marian Mazur (1909–1983). 
He was an engineer by training, and a professor at the Warsaw University of 
Technology, who created a system of cybernetic psychology, laid out in his 
big oeuvre, Cybernetyka i charakter [“Cybernetics and character”].41 The book 
reiterates words like “homeostat,” “feedback,” “information” and system as a 
mundane mantra; it is replete with mathematical formulae and diagrams that are 
supposed to depict the functioning of human psyche, and it is permeated with 
the author’s devotion to scientific precision. The first chapter includes – a very 
accurate – list of sixteen differences between a scientist and a doctrinarian. The 
problem is, though, that his own theory and the way he lays it out makes it seem 
like a doctrine much more than a science in light of his own argument, which 
makes it ironic. Most of the book is taken up by enunciations about the advantages 
of cybernetics over other sciences and a discussion of the functioning of human 
psyche in cybernetic terms. The latter, however, has nothing to do with Wiener 
and his colleagues’ research on nervous system, as Mazur is not interested in the 
physiological aspects of psychology. His arguments are merely a transposition 
of one terminology to another: classic (not to say common sense) psychological 
notions (such as character, temperament, emotions and impulses) are translated 
into cybernetic concepts. The entire operation remains unrelated to any empirical 
data, but it relies heavily on “life truths” that are scattered among innumerable 
prepositions, formulae and graphs. The crowning moment of Mazur’s argument 
is the concept of five “dynamic types of character” (exodynamic, exostatic, static, 
endostatic and endodynamic), which, combined, can produce hundreds of 
configurations. Mazur is convinced it constitutes an absolute sum of knowledge 
about human character, grounded in unshakeable foundations of cybernetics 
and mathematics. Each type is illustrated with examples from literature and 
 41 1st edition (Warsaw:  PIW, 1976); amended 2nd edition came out with a sub-
title Psychologia XXI wieku [“Psychology of the 21st century”] (Podkowa 
Leśna: Wydawnictwo Aula, 1996); 3rd edition (Warszawa: Wyższa Szkoła Zarządzania 




history: Horace, Caligula, Proust and Carmen represent the exodynamic char-
acter; Petronius from Henryk Sienkiewicz’s Quo Vadis serves as an example of 
an exostatic character, while Caesar and Cromwell – endodynamic and so forth.
Mazur’s work is one of the countless attempts to overcome humanities’ peren-
nial weaknesses: blurriness of notions. It is an attempt, which sees cybernetics 
as a remedy to this ailment – a science combining physics and biology, which in 
Mazur’s view consequently included mathematics and psychology. The attempt 
ended the same way as all other endeavors of the kind: confirming an old truth 
that in the humanities precision in terminology is paid for with their meaning. 
The book’s reviews published by scholars in the humanities basically all boiled 
down to this one point.42 Nevertheless it became quite popular with technicians 
and engineers, and the author spent the last few years surrounded by a circle of 
loyal followers (the so-called “Mazurians”). Traces of Mazur’s influence can be 
seen in writings of an eminent Polish scholar of religions, Andrzej Wierciński.
Lange applied cybernetics to economy, Mazur  – to psychology, and Józef 
Kossecki undertook an ambitious attempt to apply it in social sciences. Kossecki 
saw himself as Mazur’s disciple and had a passion for quoting him exten-
sively. He accepted Mazur’s theory of psychological types. His most impor-
tant achievements include two books:  Cybernetyka kultury [“Cybernetics of 
culture”]43 and Cybernetyka społeczna [“Social cybernetics”].44 The first one 
discusses history and culture  – globally  – in terms of cybernetics. Here, too, 
those terms have no connection to their homonyms known from the works of 
Wiener, Ashby and their forerunners. When analyzing history, Kossecki relies on 
syntheses and popular works about foreign cultures written by other specialists. 
The result is a “third-degree essay” of sorts – a text based on texts that are already 
a rewriting of other texts, but which are treated as source material. The distance 
from any actual sources, historical, cultural or even cybernetic is monstrous. 
I will quote a passage about the history and culture of Poland. It is representative 
of the whole work.
Analogous processes are observed in the history of the Polish nation. During feudalism 
we had strong nobility, which served as a homeostat. However, as capitalism developed 
the nobility was growing weaker, becoming less and less capable of serving as a nation’s 
homeostat, while the Polish bourgeoisie was not strong enough. It is no surprise that 
this is the period when the country was partitioned – the absence of a strong social class 
 42 Cf. Małgorzata Szpakowska, “Z życia żółwi,” Twórczość, no. 4 (1977), 119–122.
 43 Józef Kossecki, Cybernetyka kultury (Warszawa: PIW, 1974).
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serving as the nation’s homeostat at that time increased the likelihood of the fall of the 
entire state – although, of course, this was not the sole reason of the fall. (81)
In the later work, Cybernetyka społeczna, Kossecki’s ambitions have grown and 
the contents of the previous book are elaborated upon extensively. The author 
produced detailed analyses of economic and historical processes, focusing on 
modern Europe and introducing his periodization (whereas earlier he would 
only roughly separate epochs). For example,  chapter  13 is titled “Cybernetic 
Analysis of International Politics,” and its section 13.3 is “Cybernetic analysis 
of international politics between the Congress of Vienna and the First World 
War.” For each of the periods, the author calculates the percentage of “control 
factors” for each country in the global political scene. A  yet newer work by 
Józef Kossecki featuring cybernetics (but also discussing the role of secret or-
ganizations in history and politics) has an extremely long title, which is nev-
ertheless worth quoting in full:  Elementy nowoczesnej wiedzy o sterowaniu 
ludźmi. Socjotechnika, socjocybernetyka, psychocybernetyka. Skrypt dla oficerów 
policji [“Elements of modern science of human control. Social engineering, 
sociocybernetics and psychocybernetics. A  manual for police officers”]. 
He recommends Marian Mazur’s theory as a modern useful tool for police 
investigators.
One could expect that Józef Kossecki is the last link in the intellectual chain 
of Polish social cybernetics. That is not the case however. In 1986 the “Książka i 
Wiedza” publishing house released a book by Olgierd Cetwiński, titled Między 
buntem a pokorą [“Between revolt and submissiveness”]. In the introduction the 
author declares himself indebted to Mazur and Kossecki’s achievements. It is a 
study of cybernetic psychology and political sciences, in which the terminology 
of cybernetics (or rather, by then, merely cybernetic imagery) has become even 
blurrier than in the writings of Cetwiński’s idols. The last chapter (“Quo vadis, 
Polonia?”) contains a cybernetic account of Polish history between 1795 and 
1981. Here is an excerpt:
… the Polish Enlightenment is a period when a dynamic template of correlational 
homeostasis developed. The process was powerful: even though the Polish society had 
been incorporated into other typically homeostatic systems (the dynamic Prussian one, 
and the more stagnant Russian and Austrian ones), it managed to retain its own type 
of homeostasis, and even grew its own homeostat and its own battery to some extent. 
The invaders realized that. Hence their later efforts – coming after the failed uprisings – 
aimed at disempowering the Polish correlator … The nation’s survival through the 
partitions was largely – if not solely – made possible by the fact that it retained a corre-
lational system of homeostasis. It will not be an exaggeration to compare it to the type 
known from Athens. (298–299)
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The above gives an idea about the Polish works on social cybernetics. It is 
worth adding that in 1988 Piotr Sienkiewicz  – the editor-in-chief of Postępy 
Cybernetyki  – published a book Poszukiwanie Golema. O cybernetyce i 
cybernetykach [“Searching for Golem. On cybernetics and cyberneticists”].45 It 
is an intelligent and thorough overview of the history and themes of the field. 
The author writes: “If I were to point to one of the living authors as ‘the father’ 
of social cybernetics, I would point to Stanisław Lem with no hesitation” (118). 
I fear, however, that Lem would not approve of the idea that he might have been 
the spiritual father to Marian Mazur and Józef Kossecki – nor would they likely 
be satisfied with the concept.
This overview of Polish social cybernetics should not be treated as a full pic-
ture of the discipline as a whole, not in Poland, and certainly not in the world 
in general. It would be an extremely distorted image. Technical cybernetics and 
bionics developed quite differently; they never lacked precision, quite the oppo-
site: precision and narrow subject matters locate them at the other end of the 
spectrum than the lucubrations I have quoted. It proves the diversity within the 
field of cybernetics, which I have pointed out before. Where did it come from?
The answer requires that I produce an interpretation of the phenomenon of 
cybernetics in the science and culture of the 20th century. I will make such an 
attempt – preliminary, of course – and it will be the final part of my introduction 
to an analysis of Lem’s Dialogues.




3  Philosophical Implications of Cybernetics
The philosophical positioning of cybernetics was never clearly delineated. 
While explaining the place of his new field within the intellectual history, 
Wiener mentioned Leibniz, as well as Augustine and the Manicheans,46 but 
he was never particularly interested in the consequences of the emergence of 
cybernetics for contemporary philosophy. Cybernetics strongly, albeit mis-
leadingly, resembles the 18th-century mechanicism. It is misleading because 
Descartes and La Mettrie sought to apply mechanistic interpretation to a phys-
ical and mental whole that is a human, which means they saw consciousness as 
correlative to mechanistic processes as well.47 The cyberneticists – and I mean 
the early ones – never shared that view.48 They would not touch on the problem 
of consciousness at all.49 Human body was interesting to them on the level of 
 46 Human Use of Human Beings…, 11, 34–35. It includes a juxtaposition of two basic 
perspectives: Augustinian and Manichean. Modern science exemplifies the Augustinian 
view, as it assumes intelligibility of nature, its “goodness” (the “bad,” Manichean nature 
would interfere with the cognitive process, through arbitrary changes in the laws of 
physics for example).
 47 About Descartes, cf. Cybernetics: or Control…,  chapter 1: “Newtonian and Bergsonian 
Time,” 40–41.
 48 Of course, many of the proponents of cyberneticists were – likely unconsciously – 
mechanicists. Karl Steinbuch, for example, the author of Automat und Mensch 
(Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1961; 4th edition 1971), declares in the very first chapter, 
titled “Cybernetic Anthropology” (!): “The main thesis of this book is as follows: What 
can be observed in intellectual functions, are introducing, processing, storing and ex-
porting information. In no case is it proven or even likely that explicating intellectual 
functions requires accepting assumptions that go beyond physics.”
 49 Here is a sample of Wiener’s style of dealing with what is today phrased as the mind–
body problem: “We have already spoken of the computing machine, and consequently 
the brain, as a logical machine. It is by no means trivial to consider the light cast 
on logic by such machine, both natural and artificial. Here the chief work is that of 
Turing. We have said before that the machina ratiocinatrix is nothing but the calculus 
ratiocinator of Leibniz with an engine in it; and just as modern mathematical logic 
begins with this calculus, so it is inevitable that its present engineering development 
should cast a new light on logic. The science of today is operational; that is, it considers 
every statement as essentially concerned with possible experiments or observable 
processes. According to this, the study of logic must become a study of the logical 
machine, whether nervous or mechanical, with all its nonremovable limitations and 
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neurophysiological processes, of nervous impulses – they were not interested 
in consciousness and subjecthood. They were careful to avoid metaphysical 
speculation, aiming for the discipline to exhibit scientific precision. In his work 
The Computer and the Brain (1958), which was mentioned here earlier, von 
Neumann gave a description of logical operations in a computer and nervous 
impulses (in accordance with contemporary level of technology and knowledge) 
and wrote: “the most immediate observation regarding the nervous system is 
that its functioning is prima facie digital” (40, 44). Later, however, it turns out 
that the analogy is merely superficial (so, literally, prima facie), as in fact “the 
language of the brain is not the language of mathematics” (81). There is no decla-
ration of the kind that “human is a machine.” von Neumann cannot be counted 
among cyberneticists, but Wiener, too, writes at the beginning of  chapter 7 of 
Cybernetics: or Control… titled “Cybernetics and Psychopathology”: “I there-
fore wish to disclaim in advance any assertion that any particular entity in psy-
chopathology … is due to a specific type of defect in the organization of the 
brain as a computing machine. Those who may draw such specific conclusions 
from the consideration of this book do so at their own risk” (144). And else-
where in the same book ( chapter  5:  “Computing machines and the nervous 
system”) he observes: “The mechanical brain does not secrete thought ‘as the 
liver does bile,’ as the earlier materialists claimed, nor does it put it out in the 
form of energy, as the muscle puts out its activity. Information is information, 
not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at 
the present day” (132).
Cyberneticists were not particularly interested in the ethical implications of 
their research either. Another quote from Wiener is probably the strongest state-
ment on the subject:
Those of us who have contributed to the new science of cybernetics thus stand in a 
moral position which is, to say the least, not very comfortable. We have contributed to 
the initiation of a new science which, as I have said, embraces technical developments 
with great possibilities for good and for evil. We can only hand it over into the world that 
exists about us, and this is the world of Belsen and Hiroshima. We do not even have the 
and that the two sciences are observably and demonstrably different. This is true in 
the sense that many psychological states and sequences of thought do not conform to 
the canons of logic. Psychology contains much that is foreign to logic, but – and this 
is the important fact – any logic that means anything to us can contain nothing which 
the human mind – and hence the human nervous system – is unable to encompass 
(Cybernetics: or Control…, 124–125).
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choice of suppressing these new technical developments. They belong to the age, and the 
most any of us can do by suppression is to put the development of the subject into the 
hands of the most irresponsible and most venal of our engineers. The best we can do is 
to see that a large public understands the trend and the bearing of the present work, and 
to confine our personal efforts to those fields, such as physiology and psychology, most 
remote from war and exploitation. … I write in 1947, and I am compelled to say that it 
is a very slight hope. (28–29)
Wiener’s persona of a public intellectual kept struggling with his soul of an aca-
demic. The former would draw powerful visions of social change brought about 
by cybernetics, while the latter – as we have seen – rejected the possibility of inves-
tigating society with the use of cybernetics, even though he never concealed his 
interest in social sciences:
As to sociology and anthropology, it is manifest that the importance of information and 
communication as mechanisms of organization proceeds beyond the individual into the 
community. On the one hand, it is completely impossible to understand social commu-
nities such as those of ants without a thorough investigation of their means of communi-
cation, and we were fortunate enough to have the aid of Dr. Schneirla in this matter. For 
the similar problems of human organization, we sought help from the anthropologists 
Drs. Bateson and Margaret Mead; while Dr. Morgenstern of the Institute for Advanced 
Study was our adviser in the significant field of social organization belonging to eco-
nomic theory. His very important joint book on games with Dr. von Neumann, by the 
way, represents a most interesting study of social organization from the point of view 
of methods closely related to, although distinct from, the subject matter of cybernetics. 
(Cybernetics: or Control…, 18–19)
Yet, elsewhere in the same book he states:
It may be that there is a mass sociology of the human animalcule, observed like the 
populations of Drosophila in a bottle, but this is not a sociology in which we, who are human 
animalcules ourselves, are particularly interested. We are not much concerned about 
human rises and falls, pleasures and agonies, sub specie aeternitatis. Your anthropologist 
reports the customs associated with the life, education, career, and death of people whose 
life scale is much the same as his own. Your economist is most interested in predicting such 
business cycles as run in their course in less than a generation or, at least, has repercussions 
which affect a man differentially at different stages of his career. Few philosophers of politics 
nowadays care to confine their investigations to the world of Ideas of Plato. (Cybernetics: or 
Control…, 163–164)
Social cybernetics emerged, grew and captivated many. To what effect I  have 
shown on the Polish example. Why was it so? Why cybernetics had such a huge 
impact, incomparable to the impact of any of the natural sciences? Of course, 
thermodynamics, for example, developed rapidly in the 19th century and 
inspired a philosophical metaphor of the world as a heat engine that became 
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quite popular in the humanities in the late 19th and early 20th century.50 But nei-
ther in this nor any other case can we observe such an overwhelming adoption 
on an entire vocabulary of a discipline. There has never been any social thermo-
dynamics, which would inspire someone to calculate loops of hysteresis for the 
French Revolution.
Cybernetics offered something more though than any other discipline – or so 
it seemed at the time; it combined two fields of basic research: physics and biology. 
It focused on human body, human nervous system on a par with machines and 
their circuits and control systems. All these objects of study are categorized with 
the same terminology, but without vulgar mechanicism. Cybernetics was then a 
way to go beyond the nature–culture dichotomy, beyond the question about a 
qualitative difference between humans with their symbolic world and the rest of 
the natural world. Or at least it very much seemed like such a third way is pos-
sible, a way between arts and science, which were just then definitively parting 
ways, a phenomenon powerfully described in C. P. Snow’s essay Two Cultures.51 
Certainly, there was something extremely appealing in the idea that a human, 
an animal and a machine are equal as systems primarily determined by the cir-
culation of information in their control centers. The impression was that both 
scientists and humanities scholars received a universal shared model for all the 
phenomena they were dealing with. There was no reductionism involved  – a 
human was not seen as a mere type of a machine, but as an entity equivalent to it, 
differing in structure and possibly some aspects of functioning.
Things could have seemed that way for those who first encountered cyber-
netics soon after it was created, in the 1950s, reading Wiener and Ashby – this is 
what the first wave of enthusiasm for the field looked like. This is also how later 
people such as Mazur and Kossecki saw cybernetics. However, a close reading 
of cybernetics’ foundational texts reveals that this universality was in fact an 
 50 Cf. J. David Bolter, Turing’s Man: Western Culture in the Computer Age (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 31–32. Bolter’s remarks on philosophical 
and scientific metaphors prevalent in particular periods in the history of Europe 
(clock, steam engine, heat engine and computer) repeat and elaborate on Wiener’s 
observations from Cybernetics: or Control… (cf.  chapter 1: “Newtonian and Bergsonian 
Time,” 38–39). The whole period of positivism of the 19th century is an arena of mutual 
interactions between science and philosophy too.
 51 The essay constituted the text of a lecture given by Sir Charles Percy Snow (1905–1980), 
a physicist and novelist, in 1959. It started a long and turbulent discussion about the 
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illusion. Cybernetics did not combine physics and biology in full; it only com-
bined some narrow areas of these fields. It did not explain either humans or any 
other complex systems completely in their actions and functions – it was in fact 
only interested in some of their very abstract characteristics. Henryk Greniewski 
described it as follows:
Speaking in a bit of a joke (and one should not underestimate the didactic value of 
jokes): cybernetics does investigate animals, humans and telegraphs, but only in the way 
in which elementary geometry investigates both tree cutting, stone splitting and cutting 
metals. The same thought can be phrased “seriously” (for sticklers among the readers, 
of course): cybernetics investigates what is common in the process of communication 
for human nervous system and a telegraphic line in a highly abstract manner; simi-
larly elementary geometry (or, more precisely, solid geometry) does deal with analyzing 
solid figures into its components, “forgetting” that they are approximate idealizations 
of actual solids, and remaining quite “uninterested” in whether the solid is actually a 
piece of wood, a stone or a metal. The applicability of cybernetic tools to all kinds of 
matter is neither new nor unique in science. The same quality applies to the arithmetical 
terminology for example, or the aforementioned geometry and probability theory. You 
can count stones, just as well as animals, humans or social bodies. Probability theory is 
equally applicable to decay of atoms in a radioactive body, and to the death rate of an-
imals and people, and to draws and lotteries. (Elementy…,  chapter 3.3: “Comparative 
Remarks on Terminology,” 57)
It is a great shame that the Polish social cyberneticists never took these words 
to their hearts. Their colleagues from other countries similarly ignored Wiener’s 
remarks about the risk related to applying cybernetic notions together with the 
methodology of the sciences in general to the object of social sciences. Here is 
one more of those remarks:
I mention this matter because of the considerable, and I think false, hopes which some 
of my friends have built for the social efficacy of whatever new ways of thinking this 
book may contain. They are certain that our control over our material environment has 
far outgrown our control over our social environment and our understanding thereof. 
Therefore, they consider that the main task of the immediate future is to extend to the 
fields of anthropology, of sociology, of economics, the methods of the natural sciences, 
in the hope of achieving a like measure of success in the social fields. From believing this 
necessary, they come to believe it possible. In this, I maintain, they show an excessive 
optimism and a misunderstanding of the nature of all scientific achievement.
All the great successes in precise science have been made in fields where there is a cer-
tain high degree of isolation of the phenomenon from the observer. …
It is in the social sciences that the coupling between the observed phenomenon and the 
observer is the hardest to minimize. On the one hand, the observer is able to exert a con-
siderable influence on the phenomena that come to his attention. With all respect to the 
intelligence, skill, and honesty of purpose of my anthropologist friends, I cannot think 
Philosophical Implications of Cybernetics36
that any community which they have investigated will ever be quite the same after-
ward. … There is much in the social habits of a people which is dispersed and distorted 
by the mere act of making inquiries about it. In another sense from that in which it is 
usually stated, traduttore traditore. (Cybernetics: or Control…,  chapter 8: “Information, 
Language, and Society,” 162–163)
Claude Shannon said in an interview: “Somehow people think it [mathematical 
theory of information] can tell you things about meaning, but it can’t and wasn’t 
intended to.”52
There was no shortage of skeptical voices either, doubting cybernetics as a 
whole. For example John R. Pierce wrote in 1961 with a shade of subtle irony:
Some words have a heady quality; they conjure up strong feelings of awe, mystery, or 
romance. … I don’t believe that cybernetics is quite such a word, but it does have an elu-
sive quality as well as a romantic aura. …
The trouble is that each of the many fields that Wiener drew intro cybernetics has a 
considerable scope in itself. It would take many thousands of words to explain the his-
tory, content, and prospects of any one of them. Lumped together, they constitute not 
so much an exciting country as a diverse universe of overwhelming magnitude and 
importance.
Thus, few men of science regard themselves as cyberneticists. Should you set out to ask, 
one after another, each person listed in American Men of Science what his field is, I think 
that few would reply cybernetics. If you persisted and asked, “Do you work in the field 
of cybernetics?” a man concerned with communication, or with complicated automatic 
machines such as computers, or with some parts of experimental psychology or neuro-
physiology would look at you and speculate on your background and intentions. If he 
decided that you were a sincere and innocent outsider, who would in any event never get 
more than a vague idea of his work, he might well reply, “yes.”
So far, in this country the word cybernetics has been used most extensively in the press 
and in popular and semi-literary, if not semiliterate, magazines. I cannot compete with 
these in discussing the grander aspects of cybernetics. Perhaps Wiener has done that best 
himself in I Am a Mathematician. Even the more narrowly technical content of the fields 
ordinarily associated with the word cybernetics is so extensive that I certainly would 
never try to explain it all in one book, even a much larger book than this. … cybernetics 
includes most of the essence of modern technology, excluding the brute production and 
use of power. It includes our knowledge of the organization and function of man as well. 
Cybernetics almost becomes another word for all of the most intriguing problems of the 
world. … Thus, even if a man acknowledged being a cyberneticist, that wouldn’t give us 
much of a clue concerning his field of competence, unless he was a universal genius. … 
 52 The interview was made in November 1989 by John Horgan, quoted in: Idem, The 
End of Science. Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of the Scientific Age 
(New York: Basic Books, 2015), 213.
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Happily, as I have noted, few scientists would acknowledge themselves as cyberneticists, 
save perhaps in talking to those whom they regard as hopelessly uninformed. Thus, if 
cybernetics is overextensive or vague, the overextension or vagueness will do no real 
harm. Indeed, cybernetics is a very useful word, for it can help to add a little glamor to 
a person, to a subject, or even to a book. I certainly hope that its presence here will add 
a little glamor to this one.53
Pierce mildly suggests that cybernetics is really an all-encompassing word, that 
can mean nearly anything, and it certainly is a scientific utopia. Was not the same 
written 15 years later about structuralism, and then, 30 years later – about post-
modernism, the subsequent potential “universal perspectives”?
On the other hand, David Jay Bolter in his Turing’s Man…  – which is a 
remarkable attempt to root the computer technology within the Western culture 
as a whole – writes about cybernetics:
Wiener’s work with servomechanisms to aim antiaircraft guns and to do much else 
besides had convinced him that forms of life could be understood not as Cartesian 
clockwork, which was too crude and rigid, but rather as electromechanical or even 
electronic devices. … he stressed direct contact with the world – experiments with the 
muscles of the cat, improved prostheses for amputees, sensing equipment, and so on. 
Current workers in artificial intelligence show less interest in such direct contact with 
the world and more interest in abstract thought. Wiener was still only halfway along 
the line from Descartes to Turing. He wanted machines to imitate the man who acts 
in the world as well as the man who reasons, to explain muscle action in terms of feed-
back loops as well as chess in terms of digital program. He relied on hardware devices 
for his metaphor of man and demanded a close correspondence between man and the 
machine made to imitate him. Vacuum tubes were meant to be a physical substitute 
for neurons, servomechanisms for nerves acting upon muscles. This line of thinking 
was forthright and compelling, and led do attempts to build a brain (in theory, seldom 
in practice) using simple electronic components. Those following Wiener’s approach 
spoke of creating artificial brain cells and neutral networks and allowing the machine to 
learn as a baby was presumed to do – presuming with Locke that the baby’s mind was a 
tabula rasa at birth. But the theory of neural networks, which was developed mathemat-
ically, met with little or no practical success. In general, Wiener’s preferences gave way 
to others in the 1950’s, as computer hardware and especially programming languages 
became more sophisticated. Unfortunately, the elegant name of cybernetics … smacking 
perhaps of the antiquated technology of the war years, also gave way to “artificial intel-
ligence.” (192–193)
 53 John R. Pierce, An Introduction to Information Theory. Symbols, Signals & Noise 
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1980), 208–210, 227–228. The book is in fact an 
extensive layman’s manual introducing Shannon’s theory and its derivates.
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Bolter is locating Wiener in the development plan of information and computer 
technology, which is not entirely true about the history of cybernetics, and this 
bias is particularly clear in the statement that artificial intelligence is simply 
a different name for cybernetics (Bolter apparently does not know that many 
institutions still use the name). It is equally unacceptable to say about the first 
Cybernetics, as Bolter does in his annotated bibliography to Turing’s Man, that 
it contains a “notion of identity of man and machine” – it’s clearly simplifying 
things too much. What is important for us here is that Bolter, too, sees cyber-
netics as a sort of scientific utopia.
Summing up what has been said and quoted here before, I could say that cyber-
netics is an example of a process where the intentions of the creators have little 
to do with those of their successors. The former have great ambitions hoping the 
latter would put them to life. The latter put them to life the way they see fit and 
the way that is possible given the available materials. The scenario repeats itself 
continuously throughout the history of science and culture, producing results 
of varying quality. In the case of Norbert Wiener the very creator was torn by 
mutually contradictory tendencies: scientific precision and the visionary scale.
It is quite possible that cybernetics was one of the great myths of the 20th cen-
tury science. Its extraordinarily broad perspectives drew hordes of enthusiasts, 
believers and maniacs, who eventually dragged the discipline far from its origins, 
close to conspiracy theories and would-be-universalisms, and all the areas of 
human intellectual activity where doctrinaire shibboleths prevail over genuine 
curiosity, and the Ultimate Certainty produces deep thinking but neutralizes 
brains.
4  Introduction to Dialogues
Lem’s Dialogues, just as many other of his works, underwent significant 
transformations. The first edition54 included eight dialogues, between Hylas 
and Philonus, written between 1954 and 1956. The second edition55 was 
supplemented with two annexes, each consisting of two separate texts. The first 
annex (“Dialogues” after 16 years) is strictly about cybernetics, the second one 
contains two sizeable treaties, originally published in Studia Filozoficzne.56 Their 
content, although going beyond cybernetics, should be discussed separately in 
this chapter, as it connects cybernetics with other fields Lem is interested in.
The full title of the first edition is Dialogi o zmartwychwstaniu atomowym, 
teorii niemożności, filozoficznych korzyściach ludożerstwa, smutku w probówce, 
psychoanalizie cybernetycznej, elektrycznej metempsychozie, sprzężeniach 
zwrotnych ewolucji, eschatologii cybernetycznej, osobowości sieci elektrycznych, 
przewrotności elektromózgów, życiu wiecznym w skrzyni, konstruowaniu 
geniuszów, epilepsji kapitalizmu, maszynach do rządzenia, projektowaniu 
systemów społecznych [“Dialogues on atomic resurrection, theory of impos-
sibility, philosophical advantages to cannibalism, test-tubes sadness, cyber-
netic psychoanalysis, electric metempsychosis, evolution’s feedback, cybernetic 
eschatology, personalities of electrical networks, deceitful electronic brains, 
eternal life in a chest, constructing geniuses, capitalism’s epilepsy, management 
machines, designing social systems”]. The readers could easily feel overwhelmed 
just opening the book. The fact that it was not understood is best testified to by 
the number of reviews that came out: a note in Nowa Kultura57 (describing it as 
a “read for the select audience”) a summary in Nowe Książki58 and a review by 
 54 Kraków: WL, 1957.
 55 Kraków: WL, 1972; reprinted in 1984.
 56 “Etyka technologii i technologia etyki,” Studia Filozoficzne, no. 3 (1967), 107–142; 
“Biologia i wartości,” Studia Filozoficzne, no. 3–4 (1968), 35–78.
 57 Nowa Kultura, no. 29 (1957), 25.
 58 Danuta Kępczyńska, Nowe Książki, no. 17 (1957), 1054–1055. The author traces the 
sources of Dialogues back to the ancient forms of the genre. The obvious statement will 
be equally clear to other critics, but it does not seem like any major conclusions could 
be drawn from it. And “invoking Philonous and Hylas is obviously a joke, which is 
best in the first dialogue, made so archaic, so it ‘exudes’ the smell of agora and ancient 
Greece” (Tako rzecze… Lem, 84). Of course, the long title itself is styled in an archaic 














Wacław Sadkowski in Trybuna Ludu,59 including statements such as “Philonous’s 
long rants become boring and pointless”; and the conclusion “[Dialogues are] 
completely devoid of excitement, creative anxiety and – so to speak – the pathos 
of seeking the truth.” It is hard to imagine a more inaccurate judgment about this 
or any other of Lem’s works. And that is about it when it comes to the response 
the first edition of Dialogues received in the Polish press, although it needs to 
be said that journalists at the time were very accustomed to saying things in an 
indirect manner (which is what Sadkowski might have been doing there), and 
cybernetics (especially as it was presented in Dialogues) was not a subject that 
could be praised openly. To be precise I should add that the second edition was 
met with complete silence, while the only (but thorough) review of the third one 
was written by Marek Oramus.60 As to the Annexes, their reception boils down 
to texts such as a few sentences’ long mention in a press review in Twórczość61 
where the author (Andrzej Kijowski) states: “No dictionary of foreign words will 
be enough to translate Lem’s scientific and philosophical code into a layman’s 
parlance.” Until now Dialogues have also been very carefully omitted from Polish 
monographs on Lem’s works.62
The causes of the situation are rather clear. The subject of Dialogues was 
foreign to most Polish readers, and the author  – as I  have mentioned ear-
lier  – did not include any basic explanations in the book, employing (con-
sciously or unwillingly?) a method that Oramus later described as “natural 
selection of readers.”63 Dialogues surprised the readers of Lem the novelist, 
 59 Trybuna Ludu, no. 223 (1957), 6. Lem wrote about this review: “I cannot quite under-
stand, because it is as if someone said: this omelette does not fulfill the criteria for 
a beefsteak. It does not, because it was not meant to be literature” (Tako rzecze… 
Lem, 84).
 60 “Entuzjasta w sieci sprzężeń,” Przegląd Techniczny, no. 26 (1985), 44.
 61 Dedal (i.e., Andrzej Kijowski), Twórczość, no. 2 (1969), 142.
 62 Passages from Małgorzata Szpakowska’s Dyskusje ze Stanisławem Lemem [“Discussions 
with Stanisław Lem”] (amended 2nd edition, Warszawa: OPEN 1997, 93–99, 155–168, 
which include a detailed analysis of Dialogue 7) and Jerzy Jarzębski’s Wszechświat 
Lema [“Lem’s universe”] (Kraków: WL 2003, 37, 137, 162–163) are exceptions from the 
rule. See also: Marian M. Leś, Stanisław Lem wobec utopii [“Stanisław Lem on utopia”] 
(Białystok: Towarzystwo Literackie im. Adama Mickiewicza, 1998), 72–80 (on Dialogue 
7’s relation to Eden).
 63 Marek Oramus. “Entuzjasta…”; Umberto Eco admits to a similar approach in his 
“Postcript” to The Name of the Rose. Joyce’s remarks about “the ideal reader suffering 
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the humanities never understood them and the scientists – just never noticed 
them.64
It does not mean that Lem’s earlier works:  The Astronauts, The Magellan 
Nebula, Time Not Lost trilogy containing Hospital of the Transfiguration and a 
number of short stories were praised by the critics. The reviews, while much 
more numerous, were characterized by a lack of understanding of these works 
comparable to the reviews of Dialogues quoted earlier. The history of Lem’s 
reception is one of the sad themes of the Polish culture after 1945. Following it 
highlights a number of issues: from the backwardness of the Polish humanities 
and science in regard to world trends, to an old man’s frustration and author’s 
bitterness (he was never particularly easy-tempered, as can be seen in the Letters 
published in Polish in 2002). This not being my main subject here, I have to limit 
myself to these remarks, returning to them occasionally, as I will be discussing 
Lem’s works.
Undoubtedly Lem has been somewhere between the humanities and sci-
ence from the beginning, and even though (or perhaps because) he was moving 
between the two areas with bigger ease than most specialists can boast in their 
respective fields, he remained an outsider in both. In literature, he was perceived 
as the storyteller whose fantastic narratives were freckled with weird terms; the 
scientists were suspicious of his way of turning their professionalized knowledge 
into stories. It was only in the 1970s that critics such as Małgorzata Szpakowska, 
Jerzy Jarzębski and Stanisław Bereś undertook successful attempts to build a 
strategy to read Lem.
Dialogues is the one work by Lem that lost most of their appeal with time. I do 
not want to say they are obsolete. But the thing is cybernetics, their main subject, 
is obsolete – which Lem himself admitted in the first annex. I will try to analyze 
whether they can be read today. I assume here that cybernetics as presented in 
Dialogues is the first stage of Lem’s anthropology, and the specificity of how it is 
laid out in the book is that it goes beyond purely technological issues. I do not 
have to add that Lem extended the scope of cybernetics’ relevance in a way that 
is quite unlike what Polish social cyberneticists did.
Lem’s writing as erudite and hermetic in a manner characteristic of some of the currents 
of modernism.
 64 After the first edition, the only reaction in the field came from Greniewski, who men-




In the later, “mature” criticism of Lem, insofar as it is, to a very limited extent, 
devoted to Dialogues, they are notoriously read through a political lens.65 The 
entire terminology is supposed to serve as a smokescreen, and the first six 
dialogues would allegedly serve as a misleadingly long introduction to the main 
component of the work – Dialogue 7 devoted to a critique of the socialist polit-
ical system and the centrally planned economy. This is an acceptable interpre-
tation of course, but limited; it turns Dialogues into a political pamphlet and 
dooms it – this time inevitably – to historical oblivion, as any pamphlet would 
be. It is also difficult to believe that Lem could write this whole book only to 
smuggle in an attack on the political system.
In order to look at Dialogues from a broader perspective, it is necessary 
to start by determining the most obvious textual links. The form of the book 
relates back to Plato and Lucian in the history of literature  – they picked the 
form to emphasize some fundamental aspects of their philosophical and literary 
thought. But there is also a more immediate reference – Three Dialogues between 
Hylas and Philonous by Berkeley, which is where Lem found the names of his 
interlocutors:  Hylas and Philonous. The first of these names means “bodily,” 
“material,” “concrete,” metaphorically also “earthly”; the second one means 
“thought liking,” “cerebral,” “intellectual.” Both for the English bishop and for 
Lem, in accordance with the meanings of the names, Hylas is a naive enthusiast, 
while Philonous a thoughtful sage, which has obvious consequences in the dis-
proportionate structure of the dialogues.
 65 Cf. Jerzy Jarzębski, “Lata młodzieńcze i dojrzałość cybernetyki”, in: Stanisław Lem, 
Dialogi, Collected works (Kraków: WL, 2001), 486. Małgorzata Szpakowska, Dyskusje 
..., 155 and following.
 
 
5  The Structure of Dialogues
Let us investigate the text of the Dialogues themselves. Discussing it seems appro-
priate here, because this is the one book by Lem that is extremely poorly known 
to contemporary readers and, it seems, rarely read. Even in this summary I will 
be introducing elements of interpretation.
The first dialogue includes a discussion of paradoxes of achieving physical 
immortality through copying an organism’s molecular structure. Philonous 
proves to Hylas that copying a living organism necessitates rejecting the classic 
notion of personal identity, as the duplicated individual is identical with the orig-
inal, but it is not the same, not even if the original individual ceases to exist the 
moment the copy is formed (the word “moment” is itself impossible to deter-
mine with any precision). It is closely related to the question of consciousness. 
This particular dialogue can now be brought up in the context of the current 
discussions about ethical and philosophical aspects of cloning. The issue of 
“multiplied identities” is one of Lem’s favorites and is taken up on numerous 
occasions in Summa Technologiae.
The second dialogue is a short outline of what would then in the 1960s be 
called the mind–body problem, and which, on the other hand, is just a phase of 
the perennial philosophical problem: the problem of consciousness and its rela-
tionship with matter. At least one sentence from the dialogue merits quoting: “It 
is highly probable, that if atoms were not such complex objects, characterized 
by such peculiar qualities as the uncertainty principle, if instead they were, say, 
tiny hard balls, then the world made of them would look quite different from 
the real one  – and it seems very likely that no living creature could be made 
of such atoms, nor any neuronal structures that could be basis of psycholog-
ical processes” (page 38 of the Polish edition from 1984). In this sentence, Lem 
anticipates the consciousness theory developed 25 years later by Roger Penrose, 
according to whom consciousness theory is correlated with quantum processes 
in the microtubules of human neurons.66 The critics of the theory emphasize that 
Penrose made a logical error of ignotum per ignotum while building it, as the 
 66 Cf. Roger Penrose. The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and the 
Laws of Physics (London: Vintage, 1990). Idem, Shadows of the Mind. A Search for the 
Missing Science of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). See also: The 
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impact of the quantum processes on the human nervous system is just as much 
of a riddle for us as consciousness.
The fifth chapter of Wiener’s Human Use of Human Beings might have been 
an inspiration for the initial two dialogues. In it Wiener considers biological 
organism as an information processing system and he writes for example:
In other words, the fact that we cannot telegraph the pattern of a man from one place 
to another seems to be due to technical difficulties, and in particular, to the difficulty 
of keeping an organism in being during such a radical reconstruction. The idea itself is 
highly plausible. As for the problem of the radical reconstruction of the living organism, 
it would be hard to find any such reconstruction much more radical than that of a but-
terfly during its period as a pupa. (103–104)
It is significant that Lem adopted Wiener’s scientific and cognitive optimism, and 
he ignored his warnings and dark visions of the future and nature of our species. 
He would later surpass Wiener’s pessimism though.
The third dialogue presents Lem’s original approach to Shannon’s notion of 
information (mathematically described as the opposite of entropy), as he tries 
to describe the human ontogenesis (the development of the fetus) in terms of 
information processing. Lem emphasizes that ontogenesis seems to contradict 
the second law of thermodynamics: the degree of the order in a system increases 
with time instead of decreasing; and then he argues that this is in fact an illusion. 
He introduces key cybernetic notions here:  “feedback” (64), “the threshold of 
minimum complexity”, beyond which “the system becomes capable of producing 
other systems of equal complexity” (63).67
The fourth dialogue touches on some more issues related to defining con-
sciousness (or more precisely the impossibility of defining it). It then discusses 
the immense difficulties of reproducing human sensorium and motility in 
machine systems. Lem reveals deep understanding of these complications – a 
kind of understanding, which the robotics experts only gained 20 years later.
The fifth dialogue continues the subtle discussion of the essence of conscious-
ness. Lem investigates the subject with a determination that derives from the 
difficulties that arise from the cybernetic interpretation of life, especially an 
intelligent life, and even more specifically life of a human being understood as a 
biological entity with consciousness that cannot be reduced to biological terms.
It needs to be pointed out here that generally speaking, the first six dialogues 
revolve around two major issues:
 67 This is really an early cybernetic concept of what will then become “information 
farming”; cf. Chapter 15 of this book.
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 – an attempt at defining consciousness for the purpose of machine construction 
(mind–body problem);
 – an attempt at defining biological evolution in terms of building complex 
systems.
However, the main subject of the conversations between Philonous and Hylas 
is in fact confirming the impossibility of succeeding in these attempts, at least 
insofar as they are based on the set of notions currently in use within our cul-
ture. Even though it is not stated explicitly anywhere, the entire intellectual work 
done by the interlocutors is only proving how ineffective it is. We may presume 
this was not Lem’s original intent while setting about writing Dialogues. It does 
not mean that Dialogues are intellectually shallow. Their internal contradictions 
are like the aporiae that dismantle the grand philosophical systems from within, 
with the only exception being that the author and his protagonists realize it fully 
and are not trying to deny it, while the big authors of philosophical systems were 
always striving to prove the coherence of their systems. Lem is usually reluctant 
to claim that cybernetics solves the issues discussed in Dialogues.
All these problems, so thoroughly discussed by Hylas and Philonous, nearly 
overlap with the issues analyzed by experts in artificial intelligence (AI). The 
term is never mentioned in Dialogues, but the field itself was only being born 
at the time when he was writing them. I will discuss the links between Lem’s 
thought and AI in Part Two of this book, while analyzing relevant sections of 
Summa Technologiae.
I should return now to the discussion of the fifth dialogue. At its core there is 
the attempt to define a physiological correlate of consciousness as a type of net-
work. Such neuronal networks were the object of cyberneticists’ study from the 
very beginning of the discipline; they created their mechanical models, which 
were an approximation of a real network of the brain of humans and higher 
animals. It was assumed that the mechanism of brain’s functioning boils down 
to interconnections within such a network; and the only reason why we cannot 
explain it in full is that it is unimaginably complex. This is where the popular 
saying that human brain is the most complicated structure in the universe came 
from. It turned out to be even more correct than it was originally thought – after 
a period of enthusiasm in research on neuronal networks, the developments in 
neurophysiology led to a discovery that the functioning of a brain relies on many 
other mechanisms, and cannot be reduced to neuronal connections.
Philonous uses the moment to dismiss a suspicion that cybernetics, which 
treats consciousness as a correlate of mechanical processes (i.e., that a neuronal 
network is a type of a mechanism), is in fact a new version of mechanicism:
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[The older, 18th century] concept of ‘mechanicism’ had the following characteris-
tics: that the whole can be reduced to a sum of its parts, that every process can go either 
forward or back and a mechanism is ahistorical, i.e. it is not shaped by its past. You can 
dismantle it freely, and then put back together – it will not affect its functioning. You can 
reverse it, and it will go back to its starting point. Based on the knowledge of how far 
along in the process one of the parts is, you can always predict where it shall be at any 
given moment in the future, as long as you know all the forces that influence the mech-
anism. The point is such statements are only valid for systems such as a watch or steam 
engine, but they cannot be applied to biological or quantum phenomena. (114–115)
The notion of a network that has an entry, an exit, a control center and feedback 
is then extended to include counting machines, defense systems and animals 
with their behavior. Lem supplements this purely cybernetic approach with a 
semiotic aspect. He does not stop at the statement that information circulates 
within networks, he also points out that problems can arise from disruptions in 
circulation, especially if there is an excess of information or if the functioning 
of feedback mechanisms is flawed. He will return to the issue in the seventh 
dialogue. When Hylas asks: “Pray, tell me, what is the purpose of the very com-
plicated way in which you describe processes and phenomena that have been 
studied by psychology so thoroughly?” (128), Philonous responds with a lecture 
on how the description of a model of a network is in fact identical with the model 
itself,68 and concludes the lecture, saying: “We find ourselves in an astonishing 
situation in which the simplest logical description of the network turns out to be 
the network itself, in which logic begins to be transformed, to grow into neu-
rology” (130). It is an echo of Turing’s idea of “logic incarnated in a machine,” 
although tilted toward biology.69 Lem will develop the thought further in Summa 
Technologiae, when writing about “information farming.”
At the end of the fifth dialogue, Lem makes a brave attempt to define free will 
in cybernetic terms. The result is as follows:
In this sense network acquires information in a twofold manner: firstly, from the out-
side, and secondly through a recombination of symbols, which have not been connected 
in a given way before within the network. “The internal richness” and the “integrity of 
 68 It is in fact but a version of the old problem of the representation of reality in its model; 
one that was probably best summed up by Borges in the short story in which a ruler of 
an empire orders a 1:1 map of his state from cartographers. The problem of “map and 
territory” will return in Summa Technologiae with the description of “pantocreatic” 
methods.
 69 It will not hurt to mention that Turing’s last work, to which he only managed to create 
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the network” define its character. Such network operates on “free will,” thus manifesting 
its “character.”
The above entails that the network is responsible for each of its acts, as it is “free” in its 
decisions. It is responsible for its character shaped in previous decisions since it first 
came into existence. No decision was fully predetermined; it could have been (“acciden-
tally” or not) modified. (144)
And so the free will of this particular network commonly known as mind or soul 
is a matter of stochastics, the probability mechanisms in the processes of distri-
bution of information. This could be seen as Lem’s idee fixe: his fascination with 
probability theory. His later works, and especially The Philosophy of Chance will 
be permeated by it.
The sixth dialogue considers the possibilities of building a network, which 
would be an exact equivalent of a real human brain. So again, it belongs to the 
field we now call AI. In order to strengthen the image of difficulties involved in 
reproducing consciousness and psychological content in a machine, Lem begins 
the dialogue with a reference to Dostoyevsky’s Notes from Underground. Philonous 
says: “It is extraordinary, unheard of and thus particularly difficult, verging on 
laughable, to speak about the tragic and sublime sides of human essence and 
psyche in the language of a physicist or a designer” (147). He then discusses in 
detail the technicalities of the project of transplanting a brain to a network built 
specifically for that purpose. Such an artificial brain, it is claimed here, might be 
many times more effective than the biological one. Hylas’s objections to this view 
represent – ahead of the time – the opponents of AI, who are afraid of the possi-
bility that humans would be dominated by “smarter” machines. Philonous’s rep-
lica could be descried as a “critique of computer fetishism,” that is of the uncritical 
attitude to machines’ alleged omnipotence (166–168). Lem states (which turned 
out to be prophetic) that progress in building “artificial brains” is mostly threat-
ening to the society insofar as it pushes people into thoughtless consumption.70
For Lem the possibility of reproducing human brain in an artificial structure, 
based on an assumption that both are structurally and functionally equivalent, 
 70 Already in the 1950s, Lem knew that the notion that digital computers might become 
“smarter” than people is absurd. The title story in the Sesame collection masterfully 
showed the falsity of the belief that computer could think creatively. (The collection 
only had two editions, in 1953 and 1954. Lem never agreed for it to be published 
again because of the political connotations and naivety of the plots in most of the 
short stories.) One can add, in the spirit of Lem, that perhaps one day we shall build 
machines that can outgrow us intellectually, but these will not be digital computers. 
The motif would return in Summa Technologiae.
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is, as Philonous phrases it on Lem’s behalf, the only form of immortality avail-
able to people. So the problem put forth at the beginning of the book – whether 
we can attain physical immortality – is finally solved here, although with many 
restrictions. The idea will return later in the project of autoevolution that is 
Summa Technologiae. Lem will develop some of his bolder vision there, again 
being ahead of his time and other authors.
Clearly, cybernetics is merely a basis for Lem (even though he considered this 
to be the best basis) that he uses to take his thinking beyond technology and sci-
ence – toward philosophy or even eschatology, but nowhere in his thinking does 
he delve into speculative, immaterial metaphysics.
On to dialogue seventh, the longest one, which Lem devoted fully to the 
project of cybernetic sociology, and an original critique of the socialist system 
and the centrally planned economy. It is introduced by Philonous: “The society 
is paradoxically more alike to an electronic brain than a living organism as a 
system (an organized set) of elements connected through feedback” (172). The 
first instrument of analysis is the notion of “delayed reaction to stimulus,” which 
in processes analyzed cybernetically leads to oscillation in subsequent stages of 
these processes, regulated by feedback.
The phenomenon has been known to physics and technology, as well as 
economy for a long time. Lem is trying to prove that the same notions can be 
used to analyze processes of biological evolution and social processes as well. 
Both are nonlinear in his view. In natural sciences, the term is used to describe 
a type of processes, the variability of which cannot be described in a universal 
way, which means the rules of these processes change in time, unpredictably, in a 
stochastic manner. The dynamic of change in biological and sociological systems 
is very different. Philonous described it as follows:
When we juxtapose the rules of dynamic for biological populations and social systems, 
we see, that the former can exist long-term in an unchanged form only if they achieve 
dynamic balance, if they are internally durable, whereas the latter can exist long-term 
also if they lack internal stability. It derives from the fact that social system can be sta-
bilized forcefully. This is why changes in social systems have historically mostly been 
violent, and would take up the form of coups or revolts, as opposed to the non-violent 
dynamic of biological evolution.
In social systems numerous parameters oscillate, with the economic oscillation being 
mostly primary, while political and cultural ones are secondary. These secondary 
oscillations, which lead to changes in human behavior through changes in psychological 
attitudes, impact the primary ones, which shows the cyclical, feedback-related character 
of the phenomena. Oscillation of social systems known from history generally had a 
tendency to increase its amplitude, which after a series of hard perturbations usually led 
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to destruction of the old system by revolutionary forces, targeted against forces striving 
to save and preserve the existing structure unchanged. (184)
The argument may seem worryingly similar to Kossecki’s revelations from 
Cybernetyka społeczna, but Lem is careful to avoid illustrating his theses with 
specific historical examples, either here or elsewhere. It is not only for the fear of 
political censorship, but also – perhaps primarily from the point of view of the 
point of the text – because of the huge difficulty of translating his highly abstract 
statements into the language of specifics. We might recall here the quote from 
Greniewski’s popular lecture on the perils of abstract cybernetic notions.
On the many subsequent pages Philonous is developing an interpretation of 
two main socioeconomic systems in front of his patient interlocutor: capitalism 
and socialism. He interprets them in terms of systems, feedbacks, oscillations, 
focusing on methods preventing oscillations that are harmful for the system. 
Lem smuggles in his critique of socialism here, which is emphasized by the 
critics. Philonous talks about a tendency for “decision to flee up” (206), a phe-
nomenon that social theorists often call “flotation of responsibility.” For Lem it 
looks as follows:
… within the relatively limited group of those in power there gradually grows such a 
concentration of feedbacks regulating production, that “the information capacity” of the 
group is exceeded and there arises a necessity to expand the central management. This 
would be equivalent to an organism devoid of automatisms, i.e. automatic reactions. It 
would have to consciously, with concentration control, the heartbeat, blood pressure 
and chemistry, breathing, tissue transformation processes, etc. Such an organism could 
not do anything other than working to retain relative balance in its life processes.
Centralization involving increasing the number of feedbacks, blocks (or limits the 
transfer) of information, while extending its paths. Instead of short connections between 
supply and demand, there are layered “switching stations” in the systems. As a result of 
extending the paths of information transfer there occur significant delays between stim-
ulus and reaction … Above all the delay in production processes, i.e. the time elapsing 
between changes in demand and the resulting changes in supply, significantly impacts 
oscillation in capitalism.
In the socialist model the most important delay is caused by extended feedback loops 
(perimeter – center – perimeter). (208–209)
In later interviews Philonous engages in a detailed analysis of a whole range of 
consequences of this delay process for the social system, from economic to psy-
chological. However, no specific name, fact or description of authentic situations 
is mentioned. In the final stage of the conversation, Philonous outlines a pro-
ject of “a cybernetic social utopia,” explaining to Hylas what mechanisms should 
be improved and how in order for “a properly functioning” social system, that 
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is, one without harmful delays and oscillations, to be created. When Hylas 
asks: “Can you present to me the relationship between cybernetic sociology and 
the kind of sociology and economy that is generally known today?,” Philonous 
responds: “As of yet, there is no cybernetic sociology in a real sense; there are only 
early beginnings, individual discoveries and methodological research guidelines. 
The discipline will only emerge, when the general information theory, the most 
important and the most complex part of cybernetics, develops its mathemat-
ical tools enough and when there has been enough observational and experi-
ential facts to produce generalizations” (237). However, for the reasons I have 
described earlier, the discipline has never in fact emerged.71
The last, eighth dialogue is devoted to a preliminary venture into social psy-
chology from the cybernetic perspective. Lem is trying to determine the impact 
of individual variability within a population on the functioning of a social 
system – and vice versa. The attempts conclude in the statement:
Simplifying and shortening the matter, we can say that all occurrences within the social 
system that happen through force, repression, and prohibition have in fact one aim: of 
turning a non-linear system into a linear, in the simplest way, that is by decreasing the 
number of degrees of liberty offered to individuals who are elements of the system …
In other case, the more liberty is offered to individuals, the more unlimited disturbances 
to collective processes ensue, because the range of occurrences on the social scale 
increases; there occur new contradictory opinions, changeable individual reactions, 
radically opposed views and actions; as these phenomena progress, the systems is less 
and less linear and it is more and more difficult to retain its internal coherence and to 
predict future developments. (263–264)
At the end of the work, Lem many times and strongly emphasizes his confidence 
about the possibility of creating an optimum social system through scientific 
means  – cybernetic, of course. Philonous characteristically states:  “Politicians 
are, from the point of view of academic sociology, a sort of healers of social 
ailments, practical institutionalists without education in the area at best” (275); 
and his last words are: “Despite all disappointments, failures and tragic mistakes, 
people will build a better world. If they were not to act with that thought, we 
would lose all faith in humanity and its potential, in which case it would be better 
not to live at all my friends” (287).
 71 Małgorzata Szpakowska gives a much more detailed analysis of Dialogue 7 in her book. 
 
6  Attempt at an Interpretation
What does it all lead to? I should perhaps start with a commentary to the last 
dialogue. Similarly to Lem’s early novels, it is a declaration of faith in our spe-
cies’ auto-creative power. Yes, we are all capable of making a leap into the realm 
of enlightened happiness. Science would be our stepping stone. If we read what 
Lem had to say about human nature in the last years of his life – in his column 
Rozważania sylwiczne [“Silva rerum deliberations”] – it will turn out that with age 
he turned from a noble progressive to a determined conservatist, as one would 
be hard pressed to find anything other than bitter rants on the unchangeability 
of human vices in his late texts. With time he himself thought that “Dialogues are 
characterized by an excessive hope and faith in cybernetics.”72
The observation is only an aside, although it would be possible to write an 
interpretation of his entire work along this evolutionary line, with the interme-
diary stage of moderate skepticism, when his best novels were written.73 This 
modest vision could also be compared to the grand project of autoevolution 
from Summa Technologiae, which I will analyze in Part Two of this book and 
which was created still at the “optimist” stage of Lem’s thought. At this point, 
however, I am primarily interested in what can be learned from Dialogues in the 
21st century.
Lem’s plan was ambitious to say the least. Dialogues seem to be a prelimi-
nary project of a total anthropology based on the fundamentals of cybernetics, a 
project outlined with a great care for methodological moderation.74 That this is 
“an anthropology,” and not merely “a sociology” is visible from the range of the 
problematic, which is not limited to social issues only, but which in fact ranges 
from metaphysics to psychology. Lem clearly made it his goal to summarize all 
the most fundamental problems of the human world, and especially those, which 
ensue from the rapid intrusion of technology into it.
 72 Tako rzecze … Lem, 85.
 73 The last two dialogues could also be seen as a “metautopia” – a way of considering 
“the conditions of possibility of all future societies, which could be scientifically (i.e., 
cyberneticially) organized.”
 74 A more malicious critic could write that Dialogues really contain anything the author 
was interested in at the time. Indeed, Dialogues could be described as somewhat inco-
herent in structure and excessively complicated in arguments presented, but the qual-
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The scope makes it hard to produce an interpretation of Dialogues. In 
Chapters  1 and 2, I  suggested that cybernetics split into two heterogeneous 
branches: the very technical science and the vague social commentary. Dialogues 
do not really belong to either. They are too general for the technological cyber-
netics, and too detailed for its social counterpart. They are an intellectual project 
of their own.
How valuable is the project really though? The critique of the socialist system 
was certainly accurate, but, just as many other such critiques, expressed in a 
more common language, it had no actual effect. The futurological visions in 
Dialogue 7 and 8 did not come true in the least bit (Lem himself would mock 
the formerly trendy futurology in the 1970s and 1980s). The philosophical issues 
caused by the introduction of information technology into the living world (e.g., 
mind–body problem, and the philosophical foundations of artificial intelligence, 
AI) were described in Dialogues with rare precision and insight, but in 2017 we 
are, it seems, equally removed from their solutions as we were back in 1957. It 
seems that if Lem planned Dialogues that would actively contribute to the social 
practice – the intention was not fulfilled.
Dialogues could also be treated as a purely intellectual endeavor, a survey 
showing that cybernetics could be effectively applied as a tool for analyzing the 
social world. It requires turning a blind eye on the explicitly interventionist tone 
of the two final dialogues. However, even in this case it turns out that they have 
not achieved this goal to a satisfactory degree. Not because they were trivial 
or derivative – quite the opposite – but because the cybernetics itself has been 
removed into the archives of ideas and science. In their basic shape Dialogues 
(sauf the annexes) are a fortress built for a lost army. It is a sad paradox – as Lem 
saw the imminent failure earlier than others, and yet he wrote the book that 
exceeded the achievements of the other Polish cyberneticists (and likely foreign, 
too) many times, while the others continued to defend the position of their dis-
cipline, when it was already marginalized.
It begs notice that Dialogues prove that there is a full analogy between the 
universe of cybernetic notions and the world of human problems; or – in other 
words – that it is possible to translate the old system of notions describing the 
world into the system of cybernetic notions, and that it would lead into an at 
least partial solving of social and philosophical issues. Mazur’s Cybernetyka i 
społeczeństwo was a similar attempt, but intellectually infinitely more primitive. 
I need to point out that the attempts to frame the social world from a cybernetic 
perspective are not explanatory in character – either scientifically, or philosophi-
cally. Similarly to structuralism, for example, cybernetics did not explain reality; 
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it described it. This description seemed so revelatory for more than a decade that 
it was expected to explain everything.
This analogy positions Lem when writing Dialogues beyond the opposition of 
naturalism and culturalism. This, too, should be emphasized, because the ques-
tion about the type of view he held on human nature surfaces often in the critical 
texts. His view on the matter was by no means unchangeable and coherent, as 
Lem is neither a meliorist nor a pejorist, just as he is not merely a naturalist or 
merely a culturalist – in this latter case the methodology and theory he took up 
in Dialogues place him beyond this particular opposition. For the interlocutors 
of Dialogues, human is a creature biologically constituted – the evolution pro-
cess, itself shaped by the laws of physics, determines “the boundary conditions” 
of our existence and growth. Yet within this frame our growth goes beyond the 
materialist concept of nature. From the very beginning Lem assumes that there 
is a nonbiological element in us as well.75 His penchant for social engineering, 
which is clear in Dialogues for the first time, is a constant quality in his work. It 
will keep coming back in Summa Technologiae as well (although only in a limited 
way), and in many other works of fiction, from Eden to The Star Diaries.
One could ask here, whether the phrase “cybernetics as an anthropology” is 
not internally contradictory, derived from the fact that the former is a science, 
while the other belongs to the realm of Geisteswissenschaften and in some its 
variants has nothing to do with any kind of scientific character.76 Indeed, there is 
a fundamental aporia here, but it does not lie in the terminology, but in its deepest 
premises behind the very foundations of the book. Lem tries to explain human 
there using terms that were coined for a very different purpose. Because he is 
treating cybernetics as the foundation for a specific anthropology, none of the 
problems taken up by the interlocutors in Dialogues is fully solved. The subject 
of the conversations and the method of considering it are heterogeneous, but 
not in the hundreds of details, which are discussed accurately and fruitfully, but 
in the most general plan of the whole, when it turns out, that all arguments are 
entangled like the geoglyphs on the Nazca desert, the patterns of which can only 
be seen from the bird’s eye view.
 75 Which I would not want to describe as “spiritual,” “transcendent” or in any other way 
at this point. The theme of Lem’s anthropology and its place between naturalism and 
culturalism will be a recurrent one in later parts of this work.
 76 I am thinking here of German philosophical anthropology for example (Scheler, 
Plessner, Gehlen). On the other hand I am not discussing here the science par excel-





Attempt at an Interpretation54
If Dialogues cannot be treated as “a manual of society building,” or as “a 
treaty on the first principles” – then there is one more, third way to interpret 
it. They can be seen as an important stage in the author’s intellectual develop-
ment. I believe Dialogues cannot be understood without the knowledge of what 
cybernetics used to be, just as Lem’s later works cannot really be understood 
without knowing about Dialogues. The themes that will be important in Summa 
Technologiae, The Philosophy of Chance, Science Fiction and Futurology, not to 
mention the less prominent theoretical texts and fictions, were first taken up in 
Dialogues. The author took them up, and then critically recapitulated them in the 
annexes, to which I shall now turn.
The first annex, Dialogues after 16  years, includes two texts:  Losing 
Illusions:  From Intelectronics to Information Technology, and Applied 
Cybernetics:  An Example from the Field of Sociology. In the first one, Lem 
summarizes the history of cybernetics between 1957 and 1971 in detail, 
pointing out how it diverges from cybernetic predictions of it. The overview 
includes the links between cybernetics and the theory of information, informa-
tion technology conceived as a study of building and programming computers, 
semiotics, neurophysiology and genetics. Emphasizing again the huge difficul-
ties of trying to conceive of all these disciplines coherently together, he admits 
that he has fallen short of this task. On the other hand, the growing problems 
with reproducing the working of the brain in machine systems  – problems 
that were rarely foreseen by anyone apart from Lem back in the 1950s (such 
as the technical difficulties in building systems freely imitating human motile 
capacity, spacial orientation, shape recognition, etc.)  – led to this particular 
trend in the development of cybernetics, which was most interesting to Lem, 
being largely slowed down. But even this failure leads Lem to some valuable 
conclusions. He asks: “if indeed we build computers, but we are incapable of 
building brain simulators, because the first task proved to be immeasurably 
easier than the latter one, then why did the natural evolution choose the more 
difficult of these two tasks?” (317–318). The answer contains one of the most 
fundamental theses of Lem’s all philosophical writings: it happened so because 
the biological evolution is a stochastic process, not targeting any particular goal, 
and therefore testing innumerable variants throughout hundreds of millions of 
years – whereas human projects and products nearly always have a specific goal, 
and hence, in comparison with the products of biological evolution, they are 
highly narrowly specialized. The statement is trivial and obvious to any student 
of biology when phrased this way, but Lem will draw far-reaching conclusions 
from it. I will discuss them further throughout this work. The rest of the annex 
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is devoted to some of the most important problems troubling contemporary 
cybernetic and computer technology.77
The text about “applied cybernetics,” on the other hand, develops in Dialogue 
7 – it is an in-depth analysis of the pathologies of the system of centrally planned 
economy in communist Poland. By the time Lem wrote Dialogue 7, these pathol-
ogies have become striking – here he only pointed out the increasing “under-
current” of informal relations that underlay the failing state machine.78 The 
cybernetic terminology he uses to describe these phenomena departs consider-
ably from correspondence with the technical terminology of Wiener, Ashby and 
other forefathers of the discipline, and it becomes more and more similar to the 
elaborate imagery I wrote about when discussing Mazur and Kossecki79 – but, of 
course, Lem uses the terms with intellectual mastery that cannot be compared to 
what those authors were capable of. The pertinent quotation would be:
When the central authority loses the view of the existing state of things, because it 
unknowingly set in motion pathological steering circuits, which, abusing the regulative 
cycles, cause disturbances on other levels, gradually the entire economic organism of the 
society falls into tracks of unpredictable changes. A superficial judgment might lead to a 
conclusion that the emergence of informal managing groups is a positive phenomenon 
as a spontaneously born form (sic!) allowing for overcoming the obstacles. From this 
point of view the only alternative to such groups being formed are completely haphazard 
actions: when an excessive and physically impossible plan cannot be carried out in full, 
the options are to carry out a part of it, with the part either chosen haphazardly, or by 
choosing a part that is privileged through a silent agreement of “informal management.” 
This type of argument, however, is essentially false. There is no such alternative. The 
plan is never carried out haphazardly, because those who implement it are not logically 
 77 Among other issues it includes the sentence: “But if as a result of gradual merging 
of computing machines and memory banks there emerge national, continental, and 
later even planetary computer network, which is a realistic direction of development, 
the whole system, constituted by humans and these networks, may take up a dynamic 
trajectory, quite divergent from the civilizational hopes” (321). This is the earliest har-
binger of the Internet that can be found in Lem’s writings.
 78 Cf. Małgorzata Szpakowska, Dyskusje…, 166–167. Szpakowska points out that a society 
relying on a network of informal relations following the principle of do ut des was sat-
irized by Lem in his short story Profesor A. Dońda, never translated into English.
 79 Metaphors like that can already be found in the main body of Dialogues. Philonous 
speaks of “a crisis which is analogous to ‘a short circuit’ in a neuronal network – an 
epileptic attack,” to which Hylas exclaims: “Oh, then crises are the epilepsy of capi-
talism?”; to which Philonous responds: “With a grain of salt, one could say that” (187). 
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programmed automata, but humans. Each of them is at first trying to act in accordance 
with the accepted procedures, but since they encounter resistance – the infamous objec-
tive difficulties – those who formally are still partners become, in fact, rivals, just as they 
would be in a free market economy, with the one significant difference that the situation 
of competition, i.e. of colliding efforts from individual managers, not foreseen in the 
plan, is simply illegal. Yet, it exists; if not everything will be carried out, the fulfillment 
of specific parts is determined based on criteria and circumstances previously unac-
counted for: personal relationships and connections. (339)
It is hard not to admire such an insightful analysis. In an essay from the early 
1980s (Mój pogląd na literaturę)80 Lem wrote that “the diagnosis of our ailments 
with elements of forecast, which I gave in the 2nd edition of Dialogues, turned 
out to be terribly true” (199). And in the collection of interviews with Stanisław 
Bereś, Lem said: “I was myself astonished, how much of what I have written [in 
Dialogues] was confirmed.”81 However, this critique of the communist Poland 
contained in Dialogue 7 and the essay Cybernetyka stosowana lost its power with 
the fall of communism, and it only continued to make sense as an example of 
excellent social critique.
Annex 2 consists of two essays, which have little to do with cybernetics, but 
a lot with Summa Technologiae – they were published after its first edition. By 
discussing them here, I will introduce the second part of this work, which will be 
devoted to Lem’s Summa Technologiae.
Ethics of Technology and Technology of Ethics was originally a paper deliv-
ered at a conference on moral dilemmas in science, held by the Department of 
Philosophical Questions in Natural Science of the Institute of Philosophy and 
Sociology of the Polish Academy of Science (December 24–25, 1966). It is an 
attempt to determine the mutual influence between two evolutionary lines of the 
contemporary civilization: the technological progress and the transformation of 
ethical norms. It seems that the issue has not lost its pertinence, and in fact, at 
the beginning of the 21st century it only became more burning than it was in the 
1960s; a mention of cloning, euthanasia and of the constant progress in the tech-
nologies of genetic modifications should be enough to prove it (I will return to 
these issues at the end of Part Three). For Lem, other illustrations of the problem 
included the prevalence of drugs and other addictive substances – which were no 
less a problem then than they are now – the introduction of the contraceptive pill 
and the generally increasing ease of life in the Western societies. He summed it 
 80 Reprinted in amended version in Teksty Drugie, no. 2 (1990), and in the collection Mój 
pogląd na literaturę…, 193–214.
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up in the following pithy words: “The forceful implementation of ‘improvements’ 
can set off an ‘axiological implosion’ – i.e. a collapse of the system of values: it 
may lead to a situation in which living is very easy, but not really worth it” (371); 
and “The task of technology cannot be to constantly aim for a ‘short circuit’ of all 
the possible needs, desires or directives with their objects, because where one can 
obtain everything immediately, nothing has value, which derives from a certain 
hierarchy of goals and various degrees of difficulty in overcoming them” (373).
For Lem, the very notion of ethics is devoid of any transcendental 
connotations – he is coherently a rationalist in that regard. He states:
By ethics we shall mean a vaguely delineated set of rules of “the social game.” Some of 
these rules are certainly instrumental in character, and their occasional ethical aspect 
depends, among other things, on the whole set of rules, i.e. the entire culture. We 
believe that it is the situations of interpersonal contacts that have an ethical aspect. 
Determining which of these situations have an ethical aspect to them and how they 
can be judged in that regard is the clearest when we look at a given case from the 
perspective of a particular culture; the range of situations classified as ethical and the 
very criteria turn out to be variable (although not infinitely variable!), when looked at 
from various cultures. Judgments about interpersonal situations within a particular 
culture are especially divergent when they are made by observers positioned outside 
the given cultural environment, which implies an observer who grew up in a different 
culture. (379)
It implies that there are no universal values, but for Lem it also means that the 
emergence and development of ethical systems is independent from the biolog-
ical foundations of the human species; otherwise there would have to be some 
ethical universals, because the biological diversity within the human popula-
tion is too limited to justify the diversity in symbolic systems. Anthropological 
research has not yielded a discovery of a principle, value or norm that would be 
present in all human cultures. Thus, Lem rejects sociobiology avant la lettre, as 
Richard Dawkins and Edward O. Wilson had not even written their major works 
by then. So, again: neither naturalism nor culturalism. What is it then?
In the summary that concludes the text there is a following passage:
According to the hypothesis presented here, “the ethical” constitutes a component of 
how group behavior is controlled, with maximum probability of occurring in partic-
ular situations; this component  – together with how group behavior is programmed 
as a whole – can be seen as a result of three sequential processes combining to instill 
these behaviors:  accidental events (such as fluctuation of climate), Markov processes 
(which perpetuate effects of a random deviation from the initial state through positive 
feedback) and cumulative processes (e.g. techno-evolutionary processes). These pro-
cesses produce a model of “human nature” characteristic of a particular culture, and 
they determine a corresponding system of norms and ethical judgments, which from 
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the perspective of a participant of the culture is not merely a product of certain probabi-
listic references, but is endowed with a symbolic meaning. (419–420)
What would that mean? Above all it means that for Lem, ethics, or, more pre-
cisely, the emergence and development of ethical systems and norms for societies, 
constitute a stochastic process, a random and unpredictable one. This sentence 
of mine expresses in a colloquial language what the quoted excerpt stated with 
utmost precision. The notion of “Markov processes” plays a fundamental part in 
this essay and in Lem’s thought on culture in general, so it calls for a closer expla-
nation. Markov processes or Markov chains82 are a type of stochastic process 
characterized by a principle that stage n of such a process depends only on the 
stage directly preceding it n – 1, and no other earlier stage. Systems that undergo 
Markov processes are hence systems that “forget the past,” in a sense that from 
the current stage and state of the system one cannot derive anything about its 
earlier stages, and vice versa: no later stage can be determined from it (with the 
exception of the one following it directly). In nature an example of a Markov pro-
cess would be the motion of a particle suspended in a fluid called the Brownian 
motion. For an amateur such motion is completely random, but mathematicians 
have developed an elaborate formalism to describe it. Surprisingly, Markov pro-
cesses can yield results that seem orderly to a human mind. A computer gener-
ating sequences of letters following the rule “to x add a letter which most often 
follows it in Polish,” will produce sequences of letters imitating words of the 
language, but prevalently meaningless.83 This is exactly a Markov process.
In Lem’s view the development of ethics in societies is such a process, and in 
fact the entire culture and history of the humankind can be interpreted in this 
manner. The Philosophy of Chance will largely be devoted to proving this claim. 
In Ethics of Technology…, he draws further conclusions from it about creating 
models of societies’ evolution, and this is what he is mostly interested in (social 
engineering again). He pays no attention to the philosophical consequences 
of this position, even though they are just as interesting and unprecedented in 
the Western philosophy. Following the spirit of the 20th century, Lem dispels 
 82 Andrey (Andrei) Andreyevich Markov (1856–1922) was a Russian mathematician 
and one of the authors of the probability theory; he was a professor at a university 
in Petersburg and a member of the Petersburg Academy of Science. His research on 
processes that were later named after him started from a study of sequences of letters 
in Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin.
 83 Similar processes are in play in The Cyberiad, in the short story The First Sally (A), or 
Trurl’s Electronic Bard, where the Electronic Bard – a poetry producing machine – recites 





Attempt at an Interpretation 59
any illusions we may have about an overarching meaning of our existence and 
actions; the absence of such meaning is obvious to him, which he makes it the 
implicit underlying premise of his argument. And it is not merely an unjustified 
statement of absurdity of existence that so many other philosophers made. The 
absurdity of our existence is not pure nonsense for Lem. The fate, which steers 
our existence, is not blind. Our randomness is not completely random  – it is 
governed by mathematics.
Can it make us feel any better?84 It depends on one’s personal attitude. 
For many there will likely be no perceptible difference between randomness 
governed by the laws of stochastics and randomness that has no justification. 
Yet, for some, perhaps even many, an attempt to make our condition, in itself 
lacking external roots, a part of a mathematical formula, an attempt undertaken 
by Lem not only, and not even primarily in this essay, can be a sort of consola-
tion, as Jerzy Jarzębski put it.85
For example, in Ethics of Technology…, there is a noticeable shift in Lem’s 
worldview since writing Dialogues. It is no longer an expression of joy of pla-
nning a perfect society, the cognitive optimism, which allowed him to manipulate 
the cybernetic terminology for the purpose of producing a new anthropology, is 
gone. Instead there is a careful skepticism, and his reflection on the links between 
the human world and the rest of the reality has become much sharper.
Lem did not take the stochastic model of culture and ethics out of thin air. 
It has been proven on a broad empirical basis,86 but, of course, it does not go 
beyond being a hypothesis, and one that is not easily subjected to verifying 
procedures. The two-part title becomes understandable only after the model has 
been outlined. While “ethics of technology” seems like an almost self-evident 
concept and it certainly was not foreign to people in the second half of the 20th 
century, as it is not at the beginning of the 21st century, “technology of ethics” 
 84 Lem would never ask this question. He would likely say that the purpose of thinking 
is not to make us feel better. Nevertheless I want to point to this trace of existentialist 
interpretation, at least tentatively, as many such themes of coping with absurdity come 
up in his novels, including Solaris and The Magellan Nebula.
 85 Cf. Jarzębski, Kosmogonia i konsolacja, in: Wszechświat Lema…, 68–102. The term 
“consolation” here, drawn from classical rhetorics, is justified by the assonance between 
it and the word “cosmogony” in the title of the essay [“Cosmogony and consolation”], 
but it probably also points to the fact that, perhaps against the author’s will, Lem’s whole 
argument is somehow elitist.
 86 Cf. Dialogi, 383 and following. The issue is taken up more thoroughly in The Philosophy 
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becomes understandable only if we allow for a possibility of modeling the devel-
opment of societies using mathematical tools. This is not something we know – it 
is a part of Lem’s vision of the future. We are aware that the technological pro-
gress is not concordant with the changes in ethical norms, which do not follow 
immediately. But we are still far away from these processes happening simulta-
neously, not to mention from modeling ethics a priori.
“Technology of ethics,” however, is not a naïve science fiction that would 
describe people who are completely dependent on psychotropic drugs or virtual 
projections (Lem offers a grotesque image of such a reality in The Futurological 
Congress). This is about something else: we are at the beginning of this writer’s 
next major narrative. He starts questioning the very distinction between the nat-
ural and the artificial here.87 I will discuss the details in Part Two of this book. 
Here I would only point out that within “technology of ethics” this distinction 
loses its meaning, because Lem considers the possibility of controlling societies’ 
ethical views not through any kind of repressions (be it political, ideological, 
physiological or symbolical), but on the basis of the stochastic model through 
which technologically advanced civilizations are capable of deciding about the 
fundamental parameters of their development to some extent; and this is exactly 
due to the stochastic nature of the process. Lem, however, is very clear about this 
potential being minimal and very restricted by various factors, among which 
neglecting individual human qualities of members of the given civilization is the 
least significant. He is not thinking about totalitarian Gleichschaltung here, but 
about reducing the number of parameters that need to be included in the model. 
Thus, he admits that the entire model is a mathematical construct rather than a 
sociological one, or, in fact just a preliminary attempt at producing such a con-
struct, because no formalism has been proposed in the end.
The essay Biology and Values touches upon ethics from a slightly different angle, 
although still within the perimeters of the probability theory and close to cyber-
netics. It begins with a distinction between autonomous values, nonrelational 
values (treated as facts) and non-autonomous values, that is, instrumental, rela-
tive to something (treated as qualities) (426–427). In the first chapter, “Axiology 
and Physics,” he asks “when and how instrumental values are formed, where do 
they come from” (437), to which
one has to respond that the difference between presence and absence of axiology, just 
as the difference between a real goal and absence of a goal, can be conceived of with 
use of the same method that would allow us to understand a difference between a bald 
 87 Cf. Jarzębski, Wszechświat Lema…, 97 and following. 
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head and a head full of hair. When a stone falls due to gravity, we do not ask whether it 
made a decision about accelerating its speed during the fall. When a virus approaches 
a cell, we are in a sphere of classificatory instability … If we assume the virus does not 
make a decision in the axiological sense of the word … we fall into trouble with amoebas 
… etc. In fact the point is: if we can grasp the whole model of functioning of a given 
homeostat with the same precision with which we can grasp the working of, say, an 
electrical doorbell, then “decisions taken” will need to be replaced with causal relations, 
possibly involving a feedback loop, and the “goals of actions” will be replaced with prob-
ability chains, producing structures which in borderline cases (mouse, monkey, human) 
achieve a status of models of homeostat’s environment. “Values” turn out to be simply 
a kind of relations between physical states, relations that statistically determine the 
behavior of the given system. (437)
Here Lem is trying to explain the notion of instrumental value in terms of bio-
logical cybernetics, which has been very problematic for other philosophers. 
The “relations” he mentions are transfers of information between elements of 
a system in his view. The system and the “homeostat” are signs of this being 
another attempt to produce anthropological cybernetics. This time Lem is trying 
to use it to solve a classic problem of philosophical ethics.
What is next? When analyzing the links between physics and semantics 
(discussing the case of influence of symbolic meanings on human physiology 
in taboo), in passing Lem produces a thesis about the relationship between the 
emergence of language and the emergence of regularities in human behavior:
So, when random occurrences turn into a regularity, semantics emerge as invariable. 
Hence, clearly, the meaning of “taboo” cannot be found in a physical section of brains, 
just as no other meaning can, because we are speaking of something that has not existed 
as a physical phenomenon (as ergodics of language creation) since primeval times. In 
their dynamic stillness we can only observe late results of primeval causes … So the 
program of “physicalizing culture” will likely by utopian forever. If it were to become 
a reality, values would turn out to be “superfluous” entities, like Laplace’s demon (entia 
praeter necessitatem). (440–441)
After this strong statement Lem returns to the question of the genesis of instru-
mental values. He explains the homeostatic functioning of living organisms and 
then writes  – and here comes the core of the argument  – that “instrumental 
values” are qualities of objects of states that contribute to retaining the balance 
within homeostats (both in humans and other living creatures). The definition is 
based on the fact that all homeostats and only they can be defined as systems that 
have a goal (i.e., retaining balance in a changeable environment), and a presence 
of a goal is what Lem sees as the necessary condition of an instrumental value.
On the other hand, he interprets autonomous values as a special type of infor-
mation that has a strong influence on the system; so strong that in extreme cases 
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the system can disrupt or even destroy its homeostasis (as in a case of “dying for 
one’s faith”). Lem does not explain where the special information comes from or 
what exactly is its influence. The problem of links between physics and seman-
tics comes up again. And the immediately occurring question of how to distin-
guish between a value-producing homeostat from one that does not necessitates 
an answer that: “the decision is determined by the cumulative conclusion from 
long periods of observation” (450). There is no general rule, a law of nature, that 
would determine the presence of either type of values for a particular homeostat, 
be it a human or a clam. Concluding, Lem points out certain logical difficulties 
deriving from a consideration of complex, multilevel homeostatic sets (451–454) 
and finishes by saying:
If active orientation on values ends up amounting to optimalization of ultra-stable 
states, the science will develop toward biology and physics meeting half-way: the former 
will dump the ballast of completely anachronic axiological terms that goes beyond the 
instrumental, and the latter will absorb the sphere of instrumental values in parts of its 
theory of anti-entropic systems, as an element of the general theory of physical systems. 
(454–455)
Lem is trying to combine anthropology, biology and cybernetics here, implying 
that the former will disappear when the latter two are merged. He is very close to 
pure naturalism here, but he is careful to avoid any open declaration that would 
reduce humans to a purely biological species. If he did so, his entire argument 
would become pointless, because the notion of ethical “value” would lose its 
meaning altogether. He is still in trouble here, because he is trying to bridge het-
erogeneous disciplines and discourses. He is in the shadow of cybernetics as a 
mathesis universalis.
The entire second chapter of Biology and Values, “Biology and Technology,” 
is a discussion of another such bridging attempt. It is devoted to a study of bio-
logical evolution in technological terms, with some axiometrics added for good 
measure. In short: does questions about the value of evolutionary solutions make 
sense, and hence can evolution be described as a construct? The problem re-
mains unsolved though.
In the third chapter, “Intermittent and Continuous Evolution,” Lem discusses 
certain aspect of biological evolution as a Markov process and as a game (as 
in game theory) and compares them to technological evolution. Finally, in the 
fourth chapter, “Biology and Non-instrumental Values,” Lem considers whether 
biology can contain the notion of autonomous value, which is “a typically cul-
tural phenomenon, very well known to anthropologists, for example, as scholars 
who practically devote all their efforts to trace and compare them” (482–483; 
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Lem’s view on what cultural anthropology is was already a bit obsolete). He 
claims such values can be traced in these qualities of biological organisms that 
are not capable of survival and reproduction, that is, in “redundant” informa-
tion, such as the plumage of some of the bird species. It could perform the same 
functions it has in a more modest version. However, there is caveat here: we do 
not actually know, and we will not any time soon, where exactly the threshold of 
“system’s information utility” lies. If it makes sense at all to speak of autonomous 
values in nature, they only be derivative to more fundamental phenomena (484–
485). It is a clear contradiction that Lem does not even mention: by definition 
autonomous value cannot be derivative to anything. The question of conscious-
ness through which and for which such value can be constituted is completely 
omitted here. If, however, for Lem this notion is completely independent from its 
original anthropological sense, he never provides a new definition. It is another 
example of contradictions that come from juxtaposing divergent vocabularies.
The last chapter of the essay, titled “Axiometrics of Progress” is another failed 
attempt, and Lem admits that in the very first paragraph:  “The cumulative 
effect of how far evolution went from a single cell to a human seems obvious 
with this range as an expression of progress. But when we want to evaluate this 
huge improvement with some sort of axiological measurements, we encounter 
insurmountable obstacles” (486). The point is we can meaningfully show pro-
gress within certain evolutionary lines, groups, organs or physiological systems. 
However, the method fails us when applied to evolution as a whole.
“J. Huxley, for example, juxtaposes an eagle with a tapeworm, demanding that 
the reader realizes the amazing ‘progress,’ between the two forms. Who is to 
judge it critically? It is only our aesthetical criteria that lead us to believe that an 
eagle’s existence is beautiful and heroic, whereas a tapeworm’s is opportunistic 
and ugly” (491). The same applies to comparisons between people and insects for 
example. It is not about aesthetics though, but about adaptability and specializa-
tion. And what about culture, this very human product? Indeed, Lem would say, 
we have achieved more than any other species with it, but we have no guarantee 
whatsoever that these achievements will last. He expresses a view here that could 
almost be seen as a manifesto of culturalism:
The rules of cultural development are not bioevolutionary and therefore evolu-
tion cannot be a source of knowledge about cultural obligation  – nor the other way 
round: cultural criteria cannot be applied to evolution. Consequently, the place where 
the evolutionary process extends beyond its natural monoselective (i.e. solely biolog-
ical) stochastics, the “anthropogenetic locus of evolution,” cannot be located at the top 
of value ladder used by a biologist interested in axiometrics. This place serves purposes 
that cannot be measured on a biological scale. It is the very place where scale itself is 
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being reevaluated: it is the moment when biology is being evaluated from the point of 
view of culture. (501–502)
For Lem “culture” is by essence different from “civilization” or “technology”, 
because he can see no way of describing it with the same language as the one 
he used in Dialogues to discuss the latter concepts together with “machine” and 
“nature”.
Why did Lem actually write that essay? He poses questions in it to which he 
has no answers, as he himself admits. He proposes theses that are based on con-
tradictory premises, he is hesitating between a naturalist and culturalist anthro-
pology, and at times he seems to question the point of anthropology all together. 
What is the purpose of it all?
I believe his intention can be described as follows. Evolutionary biology has 
been entangled in a prevailing contradiction from the very beginning of its 
existence, ever since On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or 
even earlier, starting with Buffon and Lamarck. Evolution understood the way 
Darwin suggested is a nondirectional process, nontheological and governed by 
impersonal laws. Living creatures are subject to such evolution, and especially 
we, humans, are. Evolutionary biology as a science should follow its own basic 
premises and describe evolutionary processes without judgment. Moreover, it is 
not supposed to (or the scholars in evolutionary biology, to be more precise and 
avoid the hypostasis, are not supposed to) describe the evolutionary process as a 
process in the common understanding of the term, as a sequence of events, with 
a beginning and an end, and consequently with its causes, values and goals. This 
is how evolutionary biology ought to be studied. This is how its texts ought to 
be written. In reality, however, this was never so. Up until our times the greatest 
biologists who wrote synthetic and popular accounts of their field, have not been 
able to refrain from a teleological narrative, presenting evolution as a sensible, 
directed process, the aim of which (and let us not even mention causes here) is 
us, of course. Using the terms of literary analysis (and I will not be the only one 
to do so), one can say that the narrative and rhetoric of evolutionary biology 
have always contradicted the discipline’s basic premises. It is hardly surprising 
though; it not only shows the unwavering vanity of the “crown jewel of crea-
tion” – it also proves Roland Barthes’ remark that “human is a story-telling crea-
ture.” Darwin’s revolution produced a general model of biological reality, but in 
practice it turned out to be impossible to follow its premises, and an evolutionary 
biologist cannot help but tell the story of the discipline, just as a historian does. 
Except that in biology this rule has bigger impact on the results of research. 
A historian studies the human world and by presenting sequences of events in 
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various configurations, he or she makes sense of the historical process, but telling 
it does not contradict the very premises of the discipline, as is the case for a biol-
ogist who theoretically cannot tell the story of evolution and judge it. But how 
else can it be described, especially from the bird’s-eye view?
No need to add that these remarks apply only to a limited number of authors, 
both in biology and history. But they do apply to those among them who had the 
greatest impact on the shape of both fields. Biologists themselves have noticed the 
problematic character of the discourse of evolutionary biology a long time ago, 
and ever since the 1960s the discipline is striving to avoid value judgments, as 
does history. I would claim that Lem’s essay Biology and Values was his attempt 
to deal with those contradictions. Having recourse, once again, to cybernetics and 
systems theory, Lem tried to combine three disciplines here: biology, cybernetics 
and anthropology (its axiological variety), expecting to succeed in eliminating the 
problem of value judgments about facts of evolution by reducing the very notion 
of value, via cybernetics, to a category of evolutionary biology. However, he must 
have realized success is impossible in this case – and perhaps hence the culturalist 
tinge in the conclusion. Lem’s failure may (again perhaps) be partially caused by 
the fact he did not draw a clear enough line between the discourse of biology, with 
its narrative and rhetoric, and its object: the reality itself. If such suggestion is true, 
it could be explained by his fascination with Turing’s vision of unified physics and 
logic: such a vision, applied more broadly, makes the very notion of scientific dis-
course pointless. Logics becomes incarnate in computers, and similarly biological 
theories could be identified with a practice of programmed evolution, in which 
case the very distinction between theory and practice, the artificial and the nat-
ural would be dismantled. Lem was deeply fascinated by such a possibility, as will 
be seen when I analyze Summa Technologiae. In Biology and Value this fascination 
might have turned against him.88
Both essays from the second annex to Dialogues went completely unno-
ticed. Philosophers of ethics were not interested, understandably, because Lem’s 
 88 In his philosophy of science Lem pays little attention to scientific discourses, paradigms 
or the entire problematic of the impact of the language of science on its content and 
methodology. When he was writing his main works such issues were not being 
discussed. However, it is tempting to say that had Lem become interested in these 
issues when they became popular, he could have given more precise answers to many 
of his own questions.
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arguments have nothing to do with the 20th-century philosophical ethics. They 
had no influence of its further development either.89
Dialogues with the annexes are both a complex and heterogeneous structure. 
The leitmotif is the conviction that cybernetics can be a cure to the ailments of 
science, and also, something Lem does not say explicitly anywhere, that cyber-
netics will help build a holistic anthropology that would combine computer 
science, sociology and genetics. Even then, however, at the early stage of his phil-
osophical development, Lem was too subtle a thinker to believe his own vision 
without reservations. If Dialogues can be of any interest today, it is because they 
carry the whole history of a certain illusion – from feisty parades, through harsh 
combat to capitulation.
As I  have mentioned a few times before, Dialogues are the first stage in 
the development of Lem’s philosophical thought. The second stage is Summa 
Technologiae. Part Two of my book is devoted to this work.
 89 In an interview Lem admitted: “I never read anything on ethics, I know nothing about 
it.” (Zbigniew Taranienko, “O biosferyczny parlament świata. Rozmowa ze Stanisławem 
Lemem,” Argumenty, 1970, 38.) Assuming we believe this statement to be true, there 
would be a mutual lack of interest between Lem and philosophical ethics.
 
 
Part Two  Summa Technologiae – Technology as 
Lifeworld
Of course, if I knew how to write analytically, starting 
with dictionaries, I would never have written a single 
book – everything was just mixing in this terrible brain 
of mine.
From a letter to Michael Kandel, May 8, 197290
 90 The excerpt refers to The Cyberiad. All quotations from Lem’s letters used in this 
chapter as motto-interludes are from: Stanisław Lem. Listy albo opór materii. Ed. and 






7  Kołakowski’s Review
In the November 1964 issue of the monthly Twórczość (which was then the most 
important Polish literary journal), in the regular “Book of the Month” column, 
there appeared an extensive review of Stanisław Lem’s newest work. The work 
was Summa Technologiae,91 and the review was penned by Leszek Kołakowski.92 
Kołakowski admits in it that he has not been able to evaluate the book properly. 
He not only emphasizes the remarkable intellectual qualities of the book, but 
also points out that Lem mixes up science and futurology so completely that
the work … merges a huge amount of concrete information and observations with fan-
tastic ideas about the future of the world of technology into an indistinguishable alloy; 
consequently these ideas become as realistic, as if they were merely plans to build a 
new bridge over the Vistula River, and certainly more realistic than new water filters for 
Warsaw. (116)
The bold visions for the future presented in ST must have seem grotesque and 
ill-suited for the realities of the Polish People’s Republic, which he ironically 
expressed in the following sentence:
I think … that the observations about transgalactic transportation can be useful even 
in our world, where real technological dreams lead us to imagine that one day people 
will invent phones that connect between Warsaw and Pruszków [a suburb of Warsaw] 
without interruption; that one day there will be elevators working without errors 
for weeks at a time, or a glue that glues things and razor blades that actually shave 
beards. (117)
But the main target of his criticism was different. The author of what would later 
become Horroris Metaphysicus held it against the author of Summa Technologiae 
that he was excessively prone to reduce human metaphysical needs to physiology 
and cybernetics and he believed firmly in the rational progress of technology. 
He wrote:
His predictions are guarded with many “maybes” and “ifs”. Yet, I do not hesitate to call 
him a brilliant ideologist of scientist technocracy, that is a person who is convinced that 
there is no real human problem that cannot be solved with technological means, without 
assuming, of course, that people will effectively find solutions to everything. (117)
 91 In order to avoid the stylistic difficulties of declension of a Latin title, from now on 
I will mostly abbreviate the title as ST.







Stanisław Lem would never forget Leszek Kołakowski’s this sentence.93 In 1991, 
27 years after this review, he published an article titled “Trzydzieści lat później”94 
[Thirty years later] in Wiedza i Życie journal, in which he was extensively 
showing that “the virtual reality,” which was then the fresh and highly publicized 
achievement of technology, was a faithful fulfillment of his own predictions from 
ST about phantomatics.95 This was exactly the part of ST that Kołakowski consid-
ered pure fiction. Lem responded:
Kołakowski censured completely the very core of the predictions contained in Summa, 
by stating that the reader would have difficulty distinguishing fairy tales from informa-
tion in it. He did honey the author with some compliments but they went completely 
sour when he accused me in conclusion of “intending to liquidate” the real of philos-
ophy, and most particularly he blamed me for presuming that one day in the future this 
realm could be invaded by products of technology. He then broke the camel’s back by 
saying: “Hence one could answer Merleau-Ponty’s question about what was left of phi-
losophy after the results of modern science by simply repeating:  everything that had 
been there before.” (12)
He then added some quite straightforward allusions about the meanders of his 
adversary’s intellectual development (Kołakowski was enthusiastic about the 
communist system in Poland in the 1950s) and accused him that he never made 
the effort to get acquainted with the effects of technological progress, and that 
“infallibilitas philosophica remained the corner stone of his position” (13). In 
 93 He produced a replica in a discussion about ST published in Studia Filozoficzne journal, 
where Lem wrote: “Does the book express a position that could be described as ‘apolo-
getic to technology’? I do not think so; I have too many reservations about the mighty 
forces we have ourselves set in motion. Am I the ideologist of a ‘scientistic technoc-
racy’? As much as a person in a dinghy in the middle of the sea can be an ideologist or 
an avid follower of a faith that states that if they do not make the best possible use of 
oars, sail and mast, this journey will not end well for them. If I kept repeating in the 
book that the only cure for technology (its terrible effects) is another technology, it was 
because I was convinced this is the actual state of affairs; not out of some enthusiasm” 
(Studia Filozoficzne, no. 2 [1991], 97).
 94 Stanisław Lem, “Trzydzieści lat później,” Wiedza i Życie, no. 6 (1991), 10–23.
 95 A little later in one of the articles in PC Magazine, which were then collected in the 
volume Tajemnica chińskiego pokoju, he admitted that he had got carried away by the 
enthusiastic media reports: “I sinned with triumphalism, because my ‘phantomatics’ 
is to the technologies of Virtual Reality what perhaps a new Mercedes model is to a 
steam-engined three wheeler, built in 1769 by an engineer called N[icolas] J[oseph] 








conclusion of the text, half of which basically consists of excerpts from ST, Lem 
sums it up as follows:
What then does a philosopher do when preparing a selection of his essays from 30 years 
earlier? Following the title of the anthology of these reprints Pochwała niekonsekwencji 
[“Praise of inconsequence”] [which is the title of the collection in which the text 
about ST was reprinted – PM] he calmly repeats that everything Lem made up about 
phantomatics back in 1963/64 is sham. (23)
Kołakowski responded in a letter to Wiedza i Życie,96 in which he wrote, among 
other things:
Lem states with triumph that – as opposed to all other futurologists – he was the real 
prophet, because “phantomatics,” i.e. creating perfect illusions, came true, while he had 
been teased when 30 years earlier, rather than a year or two ahead of the time, he accu-
rately predicted the future, and “fame and fortune” do not come to the early prophet, 
endowed with a special sense to scientifically look into the future, but to the poorer one, 
who comes on time; well, indeed, sad is the fate of minds too sharp … (71)
What follows is a polemic with the charge of ignorance about the realm of virtual 
reality, but in nearly every sentence Kołakowski suggests mockingly that Lem is 
suffering from an “omitted prophet syndrome.” Finally he writes simply:
Lem’s resentment leads him even to an observation that “ ‘infallibiltas philosophica’ 
remained the corner stone of his [i.e. my] position” – the very absurd view that I have 
mocked so many times … he claims that my 1964 review was a barely honeyed criti-
cism; I thought the proportion was reverse; but who could measure that accurately! … 
It seems, however, as an author of a review of his book in Times Literary Supplement 
remarked a few years ago, that he feels hurt that the humankind does not admire him 
as much as it should. … Vanitati creatura est subiecta, as the Scripture puts it; vanity is 
common, but the art of vanity lies in not showing it; it is not difficult – all it takes is a 
sense of when one becomes absurd. (72)97
Great people tend to have great memory and a sharp tongue. I daresay, how-
ever, that this conflict may seem pointless, as it is stems from a basic misunder-
standing. Kołakowski’s review did not condemn Lem completely, and yet this is 
all Lem saw in it. The reviewer’s torn position was not merely caused by ambiva-
lent impressions, but had roots in the book’s inherent qualities. What were they?
 96 Leszek Kołakowski, “Lemowi,” Wiedza i Życie, no. 12 (1991), 71–72.







8  What Is “Lem’s Essay”?
Lem’s four big discursive works: Dialogues, Summa Technologiae, The Philosophy 
of Chance and Science Fiction ad Futurology tend to be described by critics as 
“essays.” The term is not quite accurate in so far as a typical essay would not be 
more than a few dozen pages long, whereas all four of Lem’s “essays” are hundreds 
of pages long, with Science Fiction and Futurology nearing a thousand. They do 
however fulfill other criteria of essays in the Polish sense of the word: they follow 
a fairly liberal line of argument and include very limited academic references and 
tools (i.e., notes and references, bibliography). These features, however, which 
sometimes work perfectly for a “typical,” short essay, can have a very different 
effect in a text exceeding 700 pages, or even just 300. Such a huge essay, a hybrid 
form in size and text structure, becomes difficult to grasp and categorize, espe-
cially if the author had large aspirations, and the text subject touches on science – 
and both are definitely the case with Lem. Lem uses both the right that authors of 
informal essays have to construct his argument with a degree of liberty, and the 
right of a scholar to produce a synthesis of his subject matter. It is particularly 
troubling for someone trying to analyze ST and to grasp what theses the author 
is actually striving to prove. The richness of knowledge contained in it and the 
very peculiar structuring make ST a typical example of “an open text,” which can 
be subjected to divergent interpretations. That’s why Kołakowski could find in it 
a proof of “scientist technology” and Lem could feel offended by it.98
Before I undertake my attempt at an analysis of ST, a few words about the title. 
Kołakowski wrote about it that: “if Aquinas’ Summa Theologica were to the her-
itage of theology what Lem’s Summa is to technology, it should contain hypoth-
eses and information about quaternizing trinities, perspectives for cherubinizing 
humans and about pseudo-pandemonic mercy” (116). Jerzy Jarzębski believes 
that the title is a sign that God has been replaced by Reason as the principle 
 98 Another difficulty are the changes that Lem introduced in ST in subsequent editions. 
My interpretation is based on the 4th amended edition (Lublin:  Wydawnictwo 
Lubelskie, 1984), 352. The quotations and references in English come from the trans-
lation by Joanna Zylinska (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2013). 
It does not, however, include the afterword “Dwadzieścia lat później” [Twenty years 
later] which is included in the 4th edition in Polish. Neither includes the original 
first chapter “Sztuka i technologia” [“Art and technology”], which the author removed 
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ordering the world, “as a power which had agency and is independent from 
biology, aiming in its evolution in its own uncharted directions.”99 The problem 
is that for Aquinas God is the only and the absolute principle, and the entire 
gigantic intellectual structure of Summa Theologica, with its clockwork preci-
sion of questions, arguments and counterarguments, is unconditionally subor-
dinate to this one principle. Meanwhile, in ST the Reason has a primary role, 
as it does throughout Lem’s philosophy, but it is not an Absolute and it cannot 
be in light of the views of the author, who always avoided seeing anything as an 
Absolute. And when it comes to the formal qualities of the two works: one would 
be hard pressed to find two texts as different as Aquinas’ Summa Theologica and 
Stanisław Lem’s Summa Technologiae, the reasons being the ones I have listed 
before (rigorous treaty vs. liberties of an informal essay). Therefore, I believe the 
choice of Lem’s title was really determined by aesthetics and ambition rather 
than any precise idea of analogy.
What is the subject matter of ST, how can it be defined? Or rather, what answer 
can be given to this question based on the context of the work and author’s 
intentions? If I wanted to outline the historical context for ST, as I did for the 
Dialogues before, I would need to write a history of the entire 20th-century sci-
ence, with the history of its first half as the background of Lem’s book, and the 
history of the second – a verification of his predictions. Perhaps it is exactly when 
analyzing ST that a Lem scholar has the strongest sense of his or her incapacity 
to handle the task fully and of the task’s immense scope; when writing about 
Lem it is hard not to write about everything. And it is because he writes about 
everything.
But how does he do it? Only a naive reader could believe that Lem really mus-
tered the entire human knowledge, more than any expert in any discipline. He 
has indeed exceeded most of them in creativity of his thought on science and the 
world in general, but his method of navigating the seas of scientific knowledge 
is somewhat different from the typical scientific methodology. It could not be 
otherwise, given that his ambition is to grasp those seas from shore to shore, sail 
high seas and not just stride along coastlines. In short, Lem’s method is to write 
scientific informal essays. He has amazing knowledge, certainly vaster than most 
of his contemporaries, but he juxtaposes different elements in a way that is nei-
ther scientific nor unscientific. It is something in-between, which translates into 
the convention of an informal essay causing not small a headache for someone 
 99 Jerzy Jarzębski, “Summa technologiae i jej potomstwo. Posłowie,” in: Stanisław Lem, 
Summa Technologiae. Dzieła zebrane (Kraków: WL, 2000), 494.
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who strives to interpret him. The latter’s level of scientific immersion is usually 
very different still. Lem is the genius amateur, while a Lem scholar  – just an 
amateur. These three levels of thought raise great problems in categorizing any 
“lemological” research:  they are neither literary criticism, not science studies, 
but it should combine the best in both. If it could succeed, the interdisciplinary 
character of this three-level structure (science–Lem’s works–research on Lem’s 
works) would undoubtedly yield remarkable results.
The unscientific character of ST can be seen not only in the liberty of 
arguments (which still form a subtle structure), but also, it would seem, in its 
main objective. It is an elaborate prediction of how technology and science 
would develop; it is a type of futurology – but a very peculiar one, as I shall show 
soon. And predicting future on a scale undertaken by Lem in ST is very foreign 
to science, which does formulate predictions based on research into the current 
state of affairs and theory (and some threads of positivism and contemporary 
philosophy of science assume that this is its main goal), but certainly in a much 
more limited way.
This is enough at this point about the metaproblems with analyzing ST. It 
needs to be added that Lem was hardly ever interested in sociology of science 
and knowledge, or their social context. He was wholeheartedly a scientist, con-
vinced about the absolute independence of science and technology from any-
thing outside their realm. Małgorzata Szpakowska has laid out this quality of his 
thought very accurately.100 Interestingly enough, however, he did see the social 
context of science in his literary works, especially in His Master’s Voice.
 100 Dyskusje ze Stanisławem Lemem…, 73–74. There is a sentence about it in ST: “Even 
though it may seem strange [emphasis mine – PM], there are many contradictory 
viewpoints with regard to what a scientific theory actually is” (382). Lem put the sen-





I have always found human oscillation within the 
boundaries determined by elementary provisions of little 
intellectual interest and therefore I was more eager to 
deal with utterly extreme possibilities (as in S[umma] 
Techn[ologiae] for instance), without being concerned 
with how realistic they might be. But then I was never 
involved in futurology as it is conceived today, which is 
sort of descriptive, but I preferred being a normativist… 
and I never claimed otherwise, did I…
Letter to an unidentified addressee, September 29, 1972
Yet, Summa Technologiae is a work of futurology, albeit not a typical one. Without 
a doubt. This is how the author planned it and it can be read from its content and 
structure. It is sometimes considered to be a project in philosophy of science and 
technology, and such themes can be traced in it, whenever Lem is pondering 
on the ontological status of his observations and indulges in methodological 
digressions.101 However, treating ST as belonging entirely to philosophy of sci-
ence and technology prevents an analysis of other aspects of it, which are much 
more significant in my view.
The spirit of cybernetics hovers over the entire ST. It needs to be remem-
bered that the book was written at a time of unfading enthusiasm about science. 
It is particularly clear in  chapter 4 (“Intelectronics”), containing predictions on 
the development of “artificial brains.” There, Lem employs conceptual tours 
and arguments that are close to the ones we saw in Dialogues, including the 
specter of “cybernetic sociology.” It seems that this part of ST stood the test of 
time the least, as the growth of computers – both technologically and socially – 
ended up going in a completely different direction, which we can see quite 
clearly today. But even this chapter contains important points that require 
some scrutiny.
“Futurology,” “philosophy of science and technology,” “cybernetics.” These 
are the key words in ST. Before I  proceed to outlining the general principles 
of its structure, I need to point out that the first of these terms is particularly 
 101 Kołakowski identified ST as a work belonging to the field of philosophy of technology, 






important in this chapter. And this is because if the author really intended this 
work as a prediction, as a set of visions for the future (and Lem states such inten-
tion explicitly in many places), then someone venturing to interpret the work 
has every right to compare this type of prognosis with the current state of af-
fairs. And most of Part Two of my book will be devoted to such a comparison. 
Going through subsequent chapters of ST, I shall try to show in what ways the 
notions and predictions formulated by Lem relate to the contemporary state – 
not of science and technology, as I  lack competence in that regard, but to the 
contemporary state of thought about them. And that seems to be an acceptable 
approach, as ST itself is a type of such thought, and not a handbook or a syn-
thesis. Some of the books Lem published in the 1990s are his own responses to 
these predictions.102 However, he focuses only on the negative consequences of 
the dynamic progress of technology, discussing them with little interest though, 
which, one may assume, is a result of his feeling of disappointment that his main 
idea that should govern the progress of technology – that is, rationality and pro-
portional growth of the potential of technology and ethical pragmatics of its 
use – did not come true at all.
The central subject that ST circles around, according to the author, is “a slogan 
which through its associations sounds rather amusing, that is the call to ‘catch 
up to and even overtake Nature’.”103 Our species, according to Lem, should go 
beyond limitations imposed by evolution and physical conditions of growth, but 
Nature should help with that, suggesting the best solutions.104 This is how one 
could summarize the book, which includes the following passage in one of the 
initial chapters:
The end of this road does not lie, as some claim, in the “duplication” of the human 
design or the design of some other living organisms, inside the electrical circuits of 
digital machines. For now, life’s technology is far ahead of us. We have to catch up with 
it – not to ape its results but to exceed its seemingly unmatched perfection. (25)
 102 Cf. Jerzy Jarzębski, “Summa Technologiae i jej potomstwo.” This refers mostly to 
Tajmenica chińskiego pokoju, Bomba megabitowa and Okamgnienie. Numerous 
remarks about the accuracy of his predictions in ST are scattered throughout Lem’s 
writings starting with the early 1990s.
 103 “Discussion [on ST]”, Studia Filozoficzne, no. 2 (1995), 95.
 104 It is telling that Lem generally ignores one of the basic qualities of the Western cul-
ture – that people aim to go beyond Nature through Culture. Instead he proposes 









It only becomes clear at the end of the book that this is where Lem states his inten-
tion according to which ST is to become not only a general prediction for the devel-
opment of civilization, but also a project of autoevolution of the humankind – the 
central element of the civilization’s growth. This is how – as a utopian project of 
autoevolution – I will treat ST throughout this book. I am emphasizing it here 
in order to avoid misunderstandings in the parts that will follow, especially as the 
main subject of ST is built up with numerous preliminary studies, each requiring a 
separate analysis. My following chapters will then run parallel to the development 
of the text of ST, without merely summarizing it, but instead offering an extensive 
commentary, which will be concluded with an attempt to synthesize the meaning of 
this complex work. Then, in Part Three, I shall try to contextualize Lem’s project of 
autoevolution with broad reference to contemporary intellectual tendencies.
A peculiar quality of Lem’s style in ST needs to be pointed out here. Words 
such as “Nature,” “Machine,” “Reason,”105 “Designer,” “Science,” “Culture” appear 
on nearly every page, usually capitalized. For Lem they are the fundamental 
notions around which he weaves his entire discourse, and not only in ST. But 
they are not explained anywhere. Lem does not provide precise definitions of 
them (with the exception of a relatively precise definition of “Machine” at the 
beginning of the fifth chapter), but he does often contextualize them. They are 
not scientific terms then, but metaphors rather, figures, which Lem uses to map 
out the scope of his thought. They are indefinable, probably partly because he 
sees them all as self-evident, and partly because these are his primary notions. It 
resembles some old philosophical systems with their fundamental concepts such 
as “God,” “being,” “spirit” – to the explanation of which a whole system would be 
devoted, while they themselves were to guarantee its coherence by marking the 
very core of reality, “the transcendental signified.” In that sense, Lem is closer to 
the tradition of the Western metaphysics than he is to “the ideology of scientist 
technocracy” – assuming we do not treat the latter as a type of metaphysics as 
well (and what would an absolutization of Reason and Nature be?).
 105 In the English translation of ST, Joanna Zylinska chose to translate the Polish word 
“Rozum” as “Intelligence,” which has some merit, but it seems that the connotations 
related to the Enlightenment are more pertinent in this case, so the word “Reason” 
would be more accurate here. I leave Zylinska’s translations unchanged in that regard, 





ST was not analyzed more often than Dialogues – hundreds of phrases such as 
“personoclastic cerebromatization,”106 would scare off humanists, while scientists 
would be put off by the bold “fantastic” prediction and the “vagueness” of an 
informal essay. In the few interpretations that have been published, ST was 
mostly seen – if not simply as glorifying science and technology, then at least as 
an important stage in thinking about them.107 The reviewers did notice that in 
ST Lem was in fact modifying the meaning of those notions as they were known 
before. It was only Małgorzata Szpakowska and Jerzy Jarzębski who, starting in 
the late 1980s, began to notice that Lem was in fact subverting the very distinc-
tion between what is scientific and what is not, and what is natural or artifi-
cial. However, these two most eminent Polish Lem scholars differ radically in 
their interpretation of the fact. In her Dyskusje…, Szpakowska wrote: “Lem is 
convinced about the continuity between the behavior of human as a biological 
creature and human technological efforts mediated through conscious actions” 
(66). And immediately after: “From the point of view of an individual human 
subject technoevolution is something external, independent and unavoidable, as 
bioevolution is for an individual creature, which at best is capable of looking for 
the best tactic in struggle for survival.” For Szpakowska, technoevolution, just as 
most other themes in Lem’s discursive works (as opposed to his fictions), has no 
metaphysical connotations. Jarzębski has a radically different approach and he 
devoted a lot more attention to neutralizing the Natural/Artificial distinction. In 
the article Naturalne, sztuczne i dziura w kosmosie [“The Natural, the Artificial 
and a Hole in the Universe”],108 he claims obliterating this distinction in Lem’s 
thought correlates with the anxiety about the superior meaning of human exis-
tence in the Universe, and the notion of Reason is a factor that can help dispel 
this anxiety.
 106 On page 217. It means a mechanical, invasive transformation of human brain, which 
irrevocably changes the personality of the person subjected to this procedure. The 
notion appears in the context of social engineering.
 107 Kołakowski, “Lemowi,” Studia Filozoficzne, no. 2 (1965). Apart from that one, four 
Polish editions inspired altogether twelve press reviews (based on relevant volumes of 
the annual Polish Literary Bibliography). The 1st edition (Kraków: WL, 1964, 470) – 6 
reviews; the 2nd amended edition (Kraków: WL, 1967, 97) – 2 reviews; 3rd edition 
(Kraków: WL, 1974, 505) – 2 reviews; 4th amended edition (Lublin: Wydawnictwo 
Lubelskie, 1984, 352) – 2 reviews. So far ST has been translated to Russian (1968), 
Hungarian (1972, 1977), Serbo-Croation (1977), German (1974, reprinted in 1978, 
1980, 1981, 1986), Latvian (1987), Czech (1995) and English (2013).








Lem’s writing shows that there is no way out of this dilemma [of desiring meaning in a 
meaningless world – PM]. Perhaps then there is faith in the existence of transcendence – 
not a religious one, but rather a philosophical one: as the space where the laws of our 
evolution are rooted (perhaps by some kind of superior consciousness) and hence their 
impersonal and unconditional character is redeemed. This is also where Reason can 
escape the trap of a closed universe with its antinomies. (297)
According to Jarzębski in Lem’s works Reason:
becomes only something like a passenger, who temporarily settles inside the body of 
the evolving humankind in order to use this habitat to its biological limit and make a 
leap into another reality, move into the environment of increasingly complex machines. 
Once it mounts mechanisms, Reason will likely again exploit their potential to the limit 
in order to then move onto another horse – and so on.109
This type of Hegelian vision of Reason seems to me to be too far-fetched a hypos-
tasis, as Lem probably never accepted Reason as an entity with such a degree of 
ontological independence. I  believe it would be too “metaphysical” a leap for 
an author who usually avoided any metaphysics. On the other hand though 
Jarzębski’s view corresponds well with his interpretation of the title of ST.
Jarzębski also points to the themes in Lem’s fiction that refer to lifting the 
opposition between the Natural and the Artificial. It is one of the subjects of 
Observation on the Spot  – the lifting of this distinction surfaces there as the 
ethicsphere of Entia, permeated with microscopic particles, “quickies,” which 
make it impossible for Entians to commit acts that are forbidden by their law 
or harmful to others. Jarzębski writes: “It is about bringing the designer’s work 
to a level where differentiating between the artificial and the natural would no 
longer be possible, and hence the very matter itself (to a certain degree) – ‘the 
laws of nature’ – would fall into the scope of engineer’s skills. … The very idea 
of obliterating the differences between the artificial and the natural becomes 
important here and it triumphs. As a result the entire universe becomes an arena 
of technological mechanisms and is (potentially) permeated by rational will.”110 
Jarzębski also points out that countercultural movements in the second half of 
the 20th century opposed just such a model of the world: “A human surrounded 
with technological devices, enhanced through them and enriched by them, is no 
longer the same human as before. So this modification could be rejected.”111 It 
 109 “Literackie przygody uniwersalnego Rozumu,” in: Wszechświat Lema…, 143; see also 
further on page 144 and following.
 110 “Kosmogonia i konsolacja”…, 97, 98.








turns out, however, as I shall try to show, that in the context of Lem’s thought on 
technology such arguments lose meaning.
Now, in the 21st century, this destruction of scientist and positivist oppositions 
becomes clearer and clearer. Let us read the author’s words more closely:
We shall also, by way of speculation, consider the domains in which man’s enhanced 
activity of this kind will match Nature’s work. Even then will man remain subject to lim-
itations, the material aspect of which – conditioned, as they will be by the technology 
of the future – we cannot predict, but the psychological effects of which we can at least 
partially grasp because we are ourselves human. The thread of such understanding will 
only be broken when man, in a thousand or a million years’ time, gives up his entire 
animal heritage, his imperfect and impermanent body, for the sake of a more perfect 
design, and when he turns into a being so much higher than us that it will become alien 
to us. Our preview of the future will thus have to stop at sketching out the beginnings of 
this autoevolution of the species. (40)
Lem “outlines the beginnings of autoevolution of the species” on the hundreds 
of pages of ST that follow. The analysis leads again, as in Dialogues, on a high 
level of abstraction, carefully avoiding any specifics. Jerzy Jarzębski mentions 
that he was surprised by the lack of descriptions of everyday life of the people of 
the future.112 Lem does not include them because he knows it is easier to predict 
the general progress of civilization than the details of it, and moreover one can 
presume he has little interest for the everyday of the future. He is interested in 
thorough transformations of human world, global or even cosmic changes – and 
not what we would eat and how we would spend our free time. He described it 
in his novels (most broadly in Return from the Stars – and he considered this 
the poorest of his novels). The everyday life of normal people seems repulsive 
to Lem, which can be confirmed by his disgust with contemporary technology, 
stemming to an extent from it having become “common,” from computers de-
scending from the highs of science to business and pop culture, which started 
with the introduction of personal computers, and intensified with culture 2.0.
The “absence of the everyday,” which was so astonishing to Jarzębski, is a 
symptom of a more general “absence” or “lack” in ST. Lem is hardly interested with 
general social processes at all there – on any level. He almost does not mention the 
question of the influence of the great technological changes, which he describes pas-
sionately in the book, on the social, cultural and political life. There are only a few 
remarks about social cybernetics in ST, a faint echo of the subject extensively treated 
in Dialogues, and a very limited analysis of psychological and social consequences 
of phantomatics. ST is suspended in “social vacuum.” Here it is interestingly 
 112 “Summa technologiae i jej potomstwo”…, 483–494. 
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different from the contemporary philosophy of technology, which mostly focuses 
on rationality of the technological progress in the social context and on the human 
responsibility for this progress and its impact on the habitable zone and future gen-
erations.113 It is easy to explain Lem’s perspective in ST. First, and that is an acci-
dental reason, hoping to predict the social development, he would immediately end 
up in conflict with the contemporary political ideology, risking, at best, censorship, 
and in the worst case scenario – putting the entire ST to rest. Second, and this is 
a much sounder reason intellectually, Lem probably decided that predicting tech-
nological and scientific changes, while risky, can still be sensible, as the range of 
these changes is somehow conditioned by the laws of physics, mathematics and 
logic, whereas any prediction about social changes (even if they are related to the 
former) is completely random, as the development of society and culture cannot 
be contained by any rules or any theoretical model – so one can predict anything 
there.114 Omitting the domain of social communication has a huge unwarranted 
impact on the whole of Lem’s project of future civilization, as it practically prevents 
any thought on culture – if culture is to be understood as a correlate and center of 
this communication. Therefore, the entire issue of human autoevolution, which is 
the subject of ST, is located beyond culture and beyond the sphere of the social.
In the interpretation of Summa Technologiae, which I  present on the fol-
lowing pages, I describe “technology as life world” – Lebenswelt. This concept, 
derived from phenomenology, described well the function of technology in the 
future civilization, both according to Lem, and according to the numerous con-
temporary theoreticians, whose views will be discussed here. Technology and 
its products have been taking over the world of our experience since at least 
the beginning of the 20th century. Most of the contemporary cultural studies 
is focused on the consequences of the “real” world being mediated by its tech-
nological replicas and representations. ST is also analyzed here as an original 
attempt to grasp this process of takeover and its possible implications.
 113 In the notes to ST following sentences: can be found “All of this does not, of course, 
amount to suggesting an equivalence between man and any material object to be 
constructed or any technical product to be improved. The aura of moral responsibility 
must envelop the field of bioconstructionism – which is an area of great risk (but also 
perhaps of equally great hope)” (321). These sentences remain unrelated to the whole 
of the book though.
 114 If that supposition is correct, it means that while writing ST, Lem had to give up his 
conviction about the possibility of cybernetically regulating the social system, which 
he widely promoted in Dialogues. Hence, the sparsity of remarks on the subject in ST. 







Nihilism? In my books? There might be something to it, 
you may be in on a secret here. I would call it – futility… 
it is careful about the décor, which denies it on the surface. 
Saying terrible things, quite innocently, as if in play…
Letter to Michael Kandel, July 1, 1972
ST starts with a description of analogy between two evolutions: biological and 
technological.115 Listing similarities and differences between them, Lem suggests 
that the Designer – the symbolic figure personifying the human technological 
potential – should consciously replicate the solutions unconsciously applied by 
Evolution. In ST the differences stemming from the targeted character of con-
scious actions of a temporal Designer and the undirected, impersonal process 
of Evolution lasting billions of years are subjected to a very detailed analysis. 
I am interested in something else though. The 19th- and 20th-century science, 
affected by the myth of the omnipotent non-Natural Reason, separated so much 
from its capacity to adopt bioevolutionary solutions in technology that the 
occasional suppositions about, for example, the perfection of spider nets (per-
fection from the point of view of human technological needs) were formulated 
as surprising and remarkable. More or less when Lem was writing ST, the theme 
of “peeking on nature” appeared in scientific and popularizing discourse. Its 
initially modest impact was a result of prevalence of the type of thinking, which 
prevented forming any kind of connections between Technology and Nature. 
 115 Małgorzata Szpakowska adds another one – evolution of culture, discussed in The 
Philosophy of Chance and Science Fiction and Futurology. From the point of view of 
this work that juxtaposition is not coherent, as ST does not discuss culture at all. 
Culture is not a part of the concept of autoevolution as Lem understands it. But 
autoevolution can be interpreted in cultural terms and this is what I will be inter-
ested in. Szpakowska makes one important remark: “in Stanisław Lem’s views two 
notions play a key role: evolution and accident” (Dyskusje…, 54). Dialogues and 
ST – both devoted to technology and science – are governed by the former of the 
two concepts, while The Philosophy of Chance and Science Fiction and Futurology – 
devoted to culture – are subordinate to the latter. This would mean that in the later 
stage of his philosophical development, Lem decided statistics is the model of cul-







Cybernetics, the history of which was outlined in the previous part, was one 
of the first attempts at a methodological synthesis of Nature and Technology. 
Before that these were two separate worlds, between which there was Science, 
studying Nature, on the one hand, and providing theories as bases for growth of 
Technology, on the other.116 This would be called “stealing Nature’s secrets” – of 
course in order to discover the truth about the world and subject it to humans, 
but not to use the rules of Nature in the products of Technology. When the 
Wright brothers were designing the first airplane, they did not connect the 
design of wings with an analysis of the dynamics of bird flight. When radar 
was invented, it was not associated with bats in any way. Positivism and scien-
tism contributed greatly to solidifying this distinction. Even though the same 
laws of physics and chemistry describe the functioning of living organisms and 
technical machines, since La Mettrie no one ever thought that these two worlds 
could be linked with ties other than theoretical. This is when a distinction 
between an invention and a discovery became popular – the distinction which, 
I  should emphasize strongly, has nearly lost its meaning, at least within the 
domain of biotechnology, but also in sciences such as molecular physics, where 
the objects of observation and discoveries are mostly constructed theoretically. 
The emergence of this distinction was of course connected to the model of man, 
popularized by the Enlightenment, as a creature independent from Nature, and 
endowed with a Reason independent from Nature. The remains of the Christian 
view of Man as the lord of creation went even deeper. In the 19th century in 
the collective imagination, shaped by the early mass media, “a discovery” was 
associated with an image of a fearless white pioneer, fighting his way through 
a wild jungle or an ice desert, whereas “an invention” would convey an image 
of an engineer or a scholar, working in the quiet of his studio or in an orderly 
lab. In the late 19th and early 20th century such figures of collective imagina-
tion included Henry Morton Stanley, Edward Peary or Nils Nordenskjöld as 
discoverers, and Thomas Alva Edison and the Wright brothers as inventors.117 
They were presented as heroes of civilization, inspired by the project of pro-
gress and growth, which determined the shape of collective imagination of the 
Western civilization between the end of the 18th century and the first half of 
the 20th century. The epoch preferred discoveries and inventions that would 
bring immediate benefits to the society at large or that would strengthen the 
 116 This generalization does not refer to the group of great discoverers and inventors 
without formal education (the most famous among them being Faraday and Edison).






position of the European biggest political powers (the impact of the British 
imperialism on the dynamics of exploration in Africa cannot be overestimated). 
Perhaps this is the reason why the 19th-century discoverers of the fundamental 
laws of nature, such as Dmitri Mendeleev, never became great heroes of mass 
imagination. It was only changed by the discoveries made by Roentgen, and 
Skłodowska-Curie, who attracted large “media” attention. The fact that Albert 
Einstein became a pop icon has its roots in a completely different cultural con-
text, and mostly in the processes of mass culture.
The revolutionary character of Lem’s thought is becoming more readily apparent, 
I believe. Despite the metaphorical vagueness of the analogy between two types of 
evolution, the heuristic potential of the juxtaposition was huge. It was nothing less 
than questioning the very distinction between the Natural and the Artificial, Nature 
and Technology, discovery and invention – and the questioning was coming just 
when these oppositions seemed completely undoubtable. Lem rejects them – and 
the entire Summa Technologiae is built on this refutation.118
The thesis that bioevolution and technoevolution run parallel may imply that 
Lem is continuing the old Spencerian evolutionism. This would be utterly wrong 
though. Lem never used this metaphor to describe the structure and functioning 
of the society, which, as we remember, he preferred to describe in terms of cyber-
netics. His terminology might be vague, but he never adopts narrowly defined 
biological terms to science. And above all evolutionary metaphors are not related 
to progress and teleological growth in his thought – neither in biology, nor in 
technology. He never claims that autoevolution is the most perfect form of being, 
but only that it is an inevitable consequence of how humankind has been devel-
oping so far. If one wanted to look for fathers of this type of thinking, crea-
tively combining biology and science, one should point to Sir D’Arcy Wentworth 
Thompson (1860–1948). The British mathematician, biologist and classicist is 
the author of a monumental work On Growth and Form (1st edition 1917, 2nd 
edition 1942), where, in a nearly Pythagorean manner, he describes, how the 
laws of physics and mathematics determine the morphogenesis and ontogen-
esis of living creatures.119 He answers such questions as (and who does not ask 
 118 Jacques Monod also proposed rejecting the opposition between the natural and the 
artificial in his famous 1970 book Le Hasard et la Nécessité (Paris: Seuil, 1970, 17–18).
 119 Thompson’s thought remains outside the mainstream evolutionary biology, but the 
most eminent representatives of the discipline speak about him with highest regard. In 
his foreword to an abbreviated edition of On growth and Form (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, XXII+346), Stephen Jay Gould emphasizes the extraordinary 






themselves that?): why the spirals on snail shells are so precisely drawn or where 
does the shape of pelvic bone come from in mammals.120 Lem never mentions 
Thompson’s name, but there are many passages in ST that resemble his style, 
when Lem discusses the impact of the shape of our body, or – on a lower level – 
of the cell metabolism, on our life and technology; and all this, as Lem does 
not fail to emphasize, depends on external physical conditions. Both authors 
are not only characterized by interdisciplinary thinking and a certain intellec-
tual gigantism, but also enjoyed little popularity with their contemporaries and 
for the same reasons: Oxford humanists thought Thompson was a renegade (as 
he occupied himself with the unworthy field of biology!), while biologists and 
mathematicians took him for an odd amateur (he was the author of Glossary 
of Greek Birds, which combined philology with ornithology). Thompson’s intel-
lectual biography could be an inspiration to think about the problem of “two 
cultures” – and we should remember both the term and all its consequences were 
originally born at British universities. Perhaps Lem’s intellectual biography could 
be an incentive to understand changes within “the third culture” better.121
first sentence of his work. It is telling that Gould – shaped by the paradigm of special-
ized science – is amazed by the “renaissance” quality of Thompson’s thought.
 120 Turing’s works on morphogenesis was in some ways inspired by Thompson’s views. In 
the recent years Thompson’s way of thinking about nature has been returning in the 
ideas of Stephen Wolfram or Adrian Bejan, who build general models of mechanisms 
structuring complex biological forms basing them on contemporary laws of mathe-
matical physics.
 121 This is the term used to describe the shift of culturally creative functions from 
the humanities to natural sciences, which has been popularized since the early 
1990s, mostly by American scholars. Cf. The Third Culture, ed. by J. Brockman 





11  Taking UFO Seriously
The first problem Lem discusses in ST after the initial chapter about “two 
evolutions” is the existence of two civilizations in the universe. For a contem-
porary reader this may be somewhat surprising and an argument for a view that 
Lem is only a sci-fi author. However, beginning ST with this subject is a very con-
scious and justified move. It needs to be remembered that in the 1960s the ques-
tion of extraterrestrial intelligent forms of life was raised by serious scholars.122 
This is the time of the vast SETI program (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence), 
all of which that was left 20 years later was E.T.  in Spielberg’s blockbuster. In 
Soviet Byurakan an international symposium on extraterrestrial life was held, 
and Lem was an active participant. A  study of contemporary writings on the 
subject could help determine the borders between the scientific treatment of the 
issue and the popular media news about unidentified flying object (UFO).123 In 
the 1970s the complete lack of positive results of the search for signals from other 
intelligent creatures (the so-called Silencium Universi) led to decreasing interest 
 122 Including especially Carl Sagan (1934–1996), Francis Crick (1916–2004) and Sir Fred 
Hoyle (1915–2001).
 123 Ufology and the concept of ancient astronauts (i.e., that aliens were actively involved 
in the emergence of ancient cultures and civilizations) merit a careful analysis as 
parascientific discourses. Reading the writings in the field (especially the works of 
Erich von Daeniken) shows complex functioning of elements of language and sci-
entific methodology. In short it can be said that the authors of such works reject the 
authority of “the officially accepted science,” but they employ its tools (or, strictly 
speaking, their simplified copies) to build their own theses in order to paradoxi-
cally add to their authority, based on “scientific precision.” Such authors are usually 
unaware of the paradox and the fact that their arguments notoriously violate the most 
basic principles of scientific thinking (including the principle of reproducibility of 
experiments). Lem often emphasizes that science cannot deal with one-time phe-
nomena (in ST he writes about it in the chapter “Extrasensory Phenomena,” 354–
358). A more thorough analysis of ufological texts would require a separate study. 
Many have criticized ufology and the concept of ancient astronauts (cf., e.g.: Wiktor 
Stoczkowski, Des hommes, des dieux et des extraterrestres. Ethnologie d’une croyance 
moderne [Paris: Flammarion, 1999]). A psychoanalytic take on the UFO phenomenon 
can be found in Carl Gustav Jung’s essay Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things 
Seen in the Skies. So far, however, there have been no analyses (at least not in Poland) 
of the language of the discourse on ufology and ancient aliens that would approach 








in the issue among scientists and eventually its shift into the mass culture, where 
it has flourished ever since, for example, in the X-Files series.124 The Silencium 
Universi is a serious problem in itself, but philosophical rather than scientific. It 
inspired Lem, both in ST and elsewhere, to think about whether potential intel-
ligent aliens could be intentionally concealing their presence in the Universe.125
This would be reason enough for Lem to treat the problem of extraterres-
trial civilizations as a pertinent one. Moreover, the problem has its justified 
place within the structure of ST. Lem starts with a premise that if he is to pre-
dict the development of our civilization, he first has to compare it with other 
civilizations. Or it should be done – but we know no other. From this lack Lem 
derives conclusions about what he believes the hypothetical civilizations have 
to be like. Rejecting the famous hypothesis formulated by von Hoerner about 
common self-destructive tendencies among cosmic civilizations,126 Lem points 
out that “the Intelligence we shall discover one day will possibly be so different 
from our ideas of it that we shall not even want to call it Intelligence” (68–69). 
This is a recurring theme of many of his novels, especially Solaris, His Master’s 
Voice and The Invincible: man is trapped in the solipsism of his own thinking and 
perception, and he can only feel it, when faced with an alien intelligence. Other 
forms of life may be too different for us to start a contact and understand their 
thinking – just as we cannot grasp how animals see the world127 (although Lem 
fails to see the analogy), or even the details of other people’s consciousness, espe-
cially if they are removed from us in time and space, or belong to other cultures. 
Of course, when it comes to contact with Aliens these differences would have 
been much bigger and more intense.
This is the chapter when for the first time in ST there is a suggestion that intel-
ligent forms of life may not only transform their environment to adopt it to their 
 124 The SETI program is still in operation though and it is dynamic, as can be seen on its 
rich website: http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/. Many personal computers connected 
to the Internet also analyze the radio data. In the 1990s both NASA and its European 
counterpart European Space Agency (ESA) renewed their interest in the subject, now 
as “astrobiology,” which does not look for intelligent forms of life but for bacteria.
 125 Cf. especially The New Cosmogony in: A Perfect Vacuum.
 126 It is the time of the most intense arms race. Von Hoerner’s hypothesis, which was 
formulated to explain Silencium Universi, assumes that every or nearly every civili-
zation destroys itself once it reaches the technological stage – and therefore it never 
has enough time to broadcast signals of its existence into the universe.
 127 Cf. Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like To Be a Bat?,” in:  Mortal Questions 
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needs, but they can also take up the task of transforming themselves through 
autoevolution (70–71). In such a case observing the traces of such creatures would 
be even more difficult for us, people. We are used to Reason, meaning “a heroic 
attack on surrounding matter” (70). But this, as I  wrote before, is a positivist 
conviction. We can already see that autoevolution as conceived by Lem renders 
the opposition of the artificial and the natural meaningless. Looking for traces 
of intelligent life in the universe, we are looking for the type of transformations 
in Nature, which could be seen as a result of intentional acts of Reason (e.g., 
radio signals, which could not have been produced “naturally”). How are we 
convinced about such distinctions though, Lem asks? How do we know what is 
Nature and what is an effect of intentional action? Those distinctions are merely 
a result of the biological and later historical development of our species. Perhaps 
what we take to be nature is a product of some intelligent Designer. Such a view, 
once described as theism, known in modern physics in certain types of anthropic 
principle, and surfacing in ideological debates in the simplified form of “theory 
of intelligent design” is formulated by Lem in one of his fake reviews in A Perfect 
Vacuum, in New Cosmogony. Unconstrained by the seriousness of the essay form 
or a discursive text, he expresses a view that laws of physics are rules of a game 
played by great civilizations. Whether in its extreme form, or as old theism, or 
even the moderate versions to be found in ST – the thesis is clear: the distinction 
between Nature and Artificiality loses its meaning when we start asking for its 
criteria. If living creatures – humans or aliens – subject their own bodies to the 
kind of transformative practices to which they subject their environment, “the 
nature” and “the artificial” distinction becomes null. Why?
Once again I return to the distinction between “a discovery” and “an inven-
tion.” You can only “discover something” that existed before that, independently 
from its discoverer; “invention” is an act of creating something that did not exist 
in real life before. Uranus the planet certainly had existed before Herschel dis-
covered it. A  phonograph had certainly never existed before Edison built it. 
However, these common sense notions become more complicated in the dis-
course of the Natural and the Artificial. One could assume that the distinc-
tion has something to do with one of the fundamental qualities of the Western 
thought – its focus on the subject. The distinction between the subject – “I” – and 
the external world, which serves as the field of perception and activity of the sub-
ject but materially independent from it, has been in our thinking at least since 
Descartes. The body is the link between the “I” and the world – this will become 
very important for my analysis of posthumanism in the later part of the book. 
This sharp distinction is the reason why people of the West have had such trouble 
understanding Indian philosophical systems, for example, as they do not have a 
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concept of an individual subject cognizing the world as external to it. The impact 
of the post-Cartesian philosophy of the subject is significant but a detailed 
analysis would be unnecessarily subtle for the purpose of this work. Here it is 
enough to suggest that the post-Cartesian subjectivity became the foundation 
of distinctions that I am describing here: the artificial, creativity and invention 
have been located on the side of the “I,” whereas the natural, transformation and 
discovery are all on the side of the world.128 It seems pertinent to remark that 
the philosophical romanticism strived to overcome these distinctions as early as 
the first half of the 19th century, but it had no practical impact on the hegemony 
of the enlightenment and positivism within the social praxis. Our time on the 
other hand really did bring a breakthrough in that regard. I want to show that ST 
is in fact a harbinger of this breakthrough, and in Part Three of this book I will 
try to prove that currently we are witnessing it actually happening, with utopian 
vision of further changes in that direction becoming intellectually available as 
well. “Autoevolution” is the key term here. The way Lem understands it means 
transplanting the category of “transformation” into the sphere of the subject. The 
subject (or, as Lem calls it, the Designer) begins to apply strategies to itself – 
to its own body – that were only applied to the external world before. And 
this, let me emphasize again, effectively obliterates the differences between the 
Natural and the Artificial, a discovery and an invention.
Of course, the concept of autoevolution needs to be thoroughly discussed 
and I  shall do that in Part Three. Its understanding depends on technological 
solutions but largely also on the way the world is conceived of. It is closely linked 
with the notion of the body as well. That is why I will need to refer to phenome-
nology and gender studies, for example.
Writing about the question of extraterrestrial life as Lem saw it, one has to 
mention one more thing, or in fact one more fundamental philosophical problem 
related to progress in science and technology, which Lem writes about in ST. Up 
until the 20th century there had been no issue of the limits to human knowledge 
because human knowledge could grasp only the immediate human surround-
ings, a limited scope from the perspective of the universe: planet Earth, its solar 
system and what is contained within it. It could be said that the scope of scien-
tific research was limited to the Lebenswelt. But in the 20th century it changed 
rapidly with the dynamic progress in physics and astronomy, which produced 
the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics and cosmology, leading to the 
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burning question of the relationship between the cognized world and the per-
ceptive tools and capacities. Theories and disciplines mentioned in the previous 
sentence have become deeply unintuitive. History of science tells us that their 
authors were in fact astonished by the results they reached – as exemplified in the 
many years of discussion between Einstein and Bohr about interpreting quantum 
mechanics or Einstein’s saying, repeated ad nauseam by scholars: Raffiniert ist 
der Herrgott, aber boshaft ist Er nicht. [“Subtle is the Lord, but He is not mali-
cious”].129 It means that even though the laws of Nature are extremely hard to 
grasp and discover for a human mind, the world is ultimately knowable. (This is 
exactly what Wiener claims when he writes about the “Augustinian” vision of the 
world.) The developments in science in the second half of the 20th century have 
put that claim into question.130 Lem phrases the problem as follows: can people – 
as creatures shaped through evolutionary biology, so with a brain and senses 
which are primarily supposed to help them survive in the physical conditions of 
planet Earth – use the ultimately fairly random sensorium to really discover and 
understand all the laws of the world, both in micro- and macroscale? To put it 
both shortly and loftily: can our brain encompass the universe? Lem claims it 
cannot, as the biological and evolutionary heritage of our species limits us to a 
narrow scope of time and space. The fact that we can in no way represent sensu-
ally either the world of elementary particles, or the grand scale of the structure 
of the universe speaks in favor of that thesis. On the other hand though, the fact 
that we have been able to figure out the existence of these two levels of being 
based solely on abstract reasonings and that this knowledge is coherent, with 
slight incoherencies in its very basics (if “only” is the right word here)  – this 
very fact shows that the human mind does have surprisingly large capacities. The 
knowledge we have about processes within the atomic nucleus or the dynamics 
of galaxy clusters is useless from the point of view of evolution (unless we treat 
building nuclear power plants as an element of a strategy of acquiring energy 
for the purpose of efficient survival, but even the most radical sociobiologists 
 129 The sentence appears in ST (173) in English as “God is sophisticated, but he is not 
malicious.”
 130 In Dyskusje…, Małgorzata Szpakowska quotes a sentence from Fritjof Capra: “in the 
20th century for the first time the human capacity to understand the universe has 
been put into question;” and comments: “Lem does not draw such radical conclusions; 
the very thought that the world could turn out to be essentially un-understandable 
is completely foreign to him” (68). In this chapter I claim it is quite the opposite: in 
ST, Lem does admit such a possibility and this is the cause of one of the important 






do not go that far). And yet – we reached it. It can be a sign of a huge excessive 
potential of our brains that the evolution gave us – and this is how it is generally 
interpreted, and Lem shares the view. Our main problem is we shall never be 
able to understand the limits of this knowledge. It is as if Pascal and Wittgenstein 
shook hands: the former with his sentence about the eternal silence of these infi-
nite spaces; the latter with the thesis about the eye that cannot see itself. It is a 
paradox – one of many in Lem’s thinking – that when the human brain reaches a 
level of abstraction so extreme, that the senses have long stayed behind, suddenly 
the biological heritage intervenes with great force to remind us that we did not 
appear in this world for the purpose of learning the First Principles.
We can certainly surprise ourselves. One of the last sentences Comte, the 
father of positivism, uttered before his death is a telling testimony to that: he 
said man would never learn the chemical structure of stars. How ironic that only 
two years later (1859) Bunsen and Kirchhoff built the first spectroscope. The 
very existence of culture, art, religion, philosophy and literature is undoubtedly a 
miracle of sorts in that context. Stanisław Lem was aware of that. But in his own 
thinking, both in ST and elsewhere, he always reminds us where we come from. 
Many would rather forget the inglorious roots. As we shall see soon, Stanisław 
Lem has something special to offer to them as well.
The universe does not help us in our musings on our future, but we can spec-
ulate using arguments ex silentium and ex nihilo. This is how chapter three of ST 
concludes. Then, Lem returns to Earth to deal with Homo sapiens as a species. 
It is pertinent to quote his own self-commentary in a discussion published in 
Studia Filozoficzne. There he speaks about some of the implicit anthropological 
premises made in ST:
it is possible to equate the products of man with products of Nature in their effi-
ciency, reliability, durability, universality, etc. It is also possible to try and differentiate 
between stages of such rivalry; it would have to start with the stage of regulation, i.e. of 
optimalizing stages of what is, or what is given (society, our brain, our body); the second 
stage would be that of creation (involving a transition from what is given to creating new 
solutions). (95)
The distinction is not kept everywhere in ST, but chapter four, which I  will 
discuss shortly, does describe some improvements in the external reality of 
human life – the transition to the actual autoevolution will come later. Lem also 
expresses his view on human nature at that time, which is very important for our 
understanding of his intellectual route. Despite his self-proclaimed “skepticism” 
(Studia Filozoficzne…, 96), he is in fact still close to the unconditional optimism 
of Dialogues:
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The book [ST] assumes a certain kind of human and a certain kind of culture – “max-
imally rational.” It is premised on a historical development that will make this kind of 
human and culture more prevalent, more and more universal. That is the optimism 
which can be found in Summa. Without that direction of cultural development there 
would be no optimalization in actions, nor any rationality of efforts, nor the highest pace 
of growth or the best choice – to everyone’s benefit – among many possibilities.
Those premises have not been explicitly articulated – they can be read between the lines. 
Societies and individuals, which we know from history behave so splendidly only very 
rarely. My book turns these exceptions into a norm. It is a bold move, but I believe it is 
not entirely utopian. (97–98)131
 131 The utopian character of Lem’s predictions and projects will be analyzed in the next 




12  Turing Body
The title of the fourth chapter is “Intelectronics,” but one would be disappointed 
looking for the history of microprocessors (Intel company was established 
4 years after the first edition of ST). Instead it is a compound of “intelligent elec-
tronics” (the founders of Intel were probably working with the same idea). This 
is the chapter that most clearly continues the themes from Dialogues. Lem writes 
a lot about “intelligence amplifiers” (e.g., 93–96; the idea comes from Ashby) and 
the projects of “a radical restructuring of science as a system that acquires and 
transmits information” (86). The restructuring is forced by the “megabyte bomb” 
(81–85), that is, the exponential increase of knowledge, which no one can grasp, 
not only as a whole (it is no point even dreaming about it anymore, as Lem points 
out often and with regret), but even within one discipline.
The restructuring of science is to be made possible by the creation of cybernetic 
systems (we would say computer systems today): systems of acquiring, selecting 
and distributing information. Such systems, which for Lem are the first stage of 
technology of “information farming,” have not been created yet, although the ex-
isting algorithms for searching information on the Internet, which are constantly 
being improved, are getting closer to this vision. The ideas of machines that are 
transformers of knowledge again include Lem’s utopian belief in the rationality 
of technology and its products. One can imagine how disappointed he must have 
been with the early Internet with its practically infinite space of chaotic informa-
tion that did not become knowledge (i.e., an ordered structure). The increase in 
knowledge is gaining pace, and if Lem was anxious about the amount of it half 
a century ago, the situation is certainly far more dramatic now.132 The so-called 
Lem’s law is partially true then; he formulated it in one of his columns in the 
1990s: (1) No one reads. (2) If someone reads, they do not understand anything. 
(3) If they understand, they forget immediately. I bring up this aphorism not as 
an element of my analysis of Lem’s discourse, but to demonstrate, how bitter and 
disillusioned he was at the end of his life.
 132 In his later novel, Wizja lokalna [“Observation on the Spot”], there is an extensive 
description of “ignorantics” and “ariadnology” – disciplines devoted solely to deter-
mining the level of ignorance (stemming from excess of information, and not from 
epistemological limitations) and methods of finding information in a nearly infinite 






The functioning of “intelligence amplifiers,” Lem says, will inevitably become 
incomprehensible for people from a certain level of complexity. It is a conse-
quence of their purpose:  to process the amounts of information that humans 
can no longer process. Lem uses the notion of “a black box” here, as known in 
behaviorist psychology. He points out that we should not be worried that we 
will not understand the rules and functioning of such a machine, because our 
brain is a similar “black box.” We do not know the precise mechanism behind it, 
as the “self-referentiality” of the brain would not have any use in the evolution 
process (99).133 “The uniqueness of the cybernetic solution, whereby a machine is 
completely alienated from the domain of human knowledge, has actually already 
been used by Nature for a long time now” (99). We can now observe the “unique-
ness” on everyday basis, working on our computers, tablets and smartphones – 
no one other than IT and electronics experts can ever understand the rules of 
how these devices work. They are nearly what Lem meant as “black boxes,” but 
they are not “intelligence amplifiers.”
At this point I  find myself dangerously close to the old fear of “machines 
smarter than humans,” “breaking free” from our power and becoming unpre-
dictable. Such a view is of little interest to Lem though, as he is too attached to 
humanism, to the motif of the sorcerer’s apprentice and such other ideas. (The 
motif itself is actually quite fascinating and I will return to it when discussing 
posthumanism.) That does not mean, however, that Lem never asks about the 
consequences of “the black box” for the social practice, only limiting himself to 
epistemological problems.
For Lem intelectronics is not primarily a way to build “smarter machines” 
or “artificial brains” – they are but an intermediary stage. Constantly drawing 
parallels between Technology and Nature, he writes:
… such a new technology will mean a completely new type of control man will gain 
over himself, that is, over his organism. This will in turn enable the fulfillment of some 
age-long dreams, such as the desire for immortality, or even perhaps the reversal of 
processes that are considered irreversible today (biological processes in particular, espe-
cially aging). Yet those goals may turn out to be a fantasy, just as the alchemists’ gold 
 133 Here and in other places Lem’s argument is only congruent with some varieties of 
contemporary evolutionism, that is, the ones which assume that the evolution process 
exhibits a preference for beneficial solutions only, and it rejects solutions that are not 
beneficial or that are neutral from the point of view of survival. However, elsewhere 
in Lem’s work we would find statements about the “excess” of evolutionary solutions, 
which would mean that he does not side entirely with any type of evolutionism and 




was. Even if man is indeed capable of anything, he surely cannot achieve it in just any 
way. He will eventually achieve every goal if he so desires, but he will understand before 
that that the price he would have to pay for achieving such a goal would reduce this goal 
to absurdity.
It is because even if we ourselves choose the end point, our way of getting there is chosen 
by Nature. We can fly, but not by flapping our arms. We can walk on water, but not in 
the way it is depicted in the Bible. Perhaps we will eventually gain a kind of longevity 
that will practically amount to immortality, but to do this, we will have to give up on the 
bodily form that nature gave us. (91)
Intelectronics is the first step on the way to autoevolution. We need to remember 
that for Lem both computer and human brain are cybernetic systems. Equating 
them as a category allows him to believe that the growth of technology of 
constructing “thinking machines” will sooner or later translate into autoevolution 
technology – that there will occur a process that is reverse to what some artificial 
intelligence (AI) experts are predicting today, when they strive to build an artifi-
cial brain seeing it as the ultimate task of technology. One could say for Lem this 
is the penultimate task.
Before I proceed with a discussion of the social implications of intelectronics, 
I need to make one important digression. The whole chapter of ST I am discussing 
now is deeply related to a discipline now most commonly known as AI, even 
though Lem never uses the name. The term was first used by John McCarthy in 
1956. Nowadays AI is really a separate discipline of science, combining computer 
technology, logic, neurophysiology and neuroscience, philosophy of language 
and mind, as well as cognitive and developmental psychology. Its object is “the 
capacity of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks 
commonly associated with intelligent beings. The term is frequently applied to 
the project of developing systems capable of intellectual processes characteristic 
of humans, such as the ability to reason, discover meaning, generalize, or learn 
from past experience.”134 The main area of exploration in AI right now is building 
devices that could engage in logical games (especially chess), devices that could 
prove logical and mathematical theorems, recognize images and understand nat-
ural languages. Specialists in AI also write about constructing “artificial brain” 
(neuronal networks) and robots with advanced locomotory capacities. The 
discipline’s foundational text is an article by Alan Mathison Turing Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence, published in 1950 in a prestigious British journal 
 134 Encyclopaedia Britannica, ed. 1996, vol. 1, 605. The definition is based on the views 
of Marvin Minsky, who is generally seen as the most distinguished contemporary 




Mind. The article contains a description and a discussion of “Turing test,” a 
procedure aiming to determine whether a machine subjected to it can imitate 
human intellectual processes. One would be hard pressed to find any description 
of the AI problematic today where the author would not be respectfully referring 
to this piece and Turing’s name in the very first words. AI is a hugely controver-
sial field, provoking radically diverging philosophical views. I have no intention 
of recounting those arguments, instead hoping to point to some of the unobvious 
convergences in Turing’s and Lem’s thinking.
At the roots of all disputes around AI there is the problem of vagueness of 
two key terms. Turing’s question about whether “a machine can think” makes 
sense only if we know exactly what the terms “machine” and “think” mean. 
And this is not clear, especially with the latter word. Naturally, Turing realized 
these difficulties and took them into account, but the definitions he proposed 
are not obvious at all, and the never-ending discussion surrounding them is the 
main evidence of that. While the notion of “machine” is fairly clearly defined – 
at least in the strictly technical sense (there are precise definitions of “Turing 
machine”  – the general technological model of a counting machine  – and of 
“von Neumann machine” – the general technological model of a digital com-
puter), we still cannot find agreement on what “thinking” means. Hence the 
numerous polemics with Turing test and his definition of thinking.135 There are 
 135 The most famous among them is likely the “Chinese room argument” formulated 
by John Searle [John Searle, Minds, Brains and Programs, in: Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, no. 3 (1980), 417–457]. Searle presents a situation in which an English person 
who does not know Chinese receives a set of Chinese ideograms with instructions in 
English on how to use them. The person then generates output of correctly formed 
Chinese phrases, even though he or she does not understand them. According to 
Searle it is a proof that there is no connection between correct use of linguistic signs 
and intentionality of using them, and hence that the notion of “thinking” cannot be 
correctly applied to digital machines. Lem refers to this thought experiment in the title 
essay of his volume Tajemnica chińskiego pokoju [“The Chinese Room Secret”] (1996), 
where he rejects Searle’s arguments against Turing test. Lem included his own version 
of the test in ST (130). In The Magellan Nebula there is a “Turing tale” (245–247, in 
the 1955 Polish edition; unavailable in English).
  It is worth mentioning also Hilary Putnam’s essay Brains in a Vat. The essay contains 
evidence about conventional character of reference in linguistic signs and belongs 
mostly to philosophy of language. However, Putnam invokes Turing test in his argu-
ment, emphasizing that linguistic expressions used by a computer have no reference 
to the external world (which is a way of saying they are unintentional). From the point 




two ways to approach the problem. If thinking is defined as a process consisting 
of logical and mathematical operations (as “the strong AI” would assume), then 
machines do think. However, if thinking is defined as a process dependent on 
human sensorium, on the whole of sensual and mental experiences that make up 
our consciousness, then we cannot determine unequivocally whether machines 
can think, for the same reason why we do not have access to anyone else’s con-
sciousness. The only difference is that when A says to B “I have a toothache” and 
both are people, then while B cannot feel the same pain as A, he can represent 
the pain to himself, using what he has stored in his own memory (unless he has 
never had a toothache before). But if A said to B “I am having a short circuit” and 
A were a machine, while B a human, then B would have no way of representing 
the content of that from A statement to himself. But then the question whether 
“a machine can think” no longer has meaning.136
Turing knew perfectly well that the phenomenological and sensual approach 
to thinking makes the whole problem irrelevant and this is one of the reasons 
why he designed his test (which he himself called “an imitation game”) in such 
a way as to make it impossible to phrase the problem this way.137 Hardly anyone 
builds the main line of his argument (the “brains in a vat” from the title, isolated from 
the external, physical reality, but retaining an illusion of contact through a connection 
to a computer) is fully identical with the Lem’s short story about Professor Corcoran 
(Further Reminiscences of Ijon Tichy Part One) in Memoirs of a Space Traveler: Further 
Reminiscences of Ijon Tichy (1966, first published in English in 1991). The astonishing 
congruence has its sources in Berkeley’s philosophy of course, which both Lem and 
Putnam reinterpret.
 136 It is a fundamentally lemological problem. This is yet another example of reaching the 
very limits of human mind’s ability to conceptualize, which according to Lem are the 
reason why any attempt at contact between people and other forms of intelligence fail. 
This case is unique though as this alien form is the product of human activity. This 
paradox is a source of anxiety, which, I believe, is at the roots of most emotionally 
biased views on AI.
 137 The example I gave above takes into account only one variety of the thinking question 
within AI. Yet invoking pain is frequent in discussions about the relationship between 
intersubjective thinking and individual consciousness within the philosophy of mind 
in general; for example, cf. Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, par. 281–287. 
(I leave out here advanced discussions that take place within the contemporary phi-
losophy of mind about the very existence, characteristics and cognitive availability of 
subjective psychic experiences.) Apart from “the strong version of AI” and the “phe-
nomenological” approach I have just outlined, there is also “a weak version of AI,” 
according to which human thought processes are unpredictable (in a mathematical 






notices that Turing test actually precludes presence of the creature, which passes 
it. The communication happens solely through text. The only criterion is syntax 
and semantics of the enunciation. This makes the questions of the conditions 
that shaped it, of whether it is a result of “mathematical” or “phenomenological” 
thinking, or some other type still, in short the question of intentionality behind 
the enunciation, irrelevant. All that matters is an artifact of text.
The original version of the Turing test may seem rather surprising. It actually 
starts not with how to distinguish between a human and a machine but with dis-
tinguishing between a man (A) and a woman (B); and the man can intentionally 
mislead the interrogator by offering confusing answers, whereas for the woman 
“[t] he best strategy … is probably to give truthful answers.”138 Authors writing 
about AI usually omit this passage and proceed to the main argument. This bit 
is in fact incomprehensible unless we take into account Turing’s homosexuality, 
which implicitly dominated his life and led to his death at the early age of 42.139
I suggest that this peculiar opening of the “imitation game” from Turing may 
be related to his personal life – or rather the lack thereof,140 not in a sense that 
the whole issue of AI could be sensibly explained through the author’s personal 
issues, but they could be behind Turing’s thought, directing it toward machines 
as an alternative to people. But that is not all. Going deeper into Turing’s text 
(not merely the test) one can notice that it is highly emotional, and intellectually 
incredibly dense. Turing writes:
The new problem [introducing a machine into the test] has the advantage of drawing 
a fairly sharp line between the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man. No 
in a machine. “Spiritualism” – a conviction that there is an immaterial soul – is an 
extreme variety of the weak AI.
 138 Turing, “Computing Machines and Intelligence,” Mind, no. 236 (1950), 433–460.
 139 Cf. Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma (London: Burnett Books, 1983). It is 
a huge biography with an extensive source base, a product of 7 years of research that 
the author started practically from scratch. Turing poisoned himself with cyanide as a 
result of serious depression caused by enforced hormonal treatment that he was sen-
tenced to in court. He turned himself in to the police after a random sexual partner 
started stealing from him and blackmailing him. Homosexuality was punishable by 
law in the United Kingdom at that time.
 140 Hodges makes similar suggestions: “He painted the pages of this journey into cyber-
space with the awkward eroticism and encyclopaedic curiosity of his personality. 
Modern cultural critics have jumped with delight to psychoanalyse its surprises. … 
the subtext is full of provocative references to his own person …” Andrew Hodges, 
Turing (New York: Routledge, 1999), 38. It is an abbreviated version of the full biog-








engineer or chemist claims to be able to produce a material which is indistinguish-
able from the human skin. It is possible that at some time this might be done, but even 
supposing this invention available we should feel there was little point in trying to make 
a “thinking machine” more human by dressing it up in such artificial flesh. The form 
in which we have set the problem reflects this fact in the condition which prevents the 
interrogator from seeing or touching the other competitors, or hearing their voices. 
(434; emphasis PM)
Clearly, Turing wants to make sure there is no possibility of physical contact 
between participants of the test. If this were only about making it harder to 
distinguish between a machine and a man (which up until today tend to have 
very different physiques), it would be pragmatically understandable. But Turing 
writes that “it would not make sense” to make a machine resemble a man exter-
nally (i.e., to produce an android). Apparently retaining the physical difference is 
better in his view for some reason. Right before this passage there are sentences 
that have been quoted here before:
The best strategy for her is probably to give truthful answers. She can add such things 
as “I am the woman, don’t listen to him!” to her answers, but it will avail nothing as the 
man can make similar remarks.
We now ask the question, “What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this 
game?” (434)
A man can imitate a woman. He can also be replaced by a machine, which would 
not resemble a human at all, and then the machine would imitate either a man 
or a woman, but a human in general – regardless of gender. I believe Turing is 
striving to liberate the creature taking the test from all issues related to gender 
and sexuality. Some of the commentators wrote that a machine could replace a 
man, while others would see it as a mistake caused by “unfortunate” phrasing. In 
my view the phrasing is careful and purposeful. This is what follows:
The question and answer method seems to be suitable for introducing almost any one 
of the fields of human endeavour that we wish to include. We do not wish to penalise 
the machine for its inability to shine in beauty competitions, nor to penalise a man for 
losing in a race against an aeroplane. The conditions of our game make these disabilities 
irrelevant. The “witnesses” can brag as much as they please, if they consider it advisable, 
about their charms, strength or heroism, but the interrogator cannot demand practical 
demonstrations. (435)
Machine is to have nothing in common with human apart from intelligence that 
can be verified through text. It does not have to prove it has any other quali-
ties; it does not need to “shine in beauty competitions.” It need not be penalized 
for not fulfilling such norms in a way some people were then penalized for not 
conforming to other norms.
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A bit further on Turing discusses the definition of “a machine” and writes 
bitterly:
Finally, we wish to exclude from the machines men born in the usual manner. It is dif-
ficult to frame the definitions so as to satisfy these three conditions. One might for 
instance insist that the team of engineers should be all of one sex, but this would not 
really be satisfactory, for it is probably possible to rear a complete individual from a 
single cell of the skin (say) of a man. (435–436)
This is an extraordinary passage and, I need to add, very much in Lem’s spirit 
in how it speaks of the “nonmachine” people “born in the usual manner.” But 
something else is striking here: Turing’s argument and the way he carries out 
his reasoning are very different from the standard academic discourse. This was 
not how people wrote in the mid-20th century. (It is equally extraordinary that 
Turing predicts cloning in passing.) At this point again behind the scientific 
arguments there seems to lurk Turing’s exasperation with gender.
In the following part of the text there is a description of a digital computer and 
the famous discussion with arguments contradicting Turing’s theses. Let us look 
at the fifth argument (“from various disabilities”):
These arguments take the form, “I grant you that you can make machines do all the 
things you have mentioned but you will never be able to make one to do X.” Numerous 
features X are suggested in this connexion. I  offer a selection:  Be kind, resourceful, 
beautiful, friendly, have initiative, have a sense of humour, tell right from wrong, make 
mistakes, fall in love, enjoy strawberries and cream, make someone fall in love with 
it, learn from experience, use words properly, be the subject of its own thought, have as 
much diversity of behaviour as a man, do something really new. (447, emphasis PM)
This enumeration is food for thought here as well, especially the passage I have 
put in bold. Listing “strawberries and cream” between “fall in love” and “make 
someone fall in love with it” – and with all three preceded by “making mistakes” – 
is peculiar in itself. Moreover, further on Turing discusses some of these charges 
and writes:
There are, however, special remarks to be made about many of the disabilities that have 
been mentioned. The inability to enjoy strawberries and cream may have struck the 
reader as frivolous. Possibly a machine might be made to enjoy this delicious dish, 
but any attempt to make one do so would be idiotic. What is important about this dis-
ability is that it contributes to some of the other disabilities, e.g., to the difficulty of the 
same kind of friendliness occurring between man and machine as between white man 
and white man, or between black man and black man. (448, emphasis PM)
I believe that Turing’s commentary on the inability to enjoy strawberries and 
cream in truth refers to the two qualities listed before and after that one in the 
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enumeration above. For a psychoanalyst this would be completely obvious. 
Appreciating “delicious dish” by a machine is “idiotic.” A machine is meant to do 
something else. There is to be a different “kind of friendliness” between machine 
and man. Honestly, it is hard to not notice elements of personal engagement here.
There are a few other such passages in Turing’s text. I  have only listed the 
most telling ones. A poem Turing included in his letter to Dr. N. A. Routledge 
after his arrest is another sign that he did connect his personal issues with his 
research:  Turing believes machines think / Turing lies with men / Therefore 
machines do not think.”141 Irony turns into despair here, and the entire life work 
is being put into question.
This is enough when it comes to analyzing Turing’s article.142 Let us read this 
sentence again: “We now ask the question, ‘What will happen when a machine 
takes the part of A  [i.e. man] in this game?’ ” This is when the actual Turing 
test begins, the one that has been described and analyzed too often for it to be 
sensibly repeated here. Instead I preferred focusing on the personal issues that 
Turing hid in his text. I am asking: why did Turing want machine to replace 
man? I repeat again: I am not suggesting that the objective, scientific meaning 
of his research is determined by his personal, individual disposition. I am not 
claiming that Turing test is the product of heteronormative oppression. I  am 
trying to answer the question why of all the infinite aspect of the physical reality 
he chose to study this one – the swop of machine for man – and why he treated it 
the way he did? Why did he hide body? Why did he choose machine?
One could say I  have answered the question myself writing about the 
“nonphenomenal” presence of machine, justified by the nonintentional char-
acter of the enunciation it produced. But such explanation (apart from being 
not necessarily satisfactory from the philosophical and scientific point of view) 
remains on the methodological level. Why should I not ask about the psycho-
logical reason? In fact the explicitly personal tones included, as I have shown, 
in Turing’s article actually provoke such a question. So why did Turing write the 
way he did?
Perhaps because he valued the peacefulness of machine higher than the anx-
iety of a homosexual body. Machine is predictable, it causes no surprises, it does 
not disappoint or fail the way man does – such statements can often be heard 
 141 Hodges, Turing…, 54.
 142 Similar arguments can be found in N. Katherine Hayles’ introduction to How We 







from technocrats. They are theoretically true, but in practice any user of a per-
sonal computer would beg to differ. Perhaps, however, Turing meant something 
more. Machine has no sex; it has no lust, no desires; it does not yearn for any-
thing the way man does.
For one reason or another Turing was clearly fascinated by the vision of 
machines replacing humans. It is time to ask: what does it all have to do with 
Lem? This is a fascination the two of them have in common. Again, to answer 
the question why would Lem share it (leaving aside the question of whether this 
question makes sense in the first place), one needs to engage in risky specula-
tion,143 but on a very different subject. No one suspects Lem of sexual inver-
sion, even though there are texts about his misogyny.144 But Lem has disgust for 
human body. He abhors physiology and sexuality, which he sees as connected 
with abject secretions more than with anything else. It is a persevering motif in 
his writings: disgust with human physiology. It is another paradox:  the writer 
looking to deify man in Nature, evolution and biology describes his own species 
as “paleface” or “mucilids,” and composes insulting verses:
What Nature’s charge
Constitutes the fate of the unhappy Earthlings
Who in the price of love
The outlets of metabolism have,
Taken with pity the whole Universe
Extends its hands to you people
Who locate the perfect feelings
In the ugliest parts of the body
…
Knowing where they hold their ideals
With no way of escaping the trap,
Taken with pity the whole Universe
Wrings its tentacles in horror
…
 143 It brings to mind a comparison with a passage from The Magellan Nebula. One of the 
characters, who has just been through a heartbreak, asks a robot to kill him. Machine 
does not understand the order and the misunderstanding provokes a fascinating dia-
logue between them. I believe the scene can be interpreted as a fictionalization of 
Turing’s views on the difference between man and machine (it is unlikely this is what 
Lem had in mind, although it is not impossible Lem knew Turing’s works by the time 
he was writing The Magellan Nebula).
 144 There are quasi-homoerotic themes in his early works that usually come from an 






When in a hurry my girl I pollintae;
I write verses full of dancing
Bees, roses and butterflies
But you, unhappy human nation,
Which loving its females
Have to mate obsessively
Alas, with their plumbing,
Dost you praise it – in verses?145
Can anyone still doubt that for Lem body was disgusting?146 The near-absence of 
love themes or scenes in his novels would seem to confirm this diagnosis.147 On 
the other hand, one could list a catalogue of passages from Lem’s grotesque short 
stories from The Cyberiad and The Star Diaries where the disgust with body and 
sexuality is ostentatious.148 I am trying to offer an explanation of the lack that 
would situate Lem not only within the scope of the contemporary question of 
sexuality, but actually at the very center of it, albeit not overtly. The most impor-
tant issues do not have to be shown in their closest anatomy. We saw that with 
Turing as well. In Lem’s case the implicit reason pushing him away from the body 
may likely be his traumatic wartime experience.149
 145 Wizja lokalna, [“Observation on the Spot”] (Kraków: WL, 1983), 118 (trans. by Olga 
Kaczmarek). Names such as “paleface,” “mucilids,” “sticky Albuminids” and similar 
come up many times in The Cyberiad – the volume of short stories that have robots 
as narrators and as inner audience.
 146 Treating judgments formulated in a piece of fiction, and a grotesque one, as an expres-
sion of author’s views can be seen as a sign of methodological naivety. But it is sen-
sible to treat author’s views as formulated in his fiction and in his discursive works as 
elements of one metadiscourse. Of course, I do not assume that the views of Lem the 
author are necessarily identical with the views of Lem the person.
 147 It brings Harey from Solaris to mind. Harey is and is not human. Lem carefully 
emphasizes her superhuman qualities in the scene in which Kelvin is testing her 
blood and discovers that Harey is made of different particles than people. It is a strong 
manifestation of Harey’s “bodily inhumanity,” even though on the “macroscope” level 
she seems human.
 148 Lem’s grotesque writings are a litmus test of his worldview: he articulated in them 
his most extreme opinions about the human nature and the future of man. In his 
autocommentaries from the 1990s, he often admitted that he had hoped these par-
ticular visions would remain fantasies, but they seemed to have been fulfilled most 
literally. The Cyberiad and The Star Diaries deserve an interpretation which would 
show that they hyperbolize “serious” discourses and fictions Lem wrote, and that they 
all make up a coherent whole.
 149 I wrote about it in details in an article Lem fantastyczny czy makabryczny? O możliwym 












Instead Lem dives into the world of machines. Nearly all of his novels include 
extensive detailed descriptions of all sorts of mechanisms. Sometimes he pays 
more attention to screws, pegs and steering systems than to his character’s psyche. 
In Eden an amazing description of “factory” becomes emblematic of this theme, 
in which machine and the organic combine very closely, with the organic ele-
ment dominated by machine. Lem’s machines are not lifeless, in a sense in which 
weird objects in Locus Solus by Raymond Roussel are, or in a sense in which the 
mechanisms Vern’s characters use to order the world are lifeless. Lem’s machines 
are not dead, despite the fact that Michael Kandel translated The Cyberiad as 
Mortal Engines. They are not dead, because for Lem, just as for Turing, machines 
are better than people. Both ethically and aesthetically better.
Let me return to chapter four of ST. After outlining the “black box” idea, Lem 
writes:
It is time to introduce moral issues into our cybernetic deliberations. But it is in fact 
the other way around: it is not we who are introducing questions of ethics into cyber-
netics; it is cybernetics that, as it expands, envelops with its consequences all that which 
we understand as morality, that is, a system of criteria that evaluate behavior in a way 
that, from a purely objective perspective, looks arbitrary. Morality is arbitrary just as 
mathematics is, because both are deduced from accepted axioms by means of logical 
reasoning. (99–100)
We know these views already from Dialogues and the consequences of pro-
moting them further come with the same contradictions. As long as Lem writes 
about “electrocracy,” that is, the possibility to delegate some of the decision pro-
cesses within a society to “intelligence amplifiers,” he himself sees the aporiae 
and admits that treating a society as homeostat or a predictable processing infor-
mation system unavoidably leads to a collapse of the entire model (99–107). In 
short: the strict rationality of “the cybernetic ruler” combined with the irratio-
nality of men and the practically infinite number of parameters affecting the 
system soon ends in disaster. Comparison with the centrally planned economy is 
hard to resist, but this time it does not seem to be intentional.
Later, however, Lem goes further and tries to refer the idea of “thinking 
machines” to problems of faith and metaphysics, which means taking up a chal-
lenge which AI experts usually avoid. This boldness is impressive, but the exe-
cution is controversial, to say the least. This part of ST (107–129) contains a 
mix of extreme epistemological reductionism and bold thought experiments, as 
Source of Non-Realistic Writing”], Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki, no.  1 (2009). 
I wrote about it also in the third chapter of my book The Speaking Lion.
Turing Body 109
well as very complex attempts to bring together such issues as the possibility of 
grounding religious faith in rationality, the question of the contents of faith in 
terms of theory of information, hypotheses about the physiology of metaphysical 
experience, the cognitive status of revelation, the impact of religion on social life 
and “the ghost in the machine” (i.e., AI – this is where we can find Lem’s version 
of the Turing test). Of the whole ST this section is most like an informal essay, 
in a negative sense; to disentangle all the threads Lem combined on these pages 
would require a whole separate treaty. It includes statements such as:
No religion can do anything for humanity, because it is not an empirical knowledge. 
It does reduce the “existential pain” of individuals, but at the same time, it increases 
the sum total of calamities affecting whole populations precisely owing to its helpless-
ness and idleness in the face of social problems. It cannot thus be defended as a useful 
tool, one that remains helpless in the face of the fundamental problems of the world. 
(122–123)
This is a moment when Lem becomes a real, ahistorical, scientistic techno-
crat. If his entire work consisted of such statements, there would be no value in 
striving to analyze it.150 Soon after, however, he describes a fascinating project of 
building “a believing machine,” one that would have metaphysical beliefs about, 
say, life after death programmed into it. He then elaborated on the project in Non 
Serviam, one of fake reviews in A Perfect Vacuum. It will also return later in ST.
This intellectual Gordian knot ends, as is often the case with Lem, in a state-
ment about the impossibility of a conclusion. At the end of this part of ST, he 
proceeds directly to take up the problem of consciousness in a machine (which 
is the key issue for AI), comparing it to “the bald man paradox” (we do not know 
from which point we can speak of “consciousness” as correlate to the degree 
of complexity of mathematical processes carried out), and then eventually he 
repeats his thesis from Dialogues, that consciousness is “ ‘disseminated’ across 
the whole of the homeostat across its activity network. We cannot say anything 
else on this matter if we want to remain both sensible and cautious” (132). And 
this conclusion proved to be true – the contemporary neuroscience accepts sim-
ilar positions.
Lem’s views on reducing faith to physiology and on the social function of 
religion certainly had the biggest impact on the tone of Kołakowski’s review. It 
 150 It needs to be pointed out that in other works Lem takes up the issues of religion with 
a lot more understanding. Szpakowska devotes a whole chapter in her monograph to 
it (Lem i Pan Bóg), and Jarzębski is even trying to present his oeuvre in general as a 




needs to be added that they fell on a deaf ear as theoreticians and practitioners–
constructors of AI are generally careful to avoid getting involved in such topics or 
simply are not aware of them; and even Lem himself did a much better job mar-
rying religion with intelectronics in The Cyberiad, The Star Diaries and A Perfect 
Vacuum. The impact of technology on spiritual life was and still is being raised 
though, albeit on a different level. Suffice it to mention the notion of “cybernetic 
religion” proposed by Fromm,151 the powerful metaphor of “Turing man” offered 
by Bolter, or Henri Lefebrve’s “cybernanthrope.”152 Today many authors attempt 
to redefine basic philosophical categories due to the influence of technology (i.e., 
redefining the notion of “individual identity” in the context of cloning), but such 
discussions belong to a different field.
The last part of “Intelectronics” is “Doubts and Antinomies” (137–153). In 
it Lem sums up the unsolved conceptual problems related to AI in a way that 
remains useful today. He discusses the philosophical paradoxes of “thinking 
machines,” their “consciousness” and “personality,” their potential “wisdom” and 
so on clearly and precisely. The conclusion of the  chapter is:
Those systems will not be trying to “dominate over humanity” in any anthropomorphic 
sense because, not being human, they will not manifest any signs of egoism or desire for 
power – which obviously can only be meaningfully ascribed to “persons.” Yet humans 
could personify those machines by ascribing to them intentions and sensations that are 
not in them, on the basis of a new mythology of an intelectric age. I am not trying to 
demonize those impersonal regulators; I am only presenting a surprising situation when, 
like in the cave of Polyphemus, no one is making a move on us – but this time for our own 
good. Final decision can remain in human hands forever, yet any attempts to exercise this 
freedom will show us that alternative decisions made by the machine (had they indeed 
been alternative) would have been more beneficial because they would have been taken 
from a more comprehensive perspective. After several painful lessons, humanity could 
turn into a well-behaved child, always ready to listen to (No One’s) good advice. In this 
version, the Regulator is much weaker than in the Ruler version because it never imposes 
anything; it only provides advice – yet does its weakness become our strength? (152–153)
Michel Foucault would certainly appreciate these sentences  – Lem described 
Power without Subject, without Man. The impersonal power of machine.
 151 Erich Fromm, To Have or To Be? (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 120–132, especially 
131–132. “Man has made himself into a god because he has acquired the technical 
capacity for ‘a second creation’ … We can also formulate: We have made the machine 
into a god and have become godlike by serving the machine.”
 152 Henri Lefebvre, Vers le Cybernantrope. Contres les technocrates (Paris:  Denoe ̈l-
Gonthier, 1971). “It is a man who defines himself in terms of an artificial brain, lives 






Of course, I belong to the Enlightenment and I am a 
rationalist, albeit a little desperate. A desperate rationalist 
can turn out to be closely related to a fool.
Letter to Michael Kandel, July 1, 1972
The fifth chapter of ST, “Prolegomena to Omnipotence,” serves as a metatheory 
for the entire work. It is located midway through the book and it divides it 
into two symmetrical parts. The first one is about issues of autoevolution 
unrelated to biology (the hypothetical reference to extraterrestrial civilization 
and intelectronics, that is, the capacity to build intelligent machines without 
organic components)  – and this is the part that has been discussed here 
already. The other part of ST is devoted to those aspects of autoevolution that 
are directly connected with biology and Nature. Those include phantomology, 
information farming and autoevolution in a strict sense, that is, reconstruc-
tion of the human species. Before Lem discusses them though, he first outlines 
a sort of classification of autoevolution and tries to impose a conceptual order 
on his own reflections on the subject, which is necessary given how different 
his thought is from what was accepted earlier, as I have emphasized on many 
occasions.
At the beginning Lem writes:
It is only when we are eventually able to compete with Nature on the level of crea-
tion, when we have learned to copy it so that we can discover all of its limitations as 
a Designer, that we shall enter the realm of freedom, of being able to work out a crea-
tive strategy subordinated to our goals. … we can turn Nature’s infinity against it, so to 
speak, by working, as Technologists, on uncountable sets … We can remove the differ-
ence between “the artificial” and “the natural” – which will happen once the “artificial” 
first becomes indistinguishable from the natural and then exceeds it. We shall discuss 
later on how this is going to happen. But how should we understand this moment of 
“exceeding” the natural? It stands for carrying out with Nature’s help what it cannot do 
itself. (156)
Soon after he defines the notion of “Machine.” I will quote an extensive passage 
here, as it is one of the most important ones in ST and Lem’s way of thinking 
about technology cannot be fully understood without it.
OK, then, someone will say, all these lofty phrases were just intended to elevate human 




Everything depends on what we understand by a “machine.” It can, of course, refer 
just to what we have learned to construct so far. Yet if by “machine” we understand 
something that displays regularity, the situation will change. From such a broad per-
spective, it is not important anymore whether a “machine” has been constructed from 
existing matter, from those one hundred elements discovered by physics, or from air 
showers, or even from gravitational fields. It is also not important whether and how 
a “machine” uses, or even “creates” energy. It would, of course, be possible to con-
struct a system consisting of intelligent beings and their environment in which our 
laws of thermodynamics would not apply. Someone will respond that this system 
would be “artificial” and that we would secretly have to provide it with energy from 
outside, in a way that would be unnoticeable to its inhabitants. Yet we do not know 
whether the Metagalaxy does not have any external energy sources that would be 
“connected” to this system from outside. Maybe it does; maybe its eternal supply of 
energy results from the infinity of the Universe. If that was the case, would this mean 
that the Metagalaxy was “artificial”? As we can see, everything depends on the scale of 
phenomena under discussion. A machine is thus a system that manifests some kind 
of regularity of behavior:  statistical, probabilistic, or deterministic. From this point 
of view an atom, an apple tree, a star system, or a supernatural world is a machine. 
Everything we construct, and that behaves in a certain way, is a machine: everything 
that has inner states and outer states, while the relations between sets of those states 
are subject to certain laws. (156–157)
This is how Lem neutralizes the significance of distinguishing between the 
Natural and the Artificial. “Artificiality” for him does not imply intentionality of 
creation, and “naturality” – a lack of such intentionality (this is roughly how the 
difference between the two notions could be described in their regular sense). 
It is not about that; it is about regularity in functioning. The thesis is: Designer 
can create every system (be it a computer, a tree, a cyborg or a galaxy – the tech-
nical capacity is of no bearing here) under the sole condition, that the structure 
and functioning of the system can be described with precision. The criterion 
is purely pragmatic then, but very different from the earlier one. Even some-
thing previously considered natural can in fact be an “artificial” product. The fact 
that we still distinguish between these two categories is merely a matter of how 
backward we are technologically. We make “artificial flowers” from the artificial 
material – plastic.153 Once we learn to produce them from the same material 
that real flowers are made of, the distinction will no longer be applicable. When 
 153 That is from polymers that do not occur in living organisms. But the proteins we are 
largely made of are a type of polymers too, albeit with an incredibly complex structure. 
It means that on the level of molecular engineering we are dealing with the same class 
of substances, but the simple polymers are to proteins what a barrow is to a limou-




everything can be “artificial” in that sense, nothing is either artificial or natural, 
because a product of Nature is indistinguishable from something produced by 
Designer. Moreover, the broadening of human knowledge from the planet Earth 
to the Universe, which took place in the scope of the last hundred years, again 
deprives the opposition of Natural and Artificial of its meaning. It used to be 
possible to claim that the Amazon Jungle is natural, and the office of a dean at 
All Souls College – artificial. But a question of whether a star cluster is natural or 
artificial is just badly put.154
Lem is certain those changes will happen; we just do not know when that will 
be. Speaking of “imitology” – this is the general term Lem coins for the problem-
atic – he does not touch upon the question of “when.”155
The condition of predictability of designed system is crucial for Lem, as he 
remains faithful to cybernetics and science in general, even this late in his intel-
lectual journey. And it is not a symptom of some archaic scientism. The position 
that a Designer cannot build objects that could not be theoretically described 
stems from the assumption that any reality, not only the one we inhabit now, 
but also all the ones we could create ourselves, needs to have a set of laws that 
describe it. Otherwise we would not only be stepping into the realm of pure 
fantasy, where despite appearances Lem does not like being, but we would 
also be stepping beyond the realm of our cognition as a reality without laws of 
physics governing it is impossible to imagine for us, and impossible to figure 
out through abstract reasoning, and therefore we can say nothing meaningful 
about it, even though we can formulate any preposition about it (e.g., “kanga-
roos are made of exhausted cottage cheese”). This is not the type of writing Lem 
is interested in ST.
The statement about “regularity” as the essential feature of Machine is another 
element of an implicit “critique of the body” – Lem clearly suggests that human 
body is an irregular structure, subject to numerous aberrations in functioning 
and to many errors, one that cannot be described precisely and, hence, con-
trolled. It is then another reason to reject it.
This is roughly Lem’s main metatheoretical position. One could ask now 
whether there is place for man at all within this model – after all, so far we have 
 154 The Natural/Artificial opposition in ST is not identical with the opposition Nature/
Culture, and hence the difficulty in applying all these notions. As long as we stay on 
the planet Earth, “Artificial” is more or less the same as “Culture,” but in the lengthy 
passage I have quoted above Lem definitely goes beyond such limits.
 155 Which, we should point out, makes him a utopist. I will discuss the utopian character 






not been able to describe ourselves with regular theories and to most of us it is 
highly doubtful that we ever will. But Lem does not ask that question and the 
very notion of autoevolution leads eventually, I believe, to making such a task 
impossible.
In the chapter “Chaos and Order” another very important question is posed 
though: does any of the models of reality devised by men describe it with abso-
lute precision? This is one of the most fundamental questions for philosophy of 
science and it is usually answered in a negative – a theoretical model is never 
identical with the phenomena it describes, it exists in the realm of mediated 
symbols determined by the historically formed cultural communication – so it 
cannot render it with complete precision. Of course, in the contemporary sci-
ence these questions become very complex, especially when the reality is only 
accessible through a mathematical model describing it or through very indirect 
observations (as is the case in particle physics and cosmology). Lem solves the 
problem in the most radical way imaginable:
What are we left with then? With considering the phenomenon itself its most perfect rep-
resentation, and with replacing analytical with creative activity. In other words – with 
imitological practice. (164)
As the only perfect model of any phenomenon is the phenomenon itself, Lem in 
fact identifies theory with practice. The strategy he offers is both, as we shall see 
later when discussing information farming and autoevolution. Thus, Lem rejects 
another dogma of our thinking, separating scientific theory from engineering, or 
more generally, Science from Technology.
If we now ask how the Designer knows what he is to create if the theoretical 
model is identical with the practical object being designed, Lem responds:
I have said that restraint on the level of design will serve as a compass in our navigation 
between the abyss of knowledge and the chasm of stupidity. Such restraint stands for 
belief in the possibility of acting effectively and in the need to give up on certain things. 
It means first of all giving up on asking “definitive” questions. This is not a silence of 
someone pretending to be deaf but rather active silence. We know far more about the 
fact that it is possible to act than about how it happens. The designer is not a narrow 
pragmatist, like a builder who is constructing his house from bricks, uninterested in 
where these bricks came from and what they are, as long as the house gets built. The 
designer knows everything about his bricks – except for what they look like when no 
one is looking at them. (168)
It is a bit of an evasion, which stems from our uncertainty about the nature of 
the world. No one knows if the world we inhabit is fully cognizable, not only for 
us, which I have discussed earlier, but also “in general.” It is primarily a matter 
Metatheory 115
of whether it can be described mathematically, whether every level and aspect 
of reality can be modeled mathematically. Lem and other authors writing on 
the subject are careful to not mention the problematic status of the humani-
ties. The question can be reversed too: Does every mathematical theory describe 
some physical entity? Some scholars, such as James Jeans and Arthur Stanley 
Eddington would answer in affirmative, but today, even though many mathe-
matical theories that used to be seen as absolutely “pure” found practical use, 
such view is generally described as “mathematical mysticism,” as there is no log-
ical or scientific evidence for it – and this is where we return to the starting point. 
Lem offers an excellent metaphor here, which presents mathematician as
a mad tailor who makes all sorts of clothes. He does not know anything about people, 
birds, or plants. He is not interested in the world; he does not examine it. He makes 
clothes but does not know for whom. He does not think about it … He takes the finished 
clothes to a massive warehouse. If we could enter it, we would discover that some of the 
clothes fit an octopus, others fit trees, butterflies, or people. We would find clothes for 
a centaur and a unicorn as well as for creatures that have not even been imagined yet. 
(171–172)
All these metatheoretical reasonings have an implicit meaning. Lem’s Designer 
has the utmost degree of liberty. He is not limited by culture, politics, society, 
and history, not even by biology. He is only limited by the laws of physics – 
hence the title of the chapter: “Prolegomena to Omnipotence.” The Designer’s 
main problem is the eternal question of “what to do?” which here carries the 
broadest possible meaning, as the Designer can do nearly anything. Lem is 
trying to outline a code, a set of rules, or a method. At the same time he him-
self, as the author of ST, enjoys a virtually unlimited theoretical field, which is, 
however, determined by the fairly strict perimeter of the laws of physics and 
his own assumptions, especially regarding the (un)knowability of the world. 
He at least sees himself as unrestricted by the constraints of the past, of cul-
ture and society, but somehow obliged to correspond with them, as he is writing 
for his contemporaries, and not for those about whom he is writing. His task is 
extremely difficult, which is where the complexity of the thought in ST comes 
from, especially in this particular chapter.
The section titled modestly “A New Linnaeus: About Systematics”156 presents 
a set of notions that Lem uses referring to the main directions of development 
 156 Lem’s lofty diction in ST would itself merit some interest. Perhaps it is not so much a 
product of author’s (lack of) modesty, as of irony, which he then lost in the 1980s at 




for future technology, which will grow from combining scientific theory, tech-
nology and bio- and technoevolution. Lem emphasizes many times that the 
terms describe something that does not exist yet, and will not for a long time, so 
they have to be somewhat vague. He writes:
“Pantocreatics” refers to everything man or another intelligent being can achieve. It 
refers to gathering information and using it with a particular goal in mind. Such separa-
tion also exists today to some extent; it can be seen in the differentiation between science 
and technology. In the future, the situation will change in that information gathering 
will have become automated … The part of pantocreatics that deals with information 
use, and that has emerged from the combination of the general theory of physical and 
mathematical systems, can be divided into two fields. For the sake of brevity, and also 
to provide a kind of overview, we shall call the first of these Imitology and the second 
Phantomology. They overlap with each other to some extent. We could, of course, try 
to be more precise and say, for example, that imitology is a design theory based on 
the mathematics and algorithms that can be identified in Nature, while phantomology 
stands for actualizing in the real world mathematical structures that have no equivalent 
in Nature. Yet this would already mean assuming that Nature basically has a mathe-
matical character  – while we do not want to make such an assumption. This would 
also involve accepting algorithmic universalism – which is highly dubious in itself. It is 
therefore more sensible to leave our definitions partially open. (178)
The metaphorical style – difficult to avoid when writing about omnipotence – 
makes it hard to get a general understanding of the project. Lem constantly 
oscillates between Nature and Design, obliterating the borders between the two 
notions. Since he cannot produce precise descriptions of “pantocreatic technol-
ogies,” he finds recourse in an almost poetic strategy – he purposefully dissolves 
the semantics of his own discourse.
Lem’s view on the difference between imitology and phantomology is also 
significant here:
Imitology is an earlier stage of pantocreatics. It is derived from the modeling of real 
phenomena in scientific theories, digital machines, and so on, which is already prac-
ticed today. Imitology involves launching probable material processes (a star, a volcanic 
explosion) as well as improbable ones (a microfusion cell, a civilization). A  perfect 
imitologist is someone who is capable of repeating any natural phenomenon, or a phe-
nomenon whose emergence is enabled by Nature, even though it itself has not been 
created spontaneously by Nature … There is no sharp boundary between imitology and 
phantomology. As a later, more advanced phase of imitology, phantomology involves 
constructing ever less likely processes, all the way to entirely impossible ones, that is, 
processes than cannot take place under any circumstances, because they contradict the 
laws of Nature. It seems to be an empty class because the unrealizable cannot be real-
ized. We shall attempt to demonstrate, albeit only briefly and rather crudely, that such 
an “impossibility” does not have to be absolute. (178–179)
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We can see that, again, phenomenon becomes identical with its model. And 
again, this identity happens in both types of scholastic suppositions, de re and de 
dicto. Lem employs a rhetorical device whereby he manipulates notions as if he 
were doing so on these notions’ referents. There is a reason why Lem constantly 
uses the hypostases of Science, Technology, Nature and a few other entities. It 
would be unacceptable in a strictly academic text and they are usually the cause 
of some grotesque misunderstandings in postmodern texts. They are, however, 
necessary and justified in Lem’s writings – how else could he speak of these is-
sues, so removed from any past or present reality?
Lem’s main aim is to show that Designer-Pantocreatic and Nature can be the 
same. To make such a possibility seem more likely, he quotes examples from 
genetic engineering, which were completely fantastic in 1964, but which are 
quite practical in 2017,157 and he interprets that as a seamless transition from 
“plagiarism” from Nature to “creation.” He writes:
As we can see, our actions blur the boundary between what is “natural” and what is 
“artificial.” Modeling thus allows us to cross the boundary between plagiarism and cre-
ation because our comprehensive knowledge of the genetic code obviously allows us 
to introduce all kinds of changes into it … Evidently, we do not need to be familiar 
with the entire evolutionary road that Nature has traveled to construct a human being. 
We do not need millions of bits of information about particular stages of development, 
about Sinanthropus, about Mustier or Aurignacian civilizations. On having produced a 
“model” of a sperm or an egg that “matches” the original, we will have obtained a geno-
type that is more perfect than all the originals (owing to the accumulation of valuable 
genetic traits) – thanks to which we will have opened a “side entrance” into the process 
of creating human organisms for ourselves. (185)
This is the essence of imitology: it is about repeating the best achievements of 
Nature without repeating the whole blind process that led Nature to such results. 
This, I believe, makes the sense of the model becoming the same as the mod-
eled phenomenon clearer. Imitology is to be an “extension” of Nature steered 
by Reason – without the sharp cut that separated Science from Technology in 
modern science.
 157 The contradiction with the preceding sentence is an illusion. The fact that some of 
Lem’s project became real does not mean that we have got closer to “pantocreatics” or 
“autoevolution.” We are still just as distant from reaching the point of identity between 
Technology and Nature as we were half a century ago. In light of the strategic plans 





In the passage quoted above there emerges also a theme that will return 
later – albeit implicitly – in a discussion about reconstruction of species in the 
last chapter of ST. In order to reconstruct human organism the Designer does 
not need the history of the development of our species. And similarly, he will not 
need the history of its culture in order to reshape it. I will discuss this conclusion, 
as sad as it might be for humanists, later.
To provide even stronger arguments in favor of his metatheoretical theses 
about the possibility of “pantocreatic modeling” of reality, Lem offers another 
fascinating metaphor:
Yet maybe it is only today that we need theories and models of phenomena? Maybe, on 
being asked such a question, a wise man from another planet would silently hand out a 
piece of an old shoe sole picked up from the ground to us, communicating in this way that 
the whole truth of the Universe can be read from this piece of matter? … Does Matter by 
any chance not have all of its potential transformations “inscribed” in it … Then, taking 
the basic building block of Nature, the hydrogen atom, we could “deduce” all those pos-
sibilities from it (modestly starting from the possibility of constructing systems that are a 
trillion times more spiritual than man). We could also deduce all that is unrealizable from 
it (sweet kitchen salt NaCl, stars whose diameter equals a quadrillion of miles, etc.). From 
this perspective, matter already entails as its foundational assumptions all those possibil-
ities as well as impossibilities (or prohibitions); we are just unable to crack its “code.” … 
What we have just said is nothing else than tautological ontology … (182–183)
If it were indeed possible to deduce a description of the entire universe from 
an old shoe sole (the idea is somewhat like Zen kōans reflecting the most pro-
found sense of the world in striking absurdities), the problem of setting rules of 
pantocreatics, as well as the problem of correspondence between a model and 
a phenomenon, between a word and a thing, between a notion and an object, 
would cease to exist. The matter itself – unmediated by any kind of conceptual 
arguments – would imply nearly infinite possibilities of shaping it. It is now clear 
that most of the difficulties in creating pantocreatics ensue from the problem of 
representation that troubles the entire Western thought. Lem is no pioneer in 
such approach. This passage of ST puts him in a long line of thinkers dreaming 
of discovering a Grand Principle in the reality itself, outside any conceptual sys-
tems. “Tautological ontology” is nothing else as Leibniz’s mathesis universalis. 
Leibniz wanted to create a language in which words–things would encompass all 
features of the objects they refer to. Lem wants objects themselves to determine 
their own features and relations – so the Designer would not have to use any 
words, any notions. Any humanists, trapped under the burden of forty centu-
ries of interpretation would applaud such a dream of a thoughtless pinnacle of 
wisdom.
14  Phantomatics
Stanisław Lem’s prophecies (or, simply, Lem’s Visions) are 
characterized by the fact that he himself does not take 
them in the least bit seriously, but NEVERTHELESS 
they come true completely within about a year. 
Dangerous, right?
Letter to Szymon Kobyliński, March 14, 1974
Lem brings up chapter six in ST, “Phantomology,” whenever he wants to prove 
how sharp a prophet he is. The chapter contains a description of something that, 
perhaps somewhat hastily, came to be identified with the so-called virtual reality 
(VR). I do not intend to compare Lem’s prediction with the contemporary state 
of VR technology. It would be doubly pointless: because of my ignorance with 
regard to technological details of VR, and because Lem’s prediction is less about 
technological aspects of phantomology and more about its psychological and 
social consequences. And they should be the object of interest here, again, as was 
the case with cybernetics, considering the science and the technology from the 
point of view of their cultural significance.
Why did Lem come up with phantomatics in the first place? What is its place 
within the structure of ST? The chapter starts with the following statements:
We are faced with the following problem: how do we create realities for the intelli-
gent beings that exist in them, realities that are absolutely indistinguishable from the 
standard reality but that are subject to different laws? … We shall ask, Is it possible 
to create an artificial reality that is very similar to the actual one yet that cannot be 
distinguished from it in any way? The first topic focuses on the creation of worlds, 
the second on the creation of illusions. But we are talking about perfect illusions. 
I  do not even know whether they can be called just illusions. Please, judge for 
yourselves. (191)
 So for Lem phantomatics158 is an introduction to “pantocreatics,” “a stepping-
stone to creative engineering” (191), something of a training ground to study 
 158 A terminological remark: the text of ST suggests that “phantomology” is a theory, and 
“phantomatics” – a practice of creating “illusionary worlds.” The distinction is not 
sharp as the entire ST – as a prediction and a manifesto of autoevolution – is a piece of 
purely theoretical discourse about phenomena that do not exist yet, and, moreover, if 







people’s reactions to an “artificial–natural” reality. It is a rehearsal before the 
proper act of “second creation,” a rehearsal of an illusion of a “new world.” Lem 
describes the technical details of “phantomatic machine” and sensual experiences 
of a phantomatized person with utmost precision, and he introduces a distinc-
tion between peripheral and central phantomatics, as well as between teletaxy 
and phantoplication. We shall now look into the meaning of those terms.
Peripheral phantomatics involves stimulating senses externally – the contem-
porary VR is the closest to it, with its helmets and gloves sets. Central phantomatics 
involves stimulating directly the areas in the brain responsible for particular kinds 
of experiences. Interestingly, Lem, who is usually not keen to make excursions 
into the past, points to ecstatic shamanistic practices and strong intoxicants, 
such as drugs, as “prephantomatics” of the first type. The remark leads him to 
a conclusion, which he repeats a few times, that perhaps the real application of 
phantomatics will in fact be limited to pleasure. Given what an average Internet 
user and unprofessional user of VR technology is mostly interested in today, one 
has to admit that Lem was actually completely right in his predictions here, even 
though he was quite saddened by this particular achievement of his.159
“Central phantomatics,” with its capacity to provoke strong pleasure and 
pain by stimulating the brain directly, omitting the senses – something that has 
already been tested on animals – leads Lem to ask about the possibility of cre-
ating “artificial paradise and heaven.” It is a question of significant philosophical 
and sociological weight, but in this case Lem only flags the problem.
Lem’s dictionary includes also “cerebromatics,” which means “changes to 
the dynamic structure of the brain’s neural network,” so all actions connected 
with central phantomatics, with far-reaching psychological implications. Lem 
considers the possibility of a transformation of an individual identity that would 
not be “illusionary” (e.g., by placing a person in a phantomata simulating the 
court of Bonaparte with the phantomatized person cast as “Napoleon”), but real, 
transforming a personality so deeply that the person subjected to it would in 
fact become Napoleon, with all his biographical experience and all the person-
ality traits the emperor of the French had. By discussing this possibility, Lem is 
unusually careful about the historical and temporal aspect of human identity. 
Emphasizing that identity is determined not only by psychological processes, 
but also by external circumstances in a broad historical and social context, he 
 159 For an anthropologist, the identification of shamanistic practices with simple drug 





concludes that it is impossible to cerebromatically turn Mr. Smith into Napoleon. 
It is equally impossible in peripheral phantomatics as it only produces an illusion 
of surroundings, without the phantomatized person ever ceasing to be himself or 
herself. Lem rightly stresses that:
the more the character one wishes to impersonate differs in personality traits and histor-
ical period from his own, the more fictitious, naïve, or even primitive his behavior and 
the whole vision will be. Because, to be crowned a king or receive the Pope’s emissaries, 
one has to be familiar with the whole court protocol. (209)
We are dealing with the issue of artificiality here, but not the one that we 
encounter in the project of autoevolution, but a regular, primitive artificiality 
of a badly defined situation.160 It is the first argument supporting a thesis that 
phantomatics is actually incoherent. All these reflections resemble conversation 
between Hylas and Philonous about transmitting personal identity, except in 
Dialogues they referred to mechanical replication and teleportation of people, 
whereas here it is the issue of radical transformations of external reality. The 
continuity of this theme is a testimony not only to Lem’s long-lasting interest 
in the problem, but also to the inevitable influence of technological changes on 
conceptual standards regarding individual identity.
Phantomatization is generally risky for Lem from the social perspective. 
There is the issue of “yearning for authenticity” – the phantomatized individual 
is always aware that even the most perfect illusion is merely an illusion. He is 
then torn between the phantomatic reality and the authentic one; this duplicity 
cannot be avoided, as there is no way for a copy to become the original, which 
is particularly striking in case of Lebenswelt. Lem suggests, however, just as the 
Wachowski brothers (now sisters) do later on, in The Matrix, that phantomatized 
people could be purposefully misled about the status of the world they are in. 
He designs something resembling a “VR Turing test” and claims the only way 
to verify the “reality of the real” is through presence of material correlates of the 
most intimate content of one’s consciousness, such as damaged home appliances, 
which only the phantomatized person knows about – and he or she knows they 
are the only one who knows that. These complex and seemingly fantastic ideas 
actually resemble The Matrix plot, a film that became a manifesto of cyber-pop 
 160 Gruppenfuehrer Louis XVI in A Perfect Vacuum is a macabre version of this idea, in 
which Nazi refugees from Europe create a replica of Versailles in the Amazon Jungle. 
In light of these analyses, it seems ironical that Lem received an offer to film this story, 




culture in 1999.161 Even here, however, Lem draws some very serious conclusions. 
A phantomatized person acts in isolation:
It is because any act of turning to other people for help is, or rather can actually be, 
an act of feeding the machine with strategically valuable information … This is why the 
person undergoing the experience cannot trust anyone but himself  – which severely 
narrows down his options. He acts defensively to an extent, as he is surrounded from all 
sides. This also means that a phantomatic world is a world of total solitude. There cannot 
be more than one person in it at any one time, just as it is impossible for two real persons 
to find themselves in the same dream.
No civilization can become “fully phantomatized.” If all its members were to start 
experiencing phantomatic visions from a certain point on, the real world of this civiliza-
tion would come to a halt and die out. (202)
The diagnosis is clear: complete “artificiality” of the surrounding world, with the 
exception of the “natural” human body and mind amounts to a suicide of a civi-
lization. A moment later Lem states the same even more strongly:
Of course, it is possible to envisage some kind of omniplanetary “Superphantomat,” to 
which the inhabitants of a given planet have been connected “forever,” that is for as long 
as they have been alive, while their bodies’ vegetative processes are being supported by 
automatic devices … This civilization would only exist for the duration of one genera-
tion – the one that remains connected to the “Superphantomat.” This would thus be a 
peculiar form of euthanasia, a kind of pleasant suicide of a civilization. For this reason, 
we consider its implementation to be impossible. (202–203)
In the context of the project of autoevolution as it is presented in the whole of ST, 
the conclusion is as follows: phantomatics is but a half-measure, with harmful 
results, as it does not eliminate the Natural/Artificial dichotomy entirely, it only 
disrupts the ontology of Lebenswelt. Later in ST we shall see that only a recon-
struction of the human species in its physicality, a shift in the category of trans-
formation, which I discussed earlier, can in fact guarantee a coherent process of 
autoevolution.
This does not exhaust the subject matter of the chapter devoted to phantomatics, 
but before I proceed with that discussion, I want to briefly point to congruencies 
between phantomatics and some of the contemporary intellectual trends.
All things considered, phantomatics is flawed for Lem, as it either leads to 
cognitive dissonance or to extinction of the human species. Neither of these 
 161 In some ways the plot of The Matrix reflects Lem’s description of phantomatics 
quite faithfully. It is based on the idea of machines dominating people – something 





threats discouraged people from it though, as in the last decade of the 20th cen-
tury they not only accepted phantomatization as a possibility, but also actually 
started to desire it, although in a shape that is somewhat different from what Lem 
described in ST.
When in the 1990s Internet was rapidly popularized globally, it immediately 
became clear how many human dreams and phantasms find their expression in the 
digital cyberspace. In February 1996 John Perry Barlow, one of the gurus of the IT 
world, published The Declaration of Independence of the Cyberspace – on the Internet, 
naturally. Here is a passage from it:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from 
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave 
us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. 
… Cyberspace … is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions 
… Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a 
standing wave in the web of our communications. Ours is a world that is both every-
where and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live … Your legal concepts of property, 
expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are based on 
matter. There is no matter here.162
The statement that cyberspace is an act of nature is of particular importance 
here – it fits perfectly in Lem’s project of autoevolution. Erik Davis, from whose 
book I quote Barlow, emphasizes rightly that the exuberant rhetoric of the text 
carries a clear ideological message: Internet is to become a sphere of unrestricted 
freedom. Such view fueled the “web anarchism” at the turn of the centuries and 
it still is a support for all those who react violently to any attempts at ordering 
or controlling the web, even after it became clear that the web functions, mostly 
thanks to big corporations and not selfless activists. Here, however, I’m inter-
ested not so much in analyzing social and political aspects of the cyberspace, but 
its role in the ideas of autoevolution.163
In the early 1990s there emerged a group in Los Angeles, which came to be 
known as “extropians.” They were enthusiastic about new technologies and drew 
 162 Quoted from:  Erik Davis, TechGnosis:  Myth, Magic and Mysticism in the Age of 
Information (London: Serpents Tail, 2004), 132–133. This book, written by an IT 
specialist with some interest in the humanities, includes a lot of useful information 
about relationships between technology and magical or mystical thinking. However, 
it is extremely chaotic that makes it difficult to use it.
 163 A vast, panoramic view of global transformations of the last decade of the 20th century, 
with particular emphasis on the role of Internet, can be found in Manuel Castells’s 
trilogy: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, vol. 1: The Rise of the 






bold visions of their further growth, which would help people acquire unlimited 
capacities. In their own, somewhat mystical way, they prophesied the same pro-
ject of autoevolution and exceeding the limits of humanity that Lem presented in 
ST. It is particularly interesting that they also assumed that in the future people 
would move their brains from bodies to computer networks. Max More, the 
President of Extropy Institute, wrote:
Shrugging off the limits imposed on us by our natural heritage, we apply the evolu-
tionary gift of our rational, empirical intelligence to surpass the confines of our 
humanity, crossing the threshold into the transhuman and posthuman stages that await 
us … When technology allows us to reconstitute ourselves physiologically, genetically, 
and neurologically, we who have become transhuman will be primed to transform 
ourselves into posthumans – persons of unprecedented physical, intellectual, and psy-
chological capacity, self-programming, potentially immortal, unlimited individuals. 
(Quoted from: Davis, 143–145)
Which is exactly what Lem prophesies in ST. Stepping ahead of myself here a 
little, I will add that the same views are developed in the last chapter of ST and 
then, more than a decade later, in Golem XIV. Moreover, we encounter here 
words that remained foreign to Lem: “transhumanism” and “posthumanism,” to 
which I shall return later. At this point I just want to show that the cyberspace, 
which Lem and his commentators associated mostly with phantomatics, comes 
close to his thinking in other areas as well – or perhaps above all elsewhere. The 
passage I have quoted is a good example of the functions of the Internet and 
cyberspace in the culture of the early years of the 21st century. The heights of 
technology overlap with heights of mysticism. Davis invokes Nietzsche and his 
thesis about Übermensch as a result of rejecting the earlier model of humanity. 
I believe in the context of autoevolutionary projects this is only an intellectual 
convergence, but in Part Three I will try to search for a line that would connect 
these areas of Western thought more directly.
Extropians accuse the human kind of the same things as Stanisław Lem and 
in the same way, with the same justifications. I will try to show that the solutions 
offered to human problems are also largely similar in these two cases.
The thesis about moving human brains to computer networks is not just a 
sci-fi idea. It is one of those elements of contemporary thought, in which it is 
hard to distinguish between what is scientifically and technologically viable and 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, XXIX+594, XV+461, XV+448). However, the level of detail 
of the book, combined with the pace of developments since its publication led to the 
work losing a lot of its relevance very quickly.
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what is but wishful thinking emerging from cultural anxieties. “The presence of 
myth” in science, which Leszek Kołakowski sought deep underneath the pos-
itivist paradigm is very clear now, and not only in computer technologies, but 
also in physics and biology, for example. Authors such as Marvin Minsky and 
Hans Moravec – widely respected in the area of AI and IT – were very interested 
in the idea, even though clearly it is completely unrealistic at this point.164 (It is 
only different from Lem’s phantomatics in that Lem does not allow for rejecting 
the body, which by the way, as I have pointed out earlier, is an internal contra-
diction of phantomatics as part of the autoevolution project. This idea, however, 
highly resembles Lem’s “cosmogonic engineering,” which will be discussed later.) 
It is again a certain concept, less scientific or technological than resulting from 
many people’s state of mind at the beginning of the 21st century.
Another important cultural correlate of cyberspace would be cyberpunk. It 
is a literary genre inaugurated by a novel by a Canadian, William Gibson, titled 
Neuromancer (1984), which is often quoted and analyzed by media theorists. The 
novel is set largely in virtual space generated by computer systems. By now the 
motif has been largely exhausted, but taking into account that Gibson published 
Neuromancer when personal computers were still a technological novelty, one 
cannot help but admire his pioneering position. Cyberpunk is a literary genre 
in its own right now, with hundreds of works. Cyberpunk novels are usually 
set in environments dominated by computer systems, very much like the world 
outlined by Lem in ST, especially in the chapter I am currently discussing here. 
In Poland the most eminent representative of cyberpunk is certainly Jacek Dukaj 
(born in 1974). There are formal similarities between his works and Lem’s novels 
insofar as both contain numerous descriptions of alien (“inhuman”) worlds 
(such as VR or other planets), and those descriptions equal Lem’s best ones from 
Eden and Solaris in how vivid and powerful they are.165
Taking into account the length and the subject matter of my book, I have to 
limit my discussion of the cultural role of the Internet and cyberspace to these 
few side notes. Let us return to Lem’s phantomatics now.
I have mentioned “teletaxy” and “phantoplication” earlier. Having discussed 
the psychological and social consequences of phantomatics, Lem then remarks:
 164 Moravec, a professor in robotics at Carnegie Mellon University, presented an opera-
tional vision of moving human personality into a machine in his book Mind Children 
(1988).






The categorical statement with which we closed the previous section – that it is only 
possible to be either oneself or nobody – does not contravene phantomatics’ potential 
… We mentioned earlier that this lack of authenticity in a phantomatic vision, the fact 
that it represents a biotechnologically executed escapism, is a big problem. Cybernetics 
offers two ways of overcoming such inauthenticity of experience … we shall call them 
teletaxy and phantoplication. (217–218)
“Teletaxy” means “connecting someone to a machine that only functions as a 
link between him and the real world … Teletaxy connects a person to a ran-
domly chosen fragment of reality, as a result of which he experiences the reality 
as if he were really placed inside it” (218). The machine would be a “remote-I,” 
connected with the senses of the person steering it. Lem points to an astronom-
ical telescope as a prototype of such a teletactor.
“Phantoplication” means something very similar, with the one difference that 
instead of a machine remote-I there is a real person. Specifically, it is about
connecting one person’s neural pathways to those of another person. Thanks to this pro-
cedure … a thousand people can simultaneously “take part” in a marathon … However, 
this method only involves a unidirectional information transfer, since those “connected” 
to the runner are not all able to command his movements. (219)
Lem only devotes one paragraph to each of these ideas, after which he again 
returns to the issue of personality in the context of phantomology, which, as we 
already know, he finds extremely fascinating.166 Earlier, he described personality 
problems caused by phantomatics, and now, in the penultimate section of the 
chapter (“Personality and Information”) he focuses on paradoxes of “multiplied 
identities.”
Before I  proceed to discuss them, I  need to point to one more aspect of 
phantomatics, or, more precisely, a lack thereof. In his analyses Lem pays very 
little attention to phenomenological approaches to perception. He implicitly 
accepts that human consciousness and the external world are strictly separated, 
 166 In a letter to Michael Kandel on October 19, 1974, he wrote: “As to PHILOSOPHY 
now, I am quite rational and fairly clear in gnosiology, but it is not the same with 
ontology, because I think there is an inexplicable mystery there: the Ego (I) – physics, 
biology and other empirical sciences can sufficiently explain the emergence and exis-
tence of “others”, i.e. “third parties”, but we can NEVER count on them to explain 
where I come from. There is no clear link between “they” and “I” at all in the natural 
sciences, because “I” is existentially a unique point through its “unleaveability” (you 
cannot “leave” your I, you cannot go beyond it) and HEREIN FOR ME LIES THE 
GREATEST MYSTERY OF BEING, while the rest are merely the consequences of 




and the transfer of data via the body (or sensual impulses) is clear. Such ap-
proach is obviously reductive, but perhaps it was necessary to accept it in order 
to speak of phantomatics as a technology, and not just a vague idea.
In “Personality and Information” Lem takes up a theme of “multiplied iden-
tity,” which came up earlier in Dialogues; this time it is connected to the issue of 
teleportation. Lem is considering a possibility of framing human personality in 
terms of theory of information, and accepts implicitly that “personality” can be 
fully reduced to physiological and mathematical data. Such assumption is nec-
essary in order to meaningfully discuss teleportation at all.167 The attempts to 
explicate the notion of personality in terms of cybernetics again lead him into 
paradoxes we saw earlier in Dialogues, all the more complicated by the fact that 
in ST there is the additional element of genetics (identity as a derivate of phe-
notype). Here again from his complex argument Lem draws a conclusion that 
a “copied” or “telegraphed” individual would not be identical with the “orig-
inal,” even if it had the same atomic structure (that disregarding the influence of 
quantum uncertainty). To explain this surprising lack of identity, Lem vaguely 
refers to extraphysical factors, while also stressing it has nothing to do with 
spiritualism.
I believe this issue could have been a bit clearer, if arguments about the histo-
ricity of our existence were used. Lem nearly always disregards history, cultural 
tradition and those ways of thinking about people, which take into account the 
past, such as hermeneutics. In light of his autoevolutionary projects in ST it is 
understandable, because autoevolution – to which I will return in Part Three – 
means, among other things, rejecting historicity. But there are points in Lem’s 
thinking that would benefit from including history in the view. This is one of 
such moments. In order to explain the nonidentity between the “copied” man 
(just as the nonidentity of a clone) and the “original,” it is enough to explain 
clearly that each human being is unique due to its own history and – in a broader 
context – due to how differently every human is affected by the history of culture. 
Even the “way of creation” of a human – be it conception, artificial insemination, 
 167 Teleportation is the means of transport of choice for the protagonists of the American 
sci-fi series Star Trek, which was one of the icons of the 1980s mass culture. It inspired 
a distinguished physicist Lawrence M. Krauss to write a book The Physics of Star 
Trek (1995), where he discusses the possibility of really implementing some of the 
“fantastic” technological solutions known from the series, including teleportation. 
However, as a physicist he pays little attention to the issue of personality and con-





“copying” or cloning – is, of course, an element of one’s biography and as such 
it influences individual identity, shaping it in ways very different from any other 
individual. The “artificial” methods are perhaps not as different from the “nat-
ural” ones as Lem and contemporary commentators of the issue of cloning 
claim – and this is what leads them to engage in a heated discussion of the ques-
tion of identity. Is the difference between a clone and a human born “naturally” 
bigger than between a Wall Street broker and an Indian pariah? (I need to point 
here again to Lem’s obliteration of the Natural/Artificial distinction.) We are all 
equal in face of history in a sense that it shapes each of us differently than 
everyone else. The problem of copying people, and cloning, is telling in a sense 
that it juxtaposes – and violently, too – the presence of the historical dimen-
sion of culture and the absence of it in technology. Perhaps the problem of 
the individual identity of clones can be reduced to that juxtaposition. Such a 
juxtaposition would also be a symptom of a major breakthrough in the history 
of our species, which ST describes, I believe. It describes a shift from history to 
autoevolution, transgressing the limits of humanity.
Lem would disapprove of such an approach to the issue mainly because it 
presents human identity as dependent not on eternal, or at least unambiguous 
laws of Nature, but on something as appallingly random and incoherent as his-
tory and culture. Given the mutual influence of culture and technology within 
“the technologies of producing people,” one could also ask whether a human (a 
person) has a humanistic coefficient. Florian Znaniecki applied the notion only 
to objects in human environment. But autoevolution, with its obliteration of the 
distinction between the Natural and the Artificial, allows us to ask it also about 
human – because for Lem we become our own products, and not in a “spiritual” 
sense, as it had been earlier, but in a material sense, as we produce and modify our 
bodies. It seems to me though that Lem would respond in a negative, assuming 
he would even see the question as valid. However, I would claim that at the cur-
rent stage in our civilization’s development (before autoevolution) the only way 
to avoid the paradox of “multiplied identities” is by assuming that every member 
of our species, no matter how he or she was created, has an individual, unique 
humanistic coefficient – a set of meanings ascribed to him by others and him 
or herself. The incoherence of this solution within the project of autoevolution 
stems from the fact that “copying” people is just a half measure in light of this 
project, just as phantomatics is a half measure. Only a full autoevolution  – a 
complete reconstruction of the human species, a full detachment from the form 
of humanity we have known so far – will allow us to avoid such incoherences or 
contradictions. Lem does not say that explicitly, but I believe it is a conclusion 
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that can be drawn from ST as a whole; ST contains a lot of implicit assumptions, 
which I am trying to bring to light here.
A curious reader, still remembering some of the more recent intellectual trends, 
might ask what is the relationship between phantomatics and Baudrillard’s simu-
lacra. The answer is: there is none. For a very simple reason: Lem’s phantomatics 
is not only an element of the project of autoevolution, but it is also based on an 
intervention into the human sensorium. And Baudrillard’s metaphor of simu-
lacra refers only to the internal circuits of culture; it has no links with issues 
of biotechnology. However, it is true that Baudrillard’s thought, whatever our 
judgment about its content and precision, does describe in its own way the same 
phenomenon that Lem focuses on in ST: the destruction of the Natural/Artificial 
opposition.168
 168 Baudrillard locates the opposition inside culture as opposition between original and 
copy. See especially his description of replicas of prehistoric cave paintings in The 
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Of course, I am always right, how exhausting!
Letter to Michael Kandel, [month unknown] 22, 1974
The penultimate chapter of ST is titled “The Creation of Worlds.” It contains an 
outline of a radical transformation of external reality of human life – but still 
only the external one. It is the penultimate stage of autoevolution.
To totally restructure reality, a total method is needed. In this chapter Lem 
seems to be taking a step back from his thesis about theory and practice being 
the same, which he stated in the fifth chapter, and returns to modeling a scien-
tific theory. He is clearly irritated by the fact that science develops randomly and 
chaotically, not only because it is belittling to his vision of man, but also because 
it limits the Designer’s “omnipotence.” In short, there is a need for an “applied 
metascience”:
Human civilization is like a ship that has been built without any design plans. The con-
struction process was extremely successful … Yet this ship is still rudderless. Civilization 
lacks knowledge that would allow it to choose a path knowingly from the many possible 
ones, instead of drifting in random tides of discoveries … Science is playing a game 
with Nature, and even though it wins every time, it allows itself to be drawn into the 
consequences of this victory and exploit it, as a result of which, instead of developing 
a strategy, it ends up just practicing tactics … We have to learn how to regulate scien-
tific progress too; otherwise the random character of any future developments will only 
increase. (235)
Had Lem had a chance to read Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
published two years before ST, he would have likely agreed with his analysis of 
progress in science. But Kuhn only described the world of science – Lem wanted 
to change it.169
The change would amount to so much as transforming the process of 
science’s evolution from a chaotic one into a strictly determined process. Just as 
pantocreatics is meant to be a “rational” replica of Nature, and autoevolution a 
rational replica of bioevolution, “information farming” is to give as full control 
 169 It might be worth noting here that in the passage I have quoted Lem repeats – inten-
tionally or not – one of the oldest topoi of European literature, that is, the image of 
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over the increase of knowledge through science. And all this so that civilization 
gains “the freedom of strategic maneuvering to be able to control its path” (236).
What is information farming? In ST we read:
We are supposed to go all the way toward automatizing Science. This is a terrifying task 
… We are to invent a device that will gather information, generalize it in the same way 
the scientist does, and present the results of this inquiry to experts … Our device thus 
produces theories. (242)
Information farming is then something like a programmed metascience. On 
the following pages Lem discusses philosophy of science and links between 
information processing and biology (in human brain). This discussion re-
mains unrelated to any “official” currents in philosophy of science and they do 
not include anything that would not have been said in the preceding chapter 
already. Generally, in his version of philosophy of science, Lem leans toward a 
conventionalist orientation. The main part of the chapter is devoted to the tech-
nology of information farming. The description includes elements of cyber-
netics, theory of information, biochemistry, embryology and genetics. The 
main idea is:
Could we not take up “information farming,” cross-breed bits of information with one 
another, and initiate their “growth” so that we eventually obtain a “mature organism” in 
the form of scientific theory? (251)
The procedure would as it were repeat the development of living organisms. 
Every complex living organism grows out of a very simple nucleus, for example, 
a spermatozoid and an egg cell. The transition from this simple stage to the 
phenomenally complex grown-up organisms is an object of amazement and 
fascination (and studies) for many scholars – and of Lem. He remarks that the 
process of ontogenesis, which enables such a vast multiplication of information 
in an organism, must be subjected to a set of some very precise laws. But if that 
is the case, then we could, Lem says, design a quasi-biological system, whose 
initial structure would have some scientific information built in, and a set of 
instructions of development. The system would then fulfill those instructions, 
just as a human embryo and fetus do, resulting in a “mature organism – scien-
tific theory.”
This idea from Lem may seem completely fantastic. I will try, however, to 
treat it as a serious idea, with its own place in the project of autoevolution. 
The idea of inscribing information inside the molecular structure of matter, or 
even on a yet lower level, has particular intellectual bearing. We can immedi-
ately notice that it eliminates the problem of representation mentioned before. 
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The questions of adequacy of linguistic signs and the objects they describe 
simply disappear when the language of theory becomes a tool of practice – 
just as performatives work in magic. Lem believes here that the language of 
scientific theory could operationally be the same as genetic code. To prove it, 
he produces lengthy arguments about the essence of natural languages (sec-
tion titled “Linguistic engineering,” 267–282). Lem’s philosophy of language 
is, so to say, just as “private” as his philosophy of science, that is, it has just 
as little connection with any known philosophical currents, and it is just as 
deeply permeated with imagery derived from biology. In short, his theses can 
be summarized as follows: the meaning of a genetic code is its performativity 
in the process of ontogenesis (so, eventually, a mature organism), and the 
veracity or falsity of its “statements” is determined by natural selection. It 
is assumed that the same model can be applied to the relationship between 
the language of theory and molecular structures, which makes “information 
farming” possible in a sense that the evolving system will eventually result 
in complexity of information that will exceed the initial set – as is the case 
in ontogenesis. Similar parallels between natural language and genetic code 
are drawn in a book Das Spiel - Naturgesetze steuern den Zufall by Mandfred 
Eigen and Ruthild Winkler, which was published a decade after ST (Polish 
edition released in 1983).
I mentioned that Lem “seemingly” withdrew from the idea to identify theory 
with practice. The problem lies in a sort of conceptual split, which Lem appar-
ently does not notice. “Information farming” is indeed an example of such iden-
tification, as logical and intellectual operations are replaced here with physical 
and chemical processes. However, – and that is the key problem – the processes 
result in another theory, albeit expressed not through a set of formulae and 
theorems, but rather as lumps of matter of complex molecular structure from 
which a theory can be deciphered. It is then a sort of intermediate stage between 
“pure theory” and “pure practice.” The author’s aim, as he emphasizes, is “autom-
atizing Science,” thanks to which the Designer will know “what to do.” But 
“information farming” is not itself a construction, it is only a building instruc-
tion. Its advantage is that it eliminates the chaotic heuristics from the scientific 
process. However, the price is that even though theory becomes practice, the 
practice remains a theory. Lem, too, cannot see this contradiction or he glides 
over it on purpose.
We should remember that for Lem the project of “information farming” is 
merely a remedy to “megabyte bomb” and the chaotic increase in knowledge, so 
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it is only an intermediary step toward autoevolution, and not an element con-
stituting autoevolution. As we can clearly see now, ST mostly consists of such 
“introductions,” and this is why it has to be very generic about the questions 
of the impact of technology on human life. Only the last chapter will show that 
technology is to change it through and through, all the way to its biological 
foundations.
Could these ideas from Lem be fulfilled in any way? The idea of coding linguistic 
meanings in material systems is of course fulfilled by every computer, in its inte-
grated circuits or chips, memory and logic gates. But Lem’s project is much more 
advanced. Computers based on von Neumann’s classic architectural design operate 
only in a binary system, and all data they process have to be expressed in the binary 
code. Lem has something very different in mind: expressing a language of scientific 
theory in a representation of biological molecular structures, the way genetic code 
is represented in DNA sequences. Contemporary technologies are slowly getting 
closer to such options, or similar ones. I am speaking of quantum computers and 
biocomputers here.
In the late 1970s Richard Feynman was the first to put forward the idea of 
bringing mathematical processes to the lowest, quantum level of matter. He has 
been building such systems since the 1990s. In quantum computers information 
is inscribed and processed not as bits but quantum bits, that is, quantum states of 
individual atoms and their superpositions. It increases the computing power by 
many orders of magnitude and it is a tremendous qualitative change in comparison 
to digital computers. If quantum computers were popularized, it would probably 
get us closer to the idea of “information farming,” although it seems unlikely that 
even those machines would be able to add new data to their databases on their 
own. Biocomputers are much closer to Lem’s ideas, that is, machines that com-
bine mechanical systems with living matter. Future research on these systems and 
a technology of inscribing data expressed in human natural languages into DNA 
sequences (DNA digital data storage) will allow us to see to what extent it is a fulfill-
ment of the idea of information farming.
Apart from these technologies, there are also theories describing reality in a 
way that make “information farming” possible. These are self-organizing systems 
theories, which have been developed since the 1960s by Humberto Maturana, 
Francisco Varela and Niklas Luhmann  – I  have mentioned them in Part One 
as the late (and somewhat alienated) offspring of cybernetics. These theories 
often employ the notion of “autopoiesis,” which means the ability of complex 
systems (organic or inorganic) to transform their own structure and qualities. 
Such theories have a lot in common with emergentism, a view that a system as a 
whole has qualities that cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts and relations 
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between them. This position has been mostly shaped in opposition to contempo-
rary reductionism in natural sciences. All these currents resemble the premises 
of Lem’s project of “information farming” to some degree.170
And what is the relationship between “information farming” and “the crea-
tion of worlds”? It seems that in this case it is quite simple. Again, Lem seam-
lessly oscillates between his “theory” and “practice.” The project of automatized 
science is a “user manual” for the Designer, a set of practical tips. It was discussed 
in “Prolegomena to Omnipotence” as well, but there it was about something 
else: Lem focused on a set of general rules for the Designer to follow, something 
like a “constitution,” setting the terms of “omnipotence.”
The two final sections of “The Creation of Worlds” are “The Engineering of 
Transcendence” and “Cosmogonic Engineering.” Lem reaches the limits of his 
own technological imagination here. The connection of these passages of ST 
with the rest of the book seems rather feeble, even though the author claims they 
are a description of “another possibility of taming the information deluge” (282). 
This is not so much about the “megabyte bomb” though, as it is about the human 
yearning for faith, for irrational metaphysics – which Lem sometimes notices, 
but does not approve (we have already seen, what he is capable of saying about 
religion) and tries to frame the issue in terms of technology. So it is like mixing 
fire with ice.
The way he does it is impressive. He begins by pointing out the futility of 
consumerism:
It is often said that the separation of the present reality from transcendence, so com-
monplace today, is pernicious in that it underlines the universe of fixed values. Because 
life on Earth is the only thing that exists, because it is only in this life that we can 
seek fulfillment, the only kind of happiness that can be offered to us is purely carnal. 
Heavens have not revealed anything to us; there are no signs that would indicate the 
need to devote ourselves to some higher, nonmaterial goals. We furnish our lives ever 
more comfortably; … we invent more and more ephemeral trends, dances, one-season 
stars; … Entertainment derived from a nineteenth-century funfair is today becoming 
 170 From here it is close to scientific mysticism of, for example, “the gnosis of Princeton,” 
which has been the position of many scholars from Princeton since the 1970s (with the 
most eminent among them being Fritjof Capra). “The Gnosis of Princeton” involved a 
conviction, that every element of matter, all the way to atoms and elementary particles, 
is endowed with some kind of consciousness. This shows that Lem’s thought does 
occasionally, against his will, get close to the border between scientific thinking and 
magical and mystical one. For more on “the gnosis of Princeton”, see: Raymond Ruyer, 
La Gnose de Princeton (Paris: Fayard, 1974).
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an industry underpinned by an ever more perfect technology … At the same time, a 
feeling of emptiness, superficiality, and sham sets in, one that is particularly dominant in 
civilizations that have left the majority of primitive troubles, such as hunger and poverty, 
behind them. Surrounded by underwater-lit swimming pools and chrome and plastic 
surfaces, we are suddenly struck by the thought that the last remaining beggar, having 
accepted his fate willingly, thus turning it into an ascetic act, was incomparably richer 
than man is today, with his mind fed TV nonsense … The beggar believed in eternal 
happiness … looking as he did into the vast transcendence ahead of him. Free time is 
now becoming … actually a vacuum, because dreams can be divided into those that can 
be realized immediately … and those that cannot be realized by any means. Our own 
body, with its youth, is the last remaining god on the ever emptying altars; … yet even 
those wonders of civilization turn out to be of no use. Nothing shows him what to do, 
what to aim for, what to dream about, what hope to have. (283–284)
It might be hard to believe this was written in Gomułka’s Poland. The passage 
sounds more like a text by an American conservative commentator such as Allan 
Bloom, and written in the 1990s, or it could be a blurb for one of Houellebecq’s 
novels. Again, it shows how perceptive Lem was about the role of technology in 
human life (which was increasing at a much lower pace then than it is now). In 
the last years of his life, he would also make similar statements, but in a much 
grumpier tone. This passage is actually quite unique in ST, because, as I have 
mentioned, Lem was not interested in the social aspects of technology. Perhaps 
because already then he saw more negatives than positives to it. Why then, we 
could ask, did he put so much emphasis on technology – so much so, that he was 
often accused of scientism? I will try to partially answer that question once I have 
looked into his response to “vacuum of transcendence.”
What is Lem’s response to it? The same as extropians have today, even though 
they seem not to notice the vacuum. Lem describes “machine,” inside which 
there is a whole world, peopled with rational creatures – it is a product of the 
Designer, and it is made of electrical impulses. It is also a huge digital computer 
simulating a highly complex global physical reality. Part of the machine is “the 
Other World” – a place, where the residents go after their death. It can be pro-
grammed so that it can realize any type of transcendence that has ever appeared 
in human thought – from the Christian paradise and hell to Buddhist nirvana. 
Lem emphasizes – and it is an important methodological remark for him – that 
he is using the term “machine” only for the lack of a better one, which would be 
more fitting for the entity he has in mind. Today we could call it cyberspace. As 
Lem writes later, the designers of such world, suffering from “withering of tran-
scendence” in their own reality, could at some point decide that it is possible and 
advisable to make an “Exodus” to the other, “artificial” world – as it does admit 
transcendence, which they know for sure, having programmed it that way.
On How to Farm Information 137
We can see that from the technological point of view this is the same idea 
as the ones presented by extropians, which I  have presented when discussing 
phantomology.171 But Lem, more attuned to philosophical questions, immedi-
ately renders it meaningless. In the sketch of a dialogue between a Designer and 
a skeptic (286–287), he proves that the contradiction does not lie in the “arti-
ficiality” of such a world (and we have already showed that the notion itself is 
meaningless in Lem’s thought), not in its “limits” (as it is no more limited to its 
inhabitants than ours is to us), but in the fact that for its inhabitants the tran-
scendence it offers can be just a matter of faith, just as it is for us. Living inside 
such a world they cannot prove the existence of “afterlife,” without depriving it 
of its meaning. And it is also ontologically impossible, because the line between 
life and death is just as strict for them as it is for us – this is how the Designer 
programmed it, exactly so that they can only believe in their afterlife, and not 
know it. Only an external observer of such a world (i.e., the Designer) knows 
that the afterlife exists. The vast difference between faith and knowledge or sci-
ence is absolutely clear for Lem here, despite his commitment to Reason. His 
Designer says:
Belief without after-death fulfillment means incomparably more to mortals than ful-
fillment or transcendence not preceded by belief… this is a highly interesting problem. 
It is real, that is, soluble, only for an observer who is positioned outside that world … 
When it comes to … suggestion that we introduce miracles into this “new world,” we 
have to reject it … Miracles are not a confirmation of belief. They are a transformation 
of the latter into knowledge because knowledge is based on observable facts – which the 
“miracles” would then become. Scientists would make them part of physics … to prove 
belief is to destroy it as it only exists in its full absurdity and groundlessness, in its rebel-
lion against empiricism … Put briefly, a world in possession of the current knowledge 
about transcendence and what it looks like is a world without belief. (287–288)
 171 Perhaps it is worth mentioning here that the source of all ideas of transferring human 
minds to cyberspace can be traced back the notions of noosphere and Omega Point 
established by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. The cyberspace itself, for example, the web, 
is sometimes seen as an incarnation of the noosphere, although one might doubt 
whether Teilhard would agree. An American cosmologist Frank Tipler is the author 
of an idea that the human kind, threatened by implosion of the universe (assuming 
the process will last long enough to be witnessed and that it will follow the scenario 
of expansion and then contraction) might make a “leap” into an artificially created 
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This sums up one of the most important problems of the Western philosophy: the 
question of validity of unprovable statements about the world. There are many 
people who need a superior, outworldly justification for the world, but such a 
justification can only be effective according to Lem if it is arbitrary. Credo, quia 
absurdum, as Tertullian put it.172 This dilemma could only be eliminated if we 
could place ourselves outside this world and remain permanently “in-between 
worlds.”
Thus, a seemingly purely technological idea seems to become a center of purely 
philosophical thinking for Lem.173 He finishes with the following sentences:
The conclusion is that the source of Great Anxiety, and of the equally dangerous mind-
lessness, lies not in the “amputation” of transcendence by materialism in man but rather 
in the present social dynamics. It is not a renaissance of transcendence that is needed but 
rather a renaissance of society. (288)
With this sentence Lem takes a step toward philosophy and social practice, but – 
faithful to his convictions – he does not go any further down that road. He is 
convinced that while technology can be a correlate of social issues (which can 
be clearly seen in all the social meanings ascribed to the web), but it almost cer-
tainly cannot be a remedy to them. Technoevolution progresses independently 
from the development of society. These are two separate currents. This view, 
which can be traced throughout ST, is one of the arguments in favor of the uto-
pian character of Lem’s thinking, as it necessitates assuming that human kind 
will somehow “grow up on its own” to benefit from all the amazing technological 
possibilities described in ST. Lem knows about this utopianism, but he does not 
like admitting it (as in the already quoted passage from Studia Filozoficzne). So 
far, however, there is no reason to believe that the technological growth has any-
thing to do with the ethical progress in users. This chasm is quite problematic 
 172 This is one of Lem’s favorite Latin quotes. His view on faith is quite different from 
contemporary theology. Lem seems to have especially valued Tertullian, Pseudo-
Dionysius the Areopagite, Nicholas of Cusa or Pascal – so thinkers representing neg-
ative theology.
 173 Again, I need to invoke the piece Non Serviam from Perfect Vacuum. Its “author” and 
protagonist, Professor Alfred Dobb, is giving an account of a discussion between two 
“personoids” he has created on a computer. They are discussing the genesis of their 
world, and they conclude with an accusation that its potential creator (i.e., Dobb) 
has entangled them in insolvable philosophical dilemmas (highly resembling ours). 
Ironically, Lem makes Dobb close the account with a statement that he feels respon-
sible for the being of these creatures, so, as long as he can, he will not turn off the 
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for the project of the species’ autoevolution, as I will show in the next part of 
this book.
The section “Cosmogonic Engineering” develops the idea of “creation of a 
world,” but without the issue of transcendence. Lem simply (?) proves the tech-
nological possibility of such occurrence, again being a quarter of a century ahead 
of extropians and other authors who were only inspired to think this way by 
the rapid growth of IT in the 1980s and 1990s. Lem imagines such a world as a 
cosmic-sized computer system, powered by star energy and simulating all “nat-
ural” phenomena in its circuits. No need to add here that the terms “natural” and 
“artificial” lose all their meaning by now.174
At this point, however, Lem get trapped in the paradox he has just thoroughly 
analyzed a moment earlier:
Equally, they [inhabitants of the world built by the Designer-Cosmogonist] are unable to 
establish whether someone created them and the cosmic habitat they freely roam, and, 
if so, who it was. Yet even though we have not been created by anyone (or at least by any 
personified being), there are plenty of philosophies that claim the contrary, declaring 
that our world is not all there is. But people who have pronounced such things have the 
same senses and brains that we do – sometimes rather sharp brains! (293–294)
This is somewhat surprising. One is tempted to ask where from the author draws 
his unshakable certitude that there is no creator of our world, given that on the 
preceding pages he has described nothing short of a creation of a world. How can 
we know that the building material of our universe – matter, energy and infor-
mation – is not a “set of building blocks” available to the Designer in a higher-
order world? The author himself admits that the sequence of such creations can 
be very long (292–293). This contradiction in Lem’s thinking is an illustration of 
a fairly persistent conflict in his work between the scientist and empiricist con-
viction about the superiority of Reason and Science over other human ways of 
experiencing reality on one hand, and a strong “sense of mystery,” a metaphysical 
yearning for a Great Dream to be hidden somewhere behind the facade of reality 
on the other. This clash of conviction actually has its own separate, thorough 
 174 Here we should invoke New Cosmogony from the Perfect Vacuum volume, which is 
a quasi-fiction developing the idea. Lem’s apocryphs are usually read as intertextual 
games of the type Borges engaged in. However, they include a lot of autocommentaries 
on Lem’s discursive texts. It would be advisable to write an analysis that would give a 
detailed idea of all such links, just as I suggested earlier for links between his discursive 
and grotesque writings. The thesis about close links between Lem’s discursive works 
and his fictions is commonly accepted in Lemology, but it rarely produces thorough 
and precise analyses of the subject.
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description within Lem’s oeuvre. It is the narrator’s words in His Master’s Voice, 
which express the conflict between amazement at the impersonal absolute 
of the laws of science on the one hand  – and the impact of cumulated indi-
vidual life experience, the psychological capacity of a scholar, his private fears 
or obsessions. It all clashes inside Peter Hogarth’s consciousness. While gener-
ally Lem remains insensitive to the relationship between science and society, he 
does seem to understand the relationship between science and the scholar’s per-
sonality very deeply. Generalizing a little, one could say that he cares about the 
adventures of an individual and the universe – and nothing less, nothing in-be-
tween. It is nearly certain that his interests were shaped in this way by his early 
war and Holocaust trauma.175
Later in the section “Cosmogonic Engineering” Lem points out that
The physicists from that world would only be able to discover the fact of creation (or 
rather of “having been created”) by comparing our real world with their own. It is only 
then that they would be able to see that our world is one level of Reality short when com-
pared with theirs … Figuratively speaking, a created world [by the Designer] is perhaps 
like a very stable, very long, and internally coherent dream that no one is dreaming but 
that rather “is dreaming itself ” – inside a “digital machine.” (294–295)
“Cosmogonic engineering” would then be free of the contradictions that 
phantomatics is flawed with, and in this sense it would be the “correct” variant 
of autoevolution. It is, however, a variant, which exceeds the project contained 
in ST as a whole. Lem sees it as a “deviation” and concludes the chapter with the 
following:
Someone could ask whether I believe it is at least a little bit likely that humans will one 
day make such – or similar – plans … I do not think so. Yet, if we take into account all 
those countless intelligent worlds revolving inside those enormous galaxies, while the 
number of those galaxies is incomparably higher than the number of … the grains of 
sand in a desert, this very number makes any improbability possible … Yet for no one 
in this whole abyss of stardust to arrive at an idea about such an undertaking, to try 
to bite more than it seems possible to chew – this indeed seems rather improbable to 
me. Before someone categorically disagrees, please, take a moment: July nights, during 
which the sky is so starry and beautiful, really encourage such contemplation. (296)
We already know what Lem thinks about a starry sky. In Part Three I will try to 
show what it entails for the moral law.
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Since following Lem’s thought has led me here to issues of utmost fantasy 
(although still rooted in science), I will quote one more passage from this chapter:
Pantocreatics does not thus create eternity because this is impossible. Fortunately, it is also 
unnecessary. We have nothing in common with a rather peculiar being who would want to 
exist for billions of years on an individual level and who would realize what such an exis-
tence means. (No human being is ever going to be able to imagine that.) (290)
It seems to be an accurate statement. But even this immeasurable difference 
has not prevented scholars from considering the existence of such forms. It was 
undertaken in the context of the “heat death” of the universe  – a scenario of 
universe’s development based on constant expansion until nearly all thermody-
namic processes cease. Universe would then become a practically infinite, empty 
space, with rare individual elementary particles. (And the word “rare” is to be 
understood as broadly as possible. It has been calculated as one electron per 
a volume exceeding the universe observable today by many orders of magni-
tude.) There are people who dare to speculate about possible forms of life in 
such conditions. These would have to be forms with radically slow life processes 
(due to the lack of energy in their environment), and so their life span would be 
counted not even in billions of years, but in billions of billions of years (we find 
ourselves in the world of big numbers were the cumulated exponents deprive 
imagination of all its capacities). An article on the subject was once published 
by Freeman Dyson,176 which was then taken up by Paul Davies in The Last Three 
Minutes,177 and eventually found an exciting and well written rendition in a book 
of two American cosmologists Fred Adams and Greg Laughlin titled The Five 
Ages of the Universe.178 It is one more evidence how far scientific deduction can 
take us, although in this case it is pure fiction, not a description or a prediction. 
Perhaps this is just the kind of sci-fi Lem dreamt about.179
 176 Freeman John Dyson, “Time Without End: Physics and Biology in an Open Universe,” 
Review of Modern Physics, no. 51 (1979), 447. Dyson’s main goal was a polemic with 
Steven Weinberg’s statement in his famous book The First Three Minutes: A Modern 
View of the Origin of the Universe: “The more the universe seems comprehensible, the 
more it also seems pointless.”
 177 Paul Davies, The Last Three Minutes: Conjectures about the Ultimate Fate of the Universe 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994).
 178 Frank Adams, Greg Laughlin, The Five Ages of the Universe: Inside the Physics of the 
Eternity (New York: Free Press, 1999).
 179 Fred Hoyle, who probably has similar intellectual leanings, wrote a novel about an 
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After this digression into the most remote domain still available to our mind’s 
reach (although too distant for our imagination to grasp it), in the last chapter of 
ST Lem returns to the project of autoevolution of our species. The project – or its 
interpretation I am about to present – involves a number of ideas that have been 
circulating in the late 20th and early 21st century.
the novel in ST on page 318. Hoyle, however, is more interested in the links between 
science and politics than in the features of the entity.
16  Putting Pieces Together
The plethora of themes in ST may confuse  – and it does confuse the general 
meaning of the work, which I wanted to bring out here. So I will now summarize 
it briefly.
Summa Technologiae develops the kind of thinking about the role of tech-
nology in the human world, which Lem started to work on in Dialogues. Just 
as in Dialogues his discourse can be accused of being somewhat chaotic – he 
put in it everything he was interested in at the time. Even if that is the case, it 
has no bearing on my analyses. I believe ST is a global prediction of how our 
civilization will develop technologically, and it includes an elaborate project 
of autoevolution of our species, based on a set of assumptions pertinent to 
philosophy, anthropology and social practice. Some of these assumptions have 
already been discussed in this part of my book. These are, above all: eliminating 
the opposition between the Natural and the Artificial and the conviction about 
the progressive character of autoevolution and about its independence from 
social processes running parallel to it.
I have been trying to show to what extent the stylistic and formal devices Lem 
used in ST affect the overall shape of his project, especially the fact he does not 
differentiate between a scientific text and an informal essay. Lem’s thinking in ST 
develops as follows: first, he considers the possibility of existence of intelligent 
forms of life different from us, treating it as an initial point of departure for the 
autoevolutionary project. He then moves on to what is now known as Artificial 
Intelligence. Its potential can be a step in acquiring control over production 
and distribution of information and knowledge, and it has the side effect of 
making “mechanical social control” possible. In the fifth out of eight chapters, he 
presents a metatheoretical discussion of the scope and methods of the Designer’s 
actions  – in ST it is a symbolic figure representing the human technological 
potential, which can be used in autoevolution. He talks about “phantomology,” 
the “early version” of reality subjected to radical technological transformation. In 
the penultimate chapter, Lem offers a project of “information farming,” which is 
to be a response to chaotic increase in knowledge, allowing for practical fulfill-
ment of far-reaching autoevolutionary plans presented in the last chapter, which 
shall be the subject of my analysis on the following pages.
As its final result autoevolution is to lead to rejecting the earlier form of human 
existence, both its spiritual and physical aspects. The totalizing character of the 




give utopian qualities to the whole idea. From a humanist’s point of view, its 
most striking feature is complete rejection of human historicity and neglecting 
the impact of social processes on technological evolution and autoevolution. Yet 
those features are justified given other premises Lem accepts. In his vision, tech-
nology replaces culture in its function of a reservoir of symbolic meanings and 
values and thus technology interferes with every sphere of life, completely per-
meating human material environment – it becomes what philosophers used to 
call Lebenswelt.
This summary makes the structure of ST seem fairly clear, but Lem’s argu-
ment is constantly interrupted with dozens of digressions and side notes, which 
may give an impression of the whole being quite chaotic, especially to a reader 
unaccustomed to this kind of broad intellectual gestures that are so typical for 
this particular author. Moreover, he himself is frequently skeptical about his 
arguments and interrupts himself with self-commentaries, doubts or methodo-
logical remarks. As a result ST is a very layered text that renders itself very easily 
to diverging interpretations. By no means am I claiming that the attempt at inter-
pretation that I am presenting here is the final one.
Part Three Autoevolution and Posthumanism 
 

17  Themes of Lampoon of Evolution
In Part Three of this book I will discuss the last chapter of ST, and then some 
of the currents in contemporary philosophy and sociology, which in one way 
or another seem to be akin to Lem’s project of autoevolution. These are mostly 
convergences rather than any kind of genetic affinities, and will partly be 
constructed through my interpretations. The aim is to show that Lem’s work, 
especially ST, has great albeit so far unacknowledged significance for the con-
temporary problems of our civilization.
The last chapter of ST is titled “Lampoon of Evolution.” It includes a descrip-
tion of the project of autoevolution of human species, the very description to 
which the rest of ST is but a set of introductory studies, as I have suggested ear-
lier. The word “lampoon” ought to be taken with a grain of salt, just as other 
rhetorical devices Lem uses in the titles of his chapters and sections of ST. It is 
a testimony to Lem’s personal and internally diverse attitude to bioevolution. 
He both admires the phenomenon, which he often hypostatizes, and is critical 
and hostile to it. The admiration comes from the fact that bioevolution has pro-
duced such amazing beings as a biological cell and rational humans.180 The crit-
icism and hostility stem from the fact that for Lem the rationalist the process is 
unbearable in how blindly random it is. This randomness has had a huge impact 
on the emergence of our species, on its physical and physiological shape and, 
more implicitly, on our minds, our culture and our history.
Autoevolution is to be, among other things, our response to this randomness. 
The fate, incarnated in stochastic mutation and selection processes, led to a sit-
uation where we, as the only form of life to our knowledge, have the ability to 
transform our mode of existence. It can be seen as the highest form of autarky.
The difference between “the artificial” and “the natural” thus begins to blur because “the 
artificial” is capable of exceeding “the natural” within any range of parameters that are 
of importance to the Designer … Man [as a bodily creature – PM] remains the last relic 
of Nature, the last “authentic product of Nature” inside the world he himself is creating. 
This state of events cannot last for an indefinite period of time. The invasion of tech-
nology created by man into his body is inevitable. (299–300)
 180 In ST as in other texts Lem sings praises of the genius with which organelles are 
designed and how they can adapt. In Lampoon, in the section titled “In the Eyes of the 
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Lem is again giving voice to his credo, as heavy as it is with implicit anthropo-
logical assumptions: we do not choose autoevolution; it is an inevitable result 
of a choice made centuries earlier. As it happened many times before in history, 
chance becomes necessity.
How will the process develop? In “Reconstructing the Species” section there 
are three alternative scenarios offered. In the first one autoevolution happens 
“only” through biotechnology – in its stage we already know today.
In this case, biotechnology’s tasks will consist in eliminating diseases or preventing 
them and also in replacing waning functions or defective organs with their biolog-
ical substitutes (such as transplants, tissue grafts) or with technical ones (prostheses). 
(300)
According to Lem “this is the most traditional and shortsighted approach” (300), 
and it is based on an assumption that “the human organism is given and thus 
fixed in its overall design” (300). This entails accepting the basic postulate – in 
the context of the public debate on biotechnology – presented by contemporary 
social and political humanism, that is, the inviolability of the biological struc-
ture of our species. But even this “traditional and shortsighted approach” already 
represents an excessive intervention into the human condition for many scholars 
and commentators today. The contrast is a clear testimony of how foreign all 
forms of humanism are to Lem, whether right-wing/conservative or left-wing/
liberal. This issue will be discussed separately later.
The second option is “a plan for creating ‘the next model’ of Homo sapiens” 
(301), in which “while doing everything as described earlier [i.e. in the first 
option] it is possible to combine those actions with a superior one, which will 
involve replacing Nature’s evolutionary gradients with man’s purposefully reg-
ulatory activity” (300). This variant is then all about replacing evolution with 
construction, and chance with a plan. Describing those scenarios, Lem was 
constantly aware how controversial every sentence is from the point of view of 
standard humanist and anthropological values. In the early 21st century this 
tension between the humanist framework and projects of autoevolution did not 
decrease, but it actually became stronger – as we shall see when analyzing con-
temporary discussion on the subject. It is because now the potential for actually 
realizing these ideas is much bigger than when Lem wrote ST. This means that 
“the threat to humanity” – as the defenders of status quo put it – became more 
imminent. So it is necessary to look very carefully at how Lem referred to poten-
tial criticism directed at his ideas.
To the question about the purpose of the autoevolutionary activities described 
in option two, Lem offers the following answer:
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It may focus on eliminating all those harmful consequences caused by the absence of 
natural selection, which destroys the inadequately adapted, from the artificial environ-
ment of that civilization. Alternatively, it may replace a modest program with a com-
prehensive one: that of biological autoevolution. The aim of the latter is to form an ever 
greater number of perfect human types (through scientifically changing hereditary 
parameters, e.g., mutability, susceptibility to cancers, body shape, inner- and cross-tissue 
correlations, and, last but not least, parameters that regulate life span or even the size 
and complexity of the brain). In other words, this would be a plan for creating ‘the next 
model’ of Homo sapiens extended in time over hundreds or perhaps even thousands of 
years. It would take place through slow and gradual changes rather than a sudden leap – 
which would smooth out intergenerational differences. (300–301)
The first two sentences of the passage describe an alternative. The first segment 
seems to be a declaration from a supporter of aggressively eugenic practices – 
this is what the mention of “eliminating all those harmful consequences caused 
by the absence of natural selection” might suggest. I believe, however, that this 
is simply an effect produced by the clumsy structure of the sentence. Its actual 
meaning would be: “a moderate” version of autoevolution should eliminate those 
factors from human biology that cause diseases and feebleness of the body – so 
it would not so much replace natural selection in its eliminating function, but 
rather finally free the human species from qualities that this selection would be 
eliminating in the past. This way we would get rid of dilemmas of keeping alive 
people who are fully paralyzed or incurable and suffering, or the elderly, or chil-
dren with serious developmental defects. In natural conditions, or even as late 
as in the first half of the last century, all these people would have no chance of 
survival. However, the progress in medicine and other sciences led to a situation 
in which the possibility (and medical obligation) to keep them alive begins to 
clash with other ethical principles, resulting in the discussion about euthanasia 
(I will be discussing that later). “The second scenario” Lem presents has a strictly 
utilitarian goal: engineering human bodies, independently from their biological 
heritage in order to improve them, so that no flaw in our bodies interferes with 
us benefiting from the fruits of scientific growth.
This second scenario is “the maximum program” (the first one is “the modest 
option”). It goes beyond even the most liberal contemporary criteria regulating 
biotechnology, but for Lem this is not the last word. Soon after he writes:
Third, perhaps the whole problem should be treated in a far more radical way. We can 
consider as inadequate both Nature’s design solution to the problem of ‘What is an 
Intelligent Being to be like?’ and the solution that could be reached by autoevolutionary 
means learned from Nature. Instead of improving or ‘patching up’ the model that exists 
within a certain set of parameters, it is possible to set some new arbitrary values for them. 
Instead of a relatively modest biological life span, we could demand quasi-immortality. 
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Instead of strengthening the design provided by Nature within the constraints set by its 
building material, we could demand the highest strength that the existing technology 
can offer. In other words, we could replace reconstruction with a total rejection of the 
existing solution and then design a completely new one. (301)
This passage carries a barely concealed postulate to reject humanity. People 
who would be so radically transformed, so completely designed anew on their 
own, would no longer be people. They would become a form of intelligent life 
completely foreign to us. I suggest that for now we put aside the most immediate 
reactions to such an idea: shock, laughter or indifference. Let us focus on this 
“foreignness.” Here and further on Lem sees it mostly as a physical difference. 
Posthumans would be tougher, stronger, more immune to things. Yet, it is also 
possible – and, I  think, necessary – to ask about the intellectual difference. It 
is true that we cannot say anything about it with certainty – even if we assume 
this is all more than just an irresponsible vision of an intellectual suffering from 
ennui. However, on behalf of the possible future posthuman, we can consider 
those trends in our human world and the way we think about the world, which 
seem to lead toward the posthuman condition. This part of my book will be 
devoted to those trends exactly.
Very aware of how unobvious his vision is, Lem devotes subsequent pages to 
a critique of it. He begins with the arguments in support of his position, mostly 
repeating what he has said earlier (301–303). And then, he gives the floor to 
an opponent of autoevolution. It is worth quoting his opinion in its entirety, 
as it proves that, despite the appearances, Lem was actually very sensitive to 
humanism – even though he rejected it.
In reply, we say that the supporter of the revolution in human redesign does not prob-
ably realize what the consequences of his postulates may be. We are not just talking 
about some narrowly conceived attachment to man’s present body. The whole of cul-
ture and art, including some of its most abstract theories, is saturated with corporeality 
the way it was formed and shaped by Nature. Corporeality has informed the canons of 
every historical aesthetic, of every existing language, and, through that, of the totality 
of human thought. Our spirit is corporeal too: it is not that this word derives from res-
piration. Contrary to what it may seem, there are no values that could have emerged 
without the presence of the corporeal factor. Love itself is entirely corporeal–in its least 
physiological sense. It would be an act of extreme madness if man really was to undergo 
a transformation owing to the technologies that he himself has created and if he would 
consider a robot with a perfect crystalline brain his successor. It would actually amount 
to a collective suicide of the human race, even though such a suicide would be covered 
up by the apparent continuation of humanity in thinking machines – which are part of 
the technology created by man. In this way, man would ultimately allow the technology 
he himself has brought about to push him out of his place of existence, of his ecological 
Themes of Lampoon of Evolution 151
niche. Having removed a less adapted species from the stage of history, technology 
would thus become a new synthetic species. (303)
No opponent of biotechnology and autoevolution could put it better. This pas-
sage also shows Lem’s attitude to body, albeit from different angle than in the 
analyses I presented earlier. Here it is clear that Lem’s hatred of the body stems 
not only from aesthetical criteria, but also from his view of the omnipotence of 
body and corporeality over human existence as a whole. Therefore his reference 
to humanism is quite peculiar, as no version of humanism in the European cul-
ture has ever emphasized the corporeal character of our existence quite so much, 
even though, as I shall show later, there are numerous covert similarities between 
the autoevolutionary project and some versions of humanism. Lem is not a nat-
uralist here though, as for him “Body” is not identical with genotype or phe-
notype, or with any other physiological factor, which contemporary naturalist 
reductionists see as the factor, that determines our lives in full. “Body” is just 
a figure here, as “Designer” or “Nature” were in the earlier chapter. It expresses 
Lem’s rejection of this particular element of our being that is painfully limiting, 
as it does not allow us to reach the heights of existence, which we have discov-
ered through our minds. It could be said that at this point in his thinking – par-
adoxically – Lem is something of a “technological spiritualist,” awaiting not the 
enslavement of the soul in a machine, but a liberation of it from the body by 
machine.
The terms “robot” and “thinking machines” that Lem uses are not exactly 
accurate here – they are meant to emphasize that the opponent is an amateur. 
As I  have already shown, the thing is not to transform people into copies of 
C3PO from Star Wars, nor to move human minds into computer networks the 
way extropians suggested. If we are to analyze Lem “seriously,” it is necessary 
to remember that a robot is one thing, an android is another, and a cyborg yet 
another type of entity – and none of these has much to do with computers. These 
terminological differences will be clarified in Chapter 23.
The response from the supporter of the project of reconstructing the spe-
cies (303–305) is based on negating the importance of the past, so if we were 
to locate the discussion on a scale between conservatism and liberalism, this 
position would be on the liberal side. So what, he says, that our biological body 
determines our being, experience and understanding of the world? So what, 
given that the body itself, born from a million of accidental mutations and 
selections, has multiple flaws and disadvantages? Evolution shaped them for the 
sole purpose of survival, while we have long been pursuing other goals. “I do not 
believe in any solutions that would be final” (305) – which means: it is merely 
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accepted custom and our limited imagination that lead us to believe that our cur-
rent material form is the only one possible. And anyway, this form – Lem repeats 
his favorite theme – is a source of constant suffering for us, because, for instance, 
the proximity of sexuality and the excretory system disgust and shame us, giving 
rise to numerous dilemmas of our culture. Its defender would say that this is why 
it is valuable. But is it worth it to pay such a high price for this value? – Lem asks.
Today we believe that it is possible to create a symphony … via a conscious mental effort. 
At the same time, the thought of “composing” a successor for ourselves … seems like a 
terrible heresy. Yet the desire to fly … also used to be seen as heresies in the past … If we 
are to behave like intellectual cowards, we can, of course, remain silent on the topic of 
any probable future developments. But in that case, we should at least make it clear that 
we are behaving like cowards. Man cannot change the world without changing himself. 
We can take the first steps on a given path while pretending we do not know where it 
leads. Yet this is not the best strategy. (305)
“Yes,” the defender would say, “but is this exploration from flying to autoevolution 
always legitimate, or are there limits to it?” In other words, is there a point beyond 
which a thought of change does become a heresy? Heart transplant was supposed 
to be it, and then artificial insemination – but after the fact we have accepted 
them. Now we are facing the possibility of cloning and label it a “heresy.” What 
about radical autoevolution? Lem does not see the objection because he is an 
ardent supporter of progress, a true child of Europe, with its mysterious desire to 
constantly exceed its limits. It has to be said very clearly here, that writing about 
“culture” and “civilization,” and their transformations inspired by the posthuman 
utopia, I am only writing about the culture and civilization of the West; I would 
not get into a discussion about how it could affect the whole world through glob-
alization, which, by the way, has become problematic, to say the least, in light 
of the events of the first 15 years of the 21st century. The utopian character of 
Lem’s utopia is based on the fact that it is really a u-topia, as we do not know 
where it will be fulfilled (if it is to be fulfilled): on the entire planet, or in one of 
its parts. In short, Lem’s whole thinking about technology is deeply rooted in 
the type of thinking that is characteristic of the Western culture, as its funda-
mental premise is that people will always aim to fulfill their whole potential, 
following the credo “if something can be done, let us do it.” The cultures of the 
East, of Mesoamerica or Africa, did not know this type of thinking. But for Lem 
the richness of cultures and their philosophical and anthropological foundations 
have no significance. It is important because he treats the Western thought  – 
especially in the realm of technological progress – as the only possible way of 
approaching these issues. For him a culture whose members would consciously 
refuse to fulfill their entire technological potential would likely be flawed. Those 
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supercivilizations that have been mentioned here before, which are concealing 
their presence in the universe, have not and would not withhold progress, they 
simply hid its results, or would hide them.
His position can then be categorized as “Eurocentric liberalism” – if we were 
to measure Lem against the contemporary spectrum of worldviews. However, 
looking at it from a different angle, at no point does Lem want to pass for a 
hardheaded anti-humanist; he knows this would make him an adherent of the 
“ideology of scientist technocracy,” as Kołakowski labeled him. So, before he 
responds to the charge of lack of specifics laid by his imaginary opponent with a 
detailed presentation of biotechnological parameters of autoevolution, he again 
expresses some general opinions about his own bold project:
[The autoevolutionist] before he moves on to discuss the position adopted by his ratio-
nalist opponent,181 he reveals that the first standpoint is actually not that alien to him. 
It is because, deep down, he feels the same strong objection to any plans for species 
reconstruction that the person who has condemned it in absolute terms does. But the 
autoevolutionist sees such future transformation as inevitable, which is why he is looking 
for all kinds of reasons that would support it, so that the necessary action overlaps with 
the outcome of the decision made. He is not an a priori opportunist; he does not think 
that what is necessary must at the same time be good. At the same time, he hopes that it 
at least may turn out to be good. (307)
One is almost tempted to add:  freedom is the recognition of necessity. There 
is a degree of fatalism in Lem’s thinking that finds expression in this sort of 
declarations. But perhaps it should rather be called intellectual heroism, as it is 
also true that it takes great courage to look into the future of our species. So far it 
seems that there is indeed no escaping technology, no stopping its progress. We 
need to be thinking about what is next; otherwise we will just be carried by it. We 
shall soon see, though, that for Lem there is apparently no difference between 
thinking and doing.
To bring out the opposition between bioevolution and autoevolution even 
more, Lem writes at the beginning of the next chapter (“Constructing Life”):
To design a dynamo machine, one does not need to know the history of its invention 
process. A young engineer can do very well without it. The historical circumstances that 
 181 Calling the defender of humanity “a rationalist” is quite a perfidious device, which 
allows Lem to, on the one hand, emphasize the specificity of the charges against 
autoevolution, but, on the other hand, to suggest that his opponent is somehow too 
earthly. Lem seems to be using the colloquial understanding of the word, which he 
would have probably used with a different meaning when referring to himself.
 
 
Themes of Lampoon of Evolution154
shaped the first generations are, or at least can be completely irrelevant to him … This 
kind of separation from developmental history is unknown in biology. (307)
It is unknown in biology – and therefore the process of bioevolution is inevitably 
burdened with the past, largely affecting our physicality. Our mind is also his-
torical, albeit for somewhat different reasons. “Separation from history” will be 
an advantage of autoevolution – which is nothing less than an engineered con-
struction. This is another reason why humanism, burdened with history,182 is so 
irrelevant to projects of autoevolution.
It needs to be added here that historicity of bioevolution and historicity of 
humanism are two very different phenomena, which can be put next to each 
other here only because, as I have shown, Lem seems to have a tendency to iden-
tify reality with discourse about it, and he does so permanently for the reality 
of bioevolution. Bioevolutionary processes are historical insofar as each sub-
sequent form of life retains certain qualities of its predecessors. Historicity of 
humanism is based on a system of values established within the Western culture 
and accepted throughout most of its existence. One of its major characteristics 
is the desire to remember the past (which is a characteristic the West happens to 
share with most human cultures). Both types of historicity lose their meaning in 
the face of autoevolution. It will explain why a bit later.
On the following pages of ST, Lem discusses those aspects of biological evo-
lution, which can be perfected in autoevolution. The long section “Constructing 
Life” (307–319) includes a description of the basics of the “species technology,” 
which again subtly weaves together the discourses of biology and engineering, 
while the author uses cybernetic notions for instance to explain processes of cel-
lular metabolism. A detailed analysis of this section of ST is not necessary for 
the purposes of this book. Lem uses rhetorical devices here that I have already 
discussed in the context of the entire ST, producing the same effect: a strong sug-
gestion that it is possible to identify biotechnological engineering with the pro-
cess of bioevolution, or at least an easy shift from bioevolution to bioconstruction 
is possible. The following paragraph merits particular attention:
Seen in this way, human evolution deserves both a positive and a negative evaluation. 
Negative, since … it deprived its final and highest products, that is, us, [emphasis – PM] 
 182 I am not invoking the title of Hayden White’s famous essay (The Burden of History) by 
accident. Narrativist historians pay great attention to the very process of accumulation 
of narratives making up “history.” This accumulation leads to increasing difficulties in 
grasping the possible meanings organizing history and human culture on all levels. Yet 
humanism cannot reject “the burden of history,” without rendering itself meaningless.
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of the opportunity to continue in a steady manner the work of progress on the biological 
level. Biotechnological as well as moral aspects stop us from simply continuing with the 
evolutionary methods: biotechnological because we are too determined as a particular 
design solution by Nature’s causal forces, and moral because we reject the method of 
blind trials and that of blind selection. (314)
The passage I have quoted in bold above should probably be treated as a lapsus 
calami, as it is a mark of a teleological approach to bioevolution, which was 
something science started being accused of in the mid-20th century at the latest, 
and which Lem usually carefully avoids.183 It is quite possible though that this 
“crack in the text” actually reveals Lem’s belief in human superiority over other 
forms of life. This would fit his utopian anthropological assumptions and would 
be yet another proof of his implicit humanism that he is striving to eradicate 
from his discourse on technology. The rest of the passage on the other hand is 
about the qualitative change that the shift from bioevolution to bioconstruction 
necessitates. Lem does not describe the character of the change precisely; it is 
related, however, to all of the premises of the autoevolution project.
Later in the text, especially in the section “Constructing Consciousness” (322–
327) Lem again returns to problems he has already discussed, above all the issue 
of consciousness and the theory of information in the context of bioconstruction. 
After a number of detailed remarks on these subjects he produces another pow-
erful general declaration. It is as follows:
One of the Nobel laureates, who received the prize precisely for his studies on heredity, 
and thus may be said to be directly interested in similar [i.e. biotechnological] 
achievements, declared that he would not want to live to see them actualized owing to 
the terrifying responsibility man would then have to take on.
Although creators of science deserve the greatest respect, it seems to me that the pre-
ceding point of view is not worthy of a scientist. One cannot simultaneously make dis-
coveries and avoid taking responsibility for their consequences … The scientist tries in 
vain to narrow down his research so that it takes the form of information gathering, 
which is protected with a thick wall against problems to be covered by its application. 
Evolution … acts ruthlessly. In gradually getting to know its engineering activities, man 
cannot pretend that he is gathering solely theoretical knowledge. (335)
“The Nobel laureate” is James Watson, and his words are a leading theme 
in discussions on bioethics today. Lem’s commentary on one hand justifies 
autoevolution (but in what sense?), but on the other it contradicts the separa-
tion between science and social practice that has been articulated many times 
throughout ST. It is another point when Lem’s persona as a scholar is in conflict 
 183 See Chapter 6 about narrative in evolutionary biology. 
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with his persona as a utopian humanist. And as to the sense of justification of 
autoevolution – I have put it into question in the parentheses above as Lem does 
not distinguish – here or elsewhere – between predictions about autoevolution 
from the practice of it. That is, he does not see that in the context of the social 
role of thinking there is a difference between thinking about a possibility of a 
certain development leading to autoevolution and thinking about autoevolution 
as if it were certain to happen. Confusing those two modes is another feature of 
Lem’s discourse, which locates it in the utopian realm.
The last paragraph from the section “Reconstructing Man” is a testimony of 
to what extent Lem’s thinking remains determined by implicit assumptions that 
are fundamentally “Western”:
What is therefore possible? Almost everything, with just one exception. Having con-
sidered in advance, people could decide one day, many thousands of years from now, 
“Enough! Let things be the way they are now; let them remain like this forever. Let us 
not change, seek, or discover anything new, since things cannot be better than they are 
now, and even if they could, we do not want it.”
Even though I have outlined many unlikely things in this book, this one seems to me the 
most unlikely of them all. (348)
It is clear: we do not stop discovering and creating, because this is just what we are, 
and it is so obvious that we do not even ask why we are like that. Contemplative 
attitudes are fundamentally alien to Lem.184 This conviction of his, which he does 
not seem to be aware of, but treats it as a given of reality, is the same one as the 
conviction that is the foundation of the entire posthumanist utopia, which I will 
be analyzing on the following pages.
In the eighth chapter of ST, Lem mentions cyborgs in passing as well. A short 
section “Cyborgization” (348–350) begins with a statement that:
Separate consideration needs to be given to the only project of human reconstruction 
proposed by scientists with which we are familiar today – a project that is still purely 
hypothetical. Yet this is not a project for universal reconstruction. It is supposed to serve 
some particular goals, that is, an adaptation to the Universe as an “ecological niche.” It 
goes under the name of “cyborg” (which is an abbreviation of the term “cybernetic orga-
nization”). (348–349)
Lem certainly has in mind the first scientific text about cyborgs, which is now the 
classic article on the subject by two Americans, Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan 
S. Kline, “Cyborgs and Space,” which was published in Astronautics journal in 
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1960. (I will discuss it in more detail in Chapter 23.) Approaching the idea of 
cyborgs as a purely technological concept is characteristic of the early discourse 
on the subject. For Lem, it is only one of the possible routes autoevolution could 
take (but the only one explicitly articulated at the time). In today’s discussions it 
plays a much more eminent role, as we shall see soon.
This is really where ST ends.185 The final two sections of “A Lampoon…” (“The 
Autoevolutionary Machine” and “Extrasensory Phenomena”, 351–358) contain 
only side notes to the main theme. The first one is devoted to a peculiar kind of 
eugenics. Lem floats an idea of a machine that would match couples to marry 
each other in such a way that they produce offspring with the best possible phe-
notype. Those critics, who mentioned the idea, approached it with skepticism, to 
say the least.186 For Lem, however, it seems not to have had any ethically dubious 
qualities, as the last sentence of the passage states:
“Cutting up people’s brains and bodies” [i.e. “strong” autoevolution] evokes disgust, 
whereas “machinic marriage counseling” seems to be quite an innocent interven-
tion – yet these are just two paths of different lengths that can both lead to analogous 
results. (354)
In the conclusion of ST, the author emphasizes how important it is to focus the 
autoevolutionary activity on the molecular level of life and he again invokes 
comparisons between “natural language” and “language of the genetic code”:
From twenty letters of amino acids Nature constructed a “pure” language, which 
expresses – via a slight rearrangement of nucleotide syllables – plagues, viruses, bacteria, 
T-rexes, termites, hummingbirds, forests, and nations, as long as it has bought time at its 
disposal. This language, so perfectly atheoretical, anticipates not only the conditions at 
the bottom of the oceans … but also the quantum character of light, thermodynamics, 
electrochemistry, echolocation, hydrostatics  – and many other things we still know 
nothing about. It does so only “practically,” because, though it causes everything, it does 
not understand anything  – yet its lack of intelligence is much more productive than 
our wisdom.187 … It truly makes sense to learn such a language – because it constructs 
philosophers, while ours constructs only philosophies. (360–361)
This declaration would explain why Lem paid so little attention to cyborgs 
whose possible construction happens on the level of entire bodies and organs, 
not molecules. Lem was a real enthusiast of biotechnology, and if one wanted to 
 185 I am not including here the “Afterword. Twenty years later,” which was added to the 
fourth Polish edition of ST. I do not think it adds anything new to the whole work.
 186 Cf., for example, Szpakowska…, 75–76.
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follow his path, a history of genetic engineering and discussions about it should 
be written. I will do something different though. I have been trying to show here 
that ST as a whole is a project of autoevolution. According to Lem autoevolution 
can happen in different ways. I  am most interested in the one, which entails 
far-reaching spiritual consequences. Even the most advanced uses of biotech-
nology do not, I believe, lead to a qualitative change in the human condition. 
People do not cease to be people. Cyborgization does cause such a leap. I will 
present the arguments in favor of these strong theses later in the text. At this 
point I just want to preliminarily explain my choice. Moreover, I have suggested 
many times that ST is a utopia, but the ideas regarding cyborgs today are no less 
utopian (as opposed to bioethical discussions), and that is another link here. 
I want to focus now on the utopianism of ST and Lem’s thinking about tech-
nology as a whole.
18  Utopia in ST
While describing and analyzing the content of ST, I pointed to those qualities of 
the work that can be seen as utopian. It is important because if it can be proved 
that ST is a kind of utopia, it would have bearing on all types of thinking about 
social practice that repeat the model of ST  – that is, autoevolutionary ideas. 
Again, I have to emphasize methodological difficulties one encounters studying 
(not to mention producing) a discourse that is somewhere in between four dif-
ferent domains: humanism and posthumanism; theory and social practice. It is 
extremely difficult to determine the relationship between such a discourse and 
its subject. It is hard to tell where a description ends and a manifesto begins; what 
is a theoretical concept and what is an actual plan of action.
I treat the utopianism of ST as one of the implicit anthropological assumptions 
Lem accepts. He rarely and marginally formulates them overtly (and I  have 
quoted many of such passages here). A  deep conviction about human ratio-
nality is a recurring thread. The thought is usually an axiom for Lem, which does 
not need to be justified. It does come into conflict though with the opposite view, 
which he has been articulating from the very beginning of his writing and which 
is the dominating one. However, we can omit that contradiction here, as it has no 
bearing on the current argument. It is an element of conflict between naturalism 
and culturalism in Lem’s thought.188
Human rationality is the necessary condition for autoevolution. Science and 
technology, which make autoevolution possible and, in fact, necessary due to 
unstoppable progress,189 have no necessary rationale for themselves. Even “infor-
mation farming” does not produce one for itself, and “pantocreatics” is but a 
set of Designer’s internal rules, which have nothing to do with the “User.” In 
short, science and technology can never answer what it is that they exist for and 
what the purpose of their products is. Therefore, if there is no obvious pragmatic 
 188 Commentators have been pointing out for a long time that Lem’s fictions and discur-
sive texts are swarmed with contradictory assumptions. See, for example, N. Katherine 
Hayles, “Chaos as Dialectic:  Stanisław Lem and the Space of Writing,” in:  idem, 
Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1990). The author (who is one of the leading 
theoreticians of posthumanism) outlines an interpretation of Lem’s work as constant 
attempts to marry various contradictory statements about man and the world.
 189 The conviction about the “inevitability of progress,” which has been discussed here 








criterion (applicability of medications, practical usefulness of technical devices), 
the question of purpose becomes problematic. What makes it even more difficult 
is that the availability of a pragmatic criterion entails a question about whether 
the achievements of science and technology are always used for a common good 
(and we know they are not). Lem rarely says any of these things, as they are 
problematic from his point of view. He would rather that the meaning of sci-
ence was implicit to it, as is the case with art that is separated from social issues. 
However, he knows this is not the case, he assumes human rationality is what 
gives meaning to science.190 Rational people – and only they – can make such a 
use of the fruits of the growth of technology based on science, that it will not turn 
against them and will not degrade the progress itself. Lem realizes how risky such 
a thesis is – and that is why he conceals it beneath the surface of the text of ST.
Yet, the social reality contradicted this thesis already when ST was being 
written. Today this contradiction is even more striking. And I do not just mean 
those versions of thoughtlessness, stupidity and bad intentions, which we wit-
ness daily on the web, nor am I  thinking about the deep separation between 
pragmatics and ethics in how technology is used. The thing is also that – despite 
the claims of “third culture” enthusiasts – science and technology do not help 
introduce order into the exponentially increasing amounts of meanings avail-
able in our culture, while they themselves keep adding on meanings. One of the 
diseases that destroy the Western culture today is semiotitis191 – excessive growth 
of chaotic meaning, which cannot be put into “grand narratives.” A thoughtful 
person is drifting today on the surface of an infinite and bottomless ocean of 
meanings, with no navigation tools, and with every move or gesture, every word, 
even accidentally dropped, immediately becoming meaningful in any number 
of ways. Scholars and intellectuals work compulsively producing new meanings. 
But this whole infinitely chaotic field of meanings makes no sense. (And the dis-
tinction between sense and meaning comes more from Sartre than Frege here.) 
Lem understood that a long time ago – I believe that his Memoirs Found in a 
Bathtub (1961) is one of the most powerful descriptions of semiotitis, if we only 
go beyond the level of political readings. Memoirs… are a startling description of 
 190 I am using the term “rationality” in its standard meaning, as shaped by the thought 
of the Enlightenment and Positivism.
 191 By creating this neologism, I  am referring to the book by Constantin Noica Six 
Maladies of the Contemporary Spirit, where the Romanian intellectual described 
catholitis, horeitis and todetitis and their opposites: acatholia, ahoretia, atodetia – they 
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a desperate work on sense, a futile work with no grounding in any kind of lasting 
foundations.
Autoevolution, seen as a product of science and technology, is devoid of sense, 
even if we assume that it does include a pragmatic criterion, which is not self-ev-
ident at all. To give it sense, Lem has to introduce an anthropological premise. 
And it is the thesis about human rationality. It is a utopian thesis. This means that 
the idea of autoevolution is utopian itself.
But what are we speaking about when we use the word “utopia”? Studying 
two of the best discussions of the problem that have been written in Polish,192 
one could come to a conclusion that nearly every conceptual system referring 
to social and cultural reality, which is not a straightforward description, is a 
utopia. Any such discourse includes either certain assumptions about human 
nature or postulates about how the social world should be arranged. Wishing to 
avoid getting into vague discussions, I accept the understanding of the concept 
of utopia presented by Karl Manheim: utopia is a system of thought, discourse 
or narrative, which calls for a change of the existing social order; as opposed to 
ideology, the aim of which is to preserve such order. The important point is that 
Manheim does not assume that utopia describes the perfect state – which was a 
characteristic of old utopias, from Plato’s republic, through More, to Wells’s pos-
itivist projects.
I believe ST is a utopia, which does not assume perfection of the pro-
ject it presents, but its inevitability. Lem emphasizes that on many occasions. 
The utopianism here is not about claiming that autoevolution is a telos for the 
humanity, a paradise or any other such ultimate point of arrival. (It is different 
in some of the newer concepts, e.g., for the extropians, but that’s another story.) 
At its core, however, there lies an assumption of human rationality that in fact 
makes ST similar to projects of enlightenment, positivism and liberalism (the 
differences between Lem’s thought and the former two has already been ana-
lyzed here). There are two options then: Manheim’s utopia of change and liberal 
utopia of rationality. They are complementary with each another. Lem believes 
that any description of future changes of humanity is only justified when one 
accepts some basic assumptions about human nature, which would inform the 
 192 These are:  Aleksander Świętochowski, Utopie w rozwoju historycznym 
(Warszawa:  Gebethner i S-ka, 1910), 347; and Jerzy Szacki, Spotkanie z utopią 
(Warszawa: Sic!, 2000), 240 (new edition). Świętochowski is of course outdated now 
in his interpretations, but most of the book is a description of tens of utopian systems, 




changes. Otherwise such description would be pure fantasy. We have already 
seen how the view materialized in “metatheory of autoevolution,” which deter-
mined its technological scope. Now I  am trying to show that the utopian as-
sumption of rationality is what determines the autoevolutionary pragmatics in 
Lem’s discourse. Pantocreatics determines the Designer; rationality determines 
“the User.” However, while the former is “real” as an essential component of the 
autoevolutionary project, the latter is an ad hoc assumption with a status of an 
axiom, which cannot be treated as a practical rule.
The difference between the two can be illustrated as follows:  let us imagine 
that a computer at an IT store comes with two user’s manuals. The first one is a 
regular manual on how to use it, install software and so on; while the latter is a 
manual of virtuous use of the computer, which, for example, includes a directive 
that the computer cannot be used to browse pornographic websites, and anyone 
who does that will be naughty. In the autoevolutionary project pantocreatics is 
the manual of the first kind, whereas rationality – of the second. Pantocreatics is 
essential for autoevolution to happen, rationality – unfortunately is not. And that 
is also a reason why rationality is what makes the project utopian.
It is a complex issue. We have here: Lem’s explicit discourse in ST and other 
“essays,” with all its difficulties; Lem’s fiction, which largely corresponds with the 
discourse193; Lem’s project of autoevolution; we have the twofold utopian char-
acter of the project as I am presenting it; the implicit and contradictory anthro-
pological assumptions accepted by Lem; the evolution of his thinking between 
the 1960s and the end of his life; and finally there is the issue of how it all relates 
to the social and political practice, especially the contemporary state of biotech-
nology and surrounding debates. It is a conundrum that is difficult to analyze and 
I shall not disentangle it on every possible level. However, later in this chapter 
I will be describing sections of the contemporary (post)humanist discourse that 
have something to do with Lem’s utopia. I want to emphasize here that the thesis 
about the utopian character of the autoevolutionary project is applicable to all 
concept I will be referring to on the following pages.
A few more general remarks need to be made about the utopian char-
acter of autoevolution. We already know that the main ethical condition for 
 193 I am only referring to those connections marginally so as not to make my 
own analyses even more complicated. Lem’s novels, especially Wizja lokalna 
[“Observation on the Spot”] and Eden have been studied in search of their utopi-
anism both by Szpakowska and Jarzębski. Cf. also Mariusz M. Leś, Stanisław Lem 
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autoevolution is human rationality. Without it, autoevolution may become what 
Internet can be: a trifle for entertainment only. Yet, this liberal and meliorist as-
sumption that makes Lem resemble many of the “old” utopians drawing visions 
of humanity without law and violence, governed by natural virtues, conflicts with 
another assumption, equally, if not more important than this one. As the author 
of the autoevolutionary project, Lem rejects – he wants to and has to reject – the 
entire humanism. Autoevolution is unhistorical, as it reveals the entire past of 
the species, not only biological past, but historical and cultural too. This may 
seem not to contradict the earlier characteristic, especially as it is shared by 
most liberal social theories that assume people are independent from the past 
and are almost infinitely malleable in their humanity. However, therein lies the 
problem:  such thinking requires that we reject the notion of “human nature,” 
and treat it as a “naturalistic fallacy.” Meanwhile, the assumption of rationality 
does imply the existence of human nature – one that would include rationality. 
If I am right in seeing an aporia here, it is one that Lem shares with most liberal 
and posthumanist thinkers – it will be evident as I discuss the notion of identity 
in contemporary (post)humanist discourse.
The fact that in ST, Lem almost never ponders on whether people will actually 
want to subject themselves to autoevolution may be an evidence that he does not 
deem the notion of “human nature” necessary. It clearly does not cross his mind 
that people could be willing to retain their current condition. Most likely it is 
simply because he sees this condition as extremely meager, but partly also because 
he shares a liberal conviction that this condition can be freely shaped, that it is 
independent from all that is past – and so that there are no imponderables that 
used to be seen as “human nature.”
A psychoanalyst would certainly wonder about the impulse that leads Lem to 
change everything. But even in this case our author is not consistent. In 1978 the 
monthly Znak asked scholars and intellectuals about their views on science and 
faith. Here is an excerpt from Lem’s response:
The newer extremists on the other hand dream about a real “etorevolution” involving 
redesigning a human that would be in every respect “better” than Homo sapiens. The 
biggest risk lies in the fact that this whole designing endeavor unwittingly goes beyond 
real history of the humanity. The thing is that every social or philosophical system, every 
religion, every historical time accepted and assumed all the qualities and values present 
in the natural man. The natural man was and is “a constant,” an unchangeable element in 
its own history. It is easy to speak generally about a “better human,” but in no tradition 
of earthly cultures, no philosophical and religious systems, no ethical codes can one find 
any directives what would suggest what this “perfected” man would be like. By stepping 
beyond the state of things we have, we are losing any normative, legal, axiological and 
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theological ground, we are left with no compass – this whole meliorist concept is left in 
a vacuum. But one day it will be possible to carry out psychological and bodily changes 
of great scope, and there may be no shortage of fanatic supporters of the process then. 
This is likely the biggest threat ahead of us.194
It looks like Lem in 1978 is criticizing Lem’s ideas from 1964. It will not seem odd 
if we take into account how unstable his anthropological views were. However, 
the evolution of Lem’s anthropology is not my concern here – it would make my 
argument too complicated. In the quoted excerpt Lem emphasizes the problem 
that has now become the main argument for the opponents of biotechnology: the 
rejection of history as a road sign, and of ethics grounded in history  – even 
though he did not mind it back in ST at all. It needs to be added that the issue 
itself is still valid, because, as I shall try to show later, posthumanism is the first 
period in our history when the content of the past in no way helps us understand 
the present. The disconnect is too radical.
In another short text, written somewhat earlier, Lem described various 
“effects” occurring within futurology. Among them there is “Archimedes effect.”
The ARCHIMEDES EFFECT is the search for support for thought. It is non-
sensical to claim that full freedom, that is, lack of limits, is what gives wings to 
thought. Weightlessness only seems to give cosmonauts full freedom of move-
ment (if they weigh nothing, they do not pull, so they have no limitations), 
because in reality it paralyzes orientation and turns man like a wriggling baby; 
similarly thought with no support in known templates does not fly infinitely but 
it holds on to anything it can, at random.
Our era invalidates all the traditional supports, including the experience of 
previous generations, customary prohibitions and the belief in unconditional 
benefits of economic growth, and thus it takes away the tested structure that the 
thought ruling action could lean on. That is why the Archimedes effect occurs 
so spasmodically today. The more things happen, that even yesterday seemed 
impossible, the more dramatically thought turns to the past, searching for 
directions.
Hence the popularity of historical parallels, hence the imposing tendency to 
remind us we come from apes, hence the discussions about the inescapability 
of inborn qualities  – and hence the sudden interest in history and ethology. 
Perhaps we can be saved by studying the behavior of Romans at the time of the 
fading empire? Or maybe rather we should focus on anthropoids? Maybe the 
behavior of rats, lemmings and predators will be our compass? Or maybe man is 
 194 Stanisław Lem, [A response], Znak, no. 291 (1978), 1148. 
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a domesticated animal that domesticated itself? And we should look for a solu-
tion in a cow or a ram? Why does the enlightened audience now read all the 
bestsellers on its apish qualities, while a century ago similar revelations would 
provoke anti-Darwinian fury? Because the limits posed by apes are better than 
none.195
Here is yet another approach to the matter: the past (biological rather than 
cultural, but not only) is a remedy to the instability of an era of great changes. 
But it is not a sure remedy, it is straw that a drowning man clutches at. It can fail 
us because the connection with the past is no longer organic, the past is, so to 
say, brought back artificially. The wave of sociobiological books on “ape roots” of 
human social institutions, which started in the 1990s, confirms Lem’s thesis. The 
remark about “cosmonaut’s baby-like helplessness” coincides with his normative 
attempts in ST (“pantocreatics”) and Lem’s dislike of “wild sci-fi.”
All these different views Lem expressed about the past share one thing: the 
past as understood by the classical, 19th- and 20th-century humanism, that is, 
the past that contains the meaning of the present, is irretrievably gone.





19  Introduction to Autoevolution
Małgorzata Szpakowska titled one of the chapters in her book “Lem i trzy ewolucje” 
[“Lem and three evolutions”].196 In it she discussed his views on biological evolu-
tion, evolution of technology and evolution of culture. She skipped a fourth evolu-
tion though, which is the most important one for this work: autoevolution.
The word occurs in ST the same way “Nature” and “Designer” do – as a pri-
mary notion, which is never defined with any precision. Until today it has gained 
no strong presence in the language of science and humanities. It is therefore 
necessary to attempt to define it and its scope. What is human autoevolution, 
what can it be? Is it just an idea, or is it a tangible process, or one that is close to 
becoming tangible?
In light of ST, the main theme of which, as has been shown earlier, is the 
call to “rationally exceed Nature,” autoevolution is a rational, planned process 
of transforming human genotype and phenotype, as well as his sensorium until 
biological forms of existence are completely rejected; the aim of the process is to 
achieve physical and intellectual prowess that is higher than a human can ever 
achieve within the potential provided by the random process of biological evolu-
tion. Going beyond the discourse of ST, it also needs to be said that the theoretical 
reflection on autoevolution has to include an analysis of its possible implications 
for human and posthuman spiritual, social and political life. Posthumanism is 
the discursive correlate of autoevolution. The analysis that follows here will be 
based on this definition.
In Lem’s fiction there are two scenarios of autoevolution present: serious and 
grotesque. The former can be found in Golem XIV (1981), the latter in “The 
Twenty-First Voyage” in The Star Diaries (1971).
Golem, a supercomputer built by people, which achieved intellectual inde-
pendence and became something of an oracle, in its Inaugural lecture discusses 
in brief the entire history of life on Earth and the human species from the point 
of view of Lem’s interpretation of biological evolution. It predicts the further 
development of humans, claiming that unsolved contradictions that torment us 
and our cultures will eventually push us to reject the current form of existence – 
the body – and to transition to other forms of existence197:
 196 Dyskusje…, 54–89.
 197 Here and further on I skip the issues of the nature of the relationship between con-








Can you remain in place standing stubbornly at the crossroads? But then you will lapse 
into stagnation, and that can be no refuge for you! … So you will embark on the expan-
sion of Intelligence, abandoning your bodies, or you will become blind men led by one 
who can see, or – ultimately – you will come to a halt in sterile despondency.
The prospects are not encouraging, but that will not hold you back. Nothing holds you 
back. Today a disembodied Intelligence seems to you just as much a catastrophe as a 
disminded body, for this act of resignation entails the totality of human values and not 
merely man’s material form. This act must be to you the most terrible downfall possible, 
the utter end, the annihilation of humanity, inasmuch as it is a casting off, a turning into 
dust and ashes of twenty thousand years of achievements – everything that Prometheus 
attained in his struggle with Caliban.
I do not know if this will comfort you, but the gradualness of the change will take away 
the monumentally tragic – and at the same time repellent and terrible – significance 
contained in my words. It will occur far more normally, and to a certain degree it is 
already happening: areas of tradition are beginning to bother you, they are falling away 
and withering, and this is what so bewilders you …
You will manage to neither perish not triumph as of old.
I feel that you are entering an age of metamorphosis; that you will decide to cast aside 
your entire history, your entire heritage and all that remains of natural humanity  – 
whose image, magnified into beautiful tragedy, is the focus of the mirrors of your beliefs; 
that you will advance (for there is no other way), and in this, which for you is now only 
a leap into the abyss, you will find a challenge, if not a beauty; and that you will proceed 
in your own way after all, since in casting off man, man will save himself.198
Golem’s words resemble contemporary posthumanist manifestos (see 
Chapters 21 and 22 here), but have much higher artistic and intellectual standing. 
The description of autoevolution in “The Twenty-First Voyage” is much more 
elaborate, if a lot less lofty. Here199 again, as in other grotesque writings by Lem, 
he describes “the other side of the coin,” mirroring his own “serious” texts, but 
with a lot less serious effect.
definitively solved and to which Lem devoted a significant part of Dialogues. Within 
the radical approaches I am discussing now, it is assumed that this problem will be 
solved through technology, or that it is merely a result of the limited humanistic 
imagination, or an erroneous interpretation of reality (i.e., the so-called Cartesian 
mistake). In fact, if it is to be taken as a real problem (i.e., if the human consciousness 
is really essentially and inextricably related to human body and senses), there could 
be no moving or extracting the mind out of the body.
 198 Stanisław Lem, “Golem XIV,” in: Imaginary Magnitude, trans. by M. E. Heine (San 
Diego-New York-London: A Harvest Book, A Helen and Kurt Wolff Book, Harcourt 
Brace & Company, 1984), 41–43.
 199 Stanisław Lem, The Star Diaries, trans. by M. Kandel (London: Secker & Warburg, 
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Golem’s version of autoevolution is similar to the extropians’ idea, although 
unlike them Lem’s Golem knows what shock it would be to culture. And this is 
one of the main conceivable versions of autoevolution. Ijon Tichy, on the other 
hand, having arrived on the planet of Dichotica, has a chance to learn about a 
new version in which humans200 do not abandon their bodies, but begin to rad-
ically transform them.
Szpakowska meticulously analyzed one of the themes in “The Twenty-First 
Voyage”: the religiosity of monks-machines, which are the last creatures on this 
planet who believe in transcendence. Yet, she completely ignored autoevolution, 
even though the two topics are complementary. The name of the planet resembles 
the word “dichotomy” – and the very dichotomy in this case lies in the growing 
“transcendental spirituality” of machine on one hand and “wild” autoevolution 
of humans, devoid of any higher meaning on the other.
Tichy makes no contact with the Dichoticans. He learns about the 
autoevolution which has been going on for more than ten centuries from books, 
provided by Demolitian Friars living in hiding (they and the Prognosites are 
two orders of machines). The autoevolution on Dichotica started with a rejec-
tion of mortality, which was turned into action through the progress of tech-
nology. It started modestly with biotechnology and intelectronics, which spread 
cloning, designing and resurrecting people, quickly leading to deconstruction of 
the truth and dogmas of the (Christian) faith, especially the immortal soul and 
the personal identity. Then
I learned that in the year 2401 Byg Brogar, Dyrr Daagard and Merr Drr threw open the 
gates to limitless autoevolutionary freedom; these scholars earnestly believed that Homo 
Autofac Sapens, the Self-made Man, made possible by their discovery, would achieve 
the ultimate in harmony and happiness, endowing himself with those aspects of form 
and qualities of spirit he judged to be most perfect … For such hopes usually attend the 
appearance of any great and new technology.
At first autoevolutionary engineering, or – as they called it – the Fetalistic Movement, 
burgeoned in a way that seemed to accord with the expectations of its illustrious 
inventors. Ideals in health, congruity, spiritual and physical beauty became universal-
ized, by constitutional law every citizen was guaranteed the right to acquire whatever 
psychic or somatic attributes were deemed the most desirable … But progress has this 
about it, that it is driven ever onward by its own advance, hence things did not stop there. 
The transformations that followed seemed innocent enough at the outset. Young women 
 200 Actually it is Dichoticans but the masque is very transparent in this case. The drawings 
that Lem places in the text and the words of the narrator make it very clear what spe-




beautified themselves by the cultivation of epidermal jewelry and other efflorescences 
of the flesh … young men sported side and back beards, cockscomb crests, jaws with 
double bites, etc.
Twenty years later the first majority parties came into being. It took a while before I real-
ized, reading, that “majority party” meant something different on Dichotica that it did 
to us. In opposition to the majority party platform, they called for the proliferation of 
anatomies, there was the minority group, which advocated reductionism, that is, the 
elimination of those organs considered by the minority leaders of various factions to be 
non-vital. (180)
Biopolitics is thus born on Dichotica – political views and programs are linked 
with autoevolutionary practices. We should add that people on Earth are close to 
this stage, even though they are not there yet in terms of technology. What else 
are the discussions on euthanasia, cloning and applied genetics that have been 
growing since the early 1990s if not just such biopolitics? Later in his readings,201 
Tichy learns the details of autoevolutionary propaganda and the subsequent 
stages of autoevolution, its meandering development and its gradual degener-
ation, which produces changing trends in increasingly odd transformations of 
bodies; a state institution called SOPSYLABD (the Soma and Psyche Planning 
Board), itself disintegrating into bureaucratic subinstitutions such as LA (Lip 
Administration), BUFF (Beautiful Figure Foundation) and NIFTY (the National 
Institute of Fingers and Toes) is striving in vain to control such tendencies. 
Without renouncing the grotesque aesthetics, Lem also shows that autoevolution 
can fall prey to the same social, political and bureaucratic processes that harmed 
all utopian and revolutionary ideas of transforming existence.
Later on in the process of autoevolution the existing notions of gender and 
sexuality are destroyed. This grotesque destruction seems today like a caricature 
of the discourse of gender and queer studies:
 201 In the structure of the text of “The Twenty-First Voyage” two motifs, human 
autoevolution and machines’ faith, correspond with two different layers of the plot. 
Tichy’s reading of books on autoevolution is interrupted by conversations on faith 
which he is having with Fathers-Robots. There are also some external interruptions as 
well. A detailed analysis of the structure of the plot is not my subject here, although one 
could make some interesting observations about it, for example, that Tichy’s contact 
with Dichoticans is almost entirely mediated by text, while his contact with machines 
is direct (bringing to mind a Turing test in a rebours). The scene in which friars are 
checked by a Dichotican patrol is equally subversive: people play the part of heartless 
oppressors, while machines are presented as the delicate, spiritual victims.
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Showing their contempt for all things utilitarian, they set eyes in their armpits, and one 
group of young biotic activists made use of innumerable sound organs … Then came the 
fashion – the mania rather – for long tentacles … And, since no one could lift those piles 
of coils by himself, so called processionals were attached, caudalettes … In the textbook 
I found illustrations depicting men of fashion, behind whom walked tentacle-bearing 
processionals on parade; but this was already the decline of the protest movement, or 
more precisely its complete bankruptcy, because it had failed to pursue any goals of its 
own, being solely a rebellious reaction against the orgiastic baroque of the age.
The baroque had its apologists … who maintained that the body existed for the purpose 
of deriving the greatest amount of pleasure from the greatest number of sites simulta-
neously. Merg Brb, its leading exponents, argued that Nature had situated – and stingily 
at that – centers of pleasurable sensation in the body for the purpose of survival only …
Brb received the enthusiastic support of a group of talented young designers from 
SOPSYPLABD, who invented brippets and gnools … ecstasy centers, of course, were 
implanted in the brain … Thus were created the brippive and gnoolial drives, also activ-
ities corresponding to those instincts, activities which a highly rich and varied range, 
for one could gnool and brip alternately or at the same time, alone, in pairs, trios and 
later – after noffles were tacked on – in groups of several dozen individuals as well. Also 
new forms of art came into being, master brippers appeared, and gnool artists, but that 
was only the beginning; towards the end of the 26th century you had the mannerism of 
the marchpusses … and the celebrated Ondor Stert, who could simultaneously gnool, 
brip and surpostulate while flying through the air on spinal wings, became the idol of 
millions. (194–196)
Behind the mocking style of the passage, we can read a certain vision of a 
continued Copernican revolution. In the process of the increasingly all-
encompassing autoevolution the very notion of what it means to be human – at 
least in a physiological sense, which, as we know, is particularly important for 
Lem and the contemporary anthropological thought – begins to lose its unique-
ness. It becomes relative by being placed on a broad scale of forms of existence 
that can be designed or assumed. Our planet is not in the center of the universe, 
nor is our galaxy, we are not the ultimate goal of creation, and our universe is not 
the only universe – and if that were not enough, it turns out that body and sex, 
through which we define our humanity, are not the only possible option of cor-
poreality and sexuality, but only one of the possible options drawn from a nearly 
unlimited spectrum. It is one of the possible consequences of autoevolution in 
its “somatic” version, especially when there no longer is any hierarchy of higher 
values. The writings of Judith Butler, describing “a gender continuum” replacing 
the binary opposition of “masculinity-femininity,” contains a similar thought, 
except articulated in all seriousness.
Further on in “The Twenty-First Voyage” there is a scene that corresponds 
even better with gender studies, and that also feeds into Lem’s taste for the 
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macabre.202 Tichy and the friars go out on the surface of the planet. They come 
across a small building, and then Tichy says:
I heard groans issuing from that place, and a throaty rattle so dreadful, my hair stood on 
end. The voice, undeniably human, chokes and moaned in turn. I knew for a certainty 
that this was the cry of someone being tortured, being murdered perhaps; I looked at 
my companions, but they paid absolutely no attention to those grisly sounds … There 
on a blood-spattered table lay a naked figure, surrounded by machines that had sunk 
gleaming tubes or tongs into its body, which was now dead, and so contorted by the final 
throes, I couldn’t tell arms from legs … I stood, overcome by the horror, the ghastliness, 
the mystery of the scene, for the corpse was alone – I could look into all the corners of 
that mechanized torture chamber …
The shining bell lifted and I beheld a face, an inhuman face; by now all the machines 
were working at once, and so rapidly, that I saw only a blur and the motion of glass pump 
beneath the table, inside which a red liquid churned, till finally in the middle of this con-
fusion the chest of the corpse began to rise and fall; before my eyes his wounds sealed up, 
he twitched all over, he yawned.
“He’s come back to life?” I asked in a whisper.
“Yes,” said the prior. “In order to die once more.”
The one lying flat looked around and with a limp, seemingly boneless palm gripped a 
handle that stuck out on the side, gave a pull, and the bell slid back over his head, the 
slanting pincers, emerging from their sheaths, clutched the body, and a scream rang out, 
the same scream as before …
it was the prior explaining that the pavilion was a special service station, where one 
could live and relive one’s own death. The purpose here is to experience sensations 
as powerful as possible, and not necessarily suffering, for with the aid of the stimuli 
transformers pain becomes an excruciating pleasure. All this derives from the fact that 
thanks to certain types of automorphosis Dichoticans can enjoy even the pangs of death 
… This particular method bears the name of “Agonanism.” (204–206)
The description of the execution of Robert Damiens, which opens Foucault’s 
Discipline and Punish, is very similar. In both cases we are dealing with a typical 
sadomasochist phantasm: surrendering to pain and torture till death. Except in 
the autoevolutionary world of Dichotica such dream can be fulfilled more than 
once, while in our world it can happen only once.203 For Lem this image is a 
 202 Such themes can be found in nearly every work of fiction that Lem produced, starting 
with the collection of monstrous fetuses in Kauters’s apartment (Hospital of the 
Transfiguration), to the pornographic X-rays in Imaginary Magnitude (which are per-
haps a distant echo of the exchange of X-rays between Castorp and Clavdia Chauchat 
in The Magic Mountain). I have pointed to possible reasons behind this tendency in 
the article “Lem fantastyczny czy makabryczny?”
 203 In 2001 in Germany 40-year-old Armin Meiwes used an Internet forum for cannibals 
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testimony to the degeneration of the Dichoticans. Absolutizing the bodily and 
sensual experiences is a substitute for the lost faith in transcendence. Again, it is 
impossible not to notice such substitution today. The entire huge realm of gender 
studies, largely shaped by Foucault’s influence and the feminist thought, focuses 
on the very question of the body – the problems of older metaphysics are consid-
ered musty and irrelevant. The body and gender perform the function of a center 
of thought – detached from their biological qualities and reduced to symbols of 
their social functions. Moreover, such theory of gender favors all these forms of 
the bodily and the sexual, which were previously not mentioned, were repressed 
as “nonnormative,” beginning with the trivial homosexuality, through all forms 
of transgender to sadomasochism and other highly nonnormative phenomena. 
By making them the center of its attention, gender studies largely contribute to 
the destruction of the existing way of understanding the issues of bodily and 
sexual identity, and hence to the rise of posthumanism.
However, if in “The Twenty-First Voyage” we can find so many traces of our 
contemporary reality of the 21st century, does it make sense to treat the text 
as a description of future autoevolution? Perhaps autoevolution is only one 
of the grotesque masks that Lem gave to our world, so the description of our 
problems becomes less straightforward? Yes and no. Yes, because “The Twenty-
First Voyage” can be read as a critique of the current situation, just as any other of 
Lem’s grotesque texts. No, if we assume that the autoevolution in “The Twenty-
First Voyage” is the same autoevolution that he discussed in ST, seen from a 
different point of view. These interpretations are equally acceptable and are not 
contradictory. In light of the latter it is visible that autoevolution of the “somatic” 
genitals and bleeding to death) and eat him. In 2004 Meiwes was sentenced to 8 years 
in jail, but his trial triggered a hot discussion whether he should be punished for killing 
and eating someone who expressly wished that to happen. And it is by no means the 
only such case.
  A desire for extreme sensual experiences and absolute domination and submission 
have the main role in S&M phantasms. Such practices are usually highly conven-
tional and can take up the form of a ritual or highly complicated and staged game. 
The emotional bond is absent or reduced to a minimum, while pure, depersonalized 
bodily experience is absolutized. Having such practices performed by machines, as it 
happens in Lem’s writing, might be a well-conceived literary idea. It can be put in the 
same realm as other mass culture products that raise the issue of sex between men and 
machines or cyborgs – for instance David Cronenberg’s films or video clips made by 
Chris Cunningham.
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type will not liberate us from the problems of the body and gender, or other 
social issues.
The following stage of autoevolution on Dichotica focused on the mind and 
produced wisdomites, who settled down due to the size of their brains. Later, it 
turned to another extreme:
The reaction, when it came, was violent. Our medieval woodcuts, offering representations 
of dragons and monstrosities from other lands, are child’s play alongside the physical 
abandonment that then beset the globe … This was also when agonanism came into 
vogue. Civilization retrogressed … In the parks all overgrown with table weeds and wild 
china there lay basking, between clumps of napkill, hullocks – veritable mountains of 
breathing meat. The majority of these monstrous forms did not arise through conscious 
choice and planning, but rather were the ghastly consequence of breakdowns in the 
body-building machinery: it produced not what had been ordered, but degenerate and 
crippled freaks. (207–208)
Even though in the 20th century, dictator Dzomber Glaubon temporarily intro-
duced “unification, normalization and bodily standardization,” as well as desex-
ualization, soon after the Dichoticans returned to autoevolutionary practices, 
biopolitics and multiplicity of sexes. As a result, during Ijon Tichy’s stay on 
Dichotica the only humanoid creatures were Fathers-Robots. In his last conver-
sation Tichy finds out that their credo is “non agam” (“I will not act”). This point 
reveals the radical difference between the Dichoticans who were in the process 
of constant autoevolution and the machines-believers, as the covert credo of the 
Dichoticans is the opposite sentence: “semper agam,” and they share the attitude 
of people that I mentioned in the previous part of this book: “if we can do it, let 
us do it!”
So it turns out that Lem can criticize even the most fundamental of his own 
beliefs. While analyzing the implicit assumptions behind the ST, I emphasized 
on many occasions, that one of the necessary conditions for the project of 
autoevolution to make sense is the assumption that people sooner or later will 
fulfill their entire intellectual and technological potential. In Lem’s discursive 
works this assumption is unquestionable. Meanwhile in his grotesque texts this 
very assumption is questioned, which implies that they can be understood as an 
internal critique within Lem’s work.204
 204 “The Twenty-first Voyage” is similar in that regard to the short story “Altruizine” in The 
Cyberiad. In this story Trurl sets off to the planet of H.P.L.D. (Highest Possible Level of 
Development; in Polish, however, the creatures are described as N.F.R., abbreviation 
from Najwyższa Forma Rozumu, but with clear political allusion to German Federal 
Republic, in Polish Republika Federalna Niemiec), where he deals with creatures 
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The analyses presented so far show that Lem allows for three types of 
autoevolution, which I here call: “somatic,” “cyborg” and “mental.” Somatic 
autoevolution is a biological manipulation of the form of the body through 
genetic engineering (“The Twenty-First Voyage”; “the weak variant” in ST); 
the cyborg autoevolution is about a far-reaching synthesis between body and 
machine (cyborgization in ST); the mental autoevolution is about radical sepa-
ration of mind from the body and placing it in another “vehiculum,” for example, 
a computer network (Golem XIV, “the strong variant” in ST). Further on I shall 
trace those themes in contemporary culture, which include these three types of 
autoevolution in one way or another.
There is also a short text by Lem from 1969 called “Autoewolucja.”205 The 
theme of the text is as follows: any autoevolutionary practices (which for Lem 
include, e.g., contraceptives) are “a clash between faith and empirical knowledge.” 
The autoevolution itself – a thorough transformation of the entire species – will 
be the biggest of those clashes and religion (at least Roman Catholicism) will 
never come to terms with that. In broader terms the question about the possi-
bility and acceptability of autoevolution is for Lem a question about the limits of 
human freedom. He sees here the problem of discrepancy between the perfor-
mative power of technology and its sensible use. But, as I have mentioned before, 
such doubts only come up marginally in his works. They are completely absent 
from ST.
degenerated by their own omnipotence. It includes a discussion of the contradiction 
entailed by the notion of omnipotence for a human being who is finite in time and 
space (Borges’s short story The Immortal has the same message). The sentence from 
“Altruizine”: “whether one thinks in metal or jelly is completely irrelevant,” is a para-
phrase of Turing’s thought.
 205 Argumenty, no. 34 (1969), 7, 14. 
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It is easy to trace themes that anticipate autoevolution within the culture of the 
West. Of course, we cannot speak of autoevolution up until the end of the 20th cen-
tury in a sense in which it was discussed in Chapter 19. Nevertheless it is possible 
to consider which of the persisting themes in history do pertain to a radical trans-
formation of humans.
It needs to be said that physical transformations of the body – which lie at the 
center of one of the variants of autoevolution – have been performed by people 
from the very beginning of the existence of the species. In this perspective, all beau-
tifying techniques have a lot to do with autoevolution. This includes deformations of 
the body known in many cultures, including changing the shape of feet in Chinese 
culture, transforming skulls among the Maya, transforming necks among the Sub-
Saharan tribes, permanent forms of skin decoration among the native tribes of the 
Amazonian jungle (as well as permanent makeup and piercing in the contemporary 
Western culture), the entire art of tattoos, from the Maori culture to subcultures 
of today – the list goes on and on. If we disregard the differences in the symbolic 
meanings of such practices, what they have in common is that they all involve 
applying various forms of mechanical techniques to the surface of human body, 
in order to change its “natural” shape. They differ from the “real” autoevolution 
insofar as they do not involve manipulating the very biological process of producing 
bodies. The procedures are “superficial” in that sense.
If we consider other effects of human desire for beautification and improve-
ment, we should include here the entire history of fashion and clothing, as well 
as, for example, the contemporary cult of youth, beauty and physical fitness, 
which is a significant element of the mass culture. It would not be sensible to 
engage in such a broad search for harbingers of autoevolution. Similarly, it would 
be interesting but hard to treat various improvements in everyday life, deriving 
from the centuries of progress in technology and medicine (such as cars and 
vaccines) as “autoevolutionary” phenomena.
When it comes to cultural topoi that correspond with autoevolution, three in 
particular seem important:  the cabalistic topos of Golem, the alchemical topos 
of a homunculus and the romantic topos of Frankenstein. All three of these 
are versions of the myth of an artificial human, which has been present in the 
Western culture since antiquity (Daedalus and Talos,206 Pygmalion and Galatea, 
 206 Talos – a robot made of bronze by Daedalus (or Hephaestus) for Minos. As a sentinel 






Prometheus and Pandora). “The artificial man” of the past tends to be linked 
with the issues of robots and cyborgization today, but I believe that the essen-
tial difference between literary myths and topoi on one hand, and technological 
developments on the other makes such links somewhat artificial (in the negative 
sense of the word), even if the comparisons juxtapose representations of robots 
and cyborgs in contemporary art and culture.
Half way between literature and technology there lies the history of technology, 
and in our case the history of humanoid automata, which could be described as 
proto-androids. Such constructions flourished in particular in the 18th century, 
with the rise of works such as those by Pierre Jaquet-Droz, which I mentioned in 
Part One. The growth of precision mechanics coincided with the enlightenment’s 
preference for practical displays of the power of Reason, dominating matter and 
transforming its laws.207 Mechanism, vitalism and the 18th-century philosophy 
of biology are all part of this group of issues, as they constitute important stages 
in the development of philosophy of the human body. This, however, decidedly 
exceeds the limits of this work.208
Beautifying techniques correspond with the somatic autoevolution. The 
theme of “artificial man” corresponds with the cyborg autoevolution. What then 
would be analogous with mental autoevolution?
I believe it would be the persistent theme of “spiritual transformation” and 
“self as a project” in the Western culture. It starts with Socrates’s ethics, and is 
then developed within Hellenistic philosophy, especially Stoicism. It includes the 
and fugitives (that is why Daedalus needed to fly out of Crete). Talos would throw 
stones at them or he would burn them flaring up himself. He was indestructible except 
for the lower part of his leg, where one of his veins ended capped with the handle. 
It was only the Argonauts who, with the help of Medea’s magic, managed to open 
that vein.
 207 Cf. Roland Carrera, Dominique Loiseau, Ollvier Roux, Androides. Les Automates 
de Jaquet-Droz (Lausanne: Scriptar, 1979); André Doyon, Lucien Liaigre, Jacques 
Vaucanson, mecanicien de genie (Paris: P.U.F., 1966); Alexandre Koyrè, Les Origines de 
la science: Les philosophes et la machine (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966); John Cohen, Les 
Robots humains dans le mythe et dans la science (Paris: Vrin, 1968); Philippe Breton, 
A l’image de l’homme. Du Golem aux realites virtuelles (Paris: Seuil, 1995).
 208 In Polish, an extensive monograph of the 18th-century philosophy of biology is 
available: Andrzej Bednarczyk, Filozofia biologii europejskiego Oświecenia: Albrecht 
von Haller i jego współcześni (Warszawa: PWN, 1984). A very good analysis of the 
image of modern experimental biology in the mass culture can be found in: Jon 
Turney, Frankenstein’s Footsteps: Science, Genetics and Popular Culture (New Haven, 






figures of Prometheus and Faustus – the characters who break out of any sub-
ordination and who display creationist ambitions.209 (Prometheus’s name comes 
up often in posthumanist manifestos.) Nietzschean project of an Übermensch 
is a crucially important stage here. All these ideas are based on an assumption 
of human independence from the external world, especially the cultural world, 
as well as on a human desire to consciously shape one’s own being. This abso-
lute existential independence is what makes all such “projects of self ” resemble 
“mental autoevolution” in which “I” is emancipated from everything, including 
the body.
Nietzsche can even be seen as the founding father of posthumanism, as he is the 
first modern thinker to have questioned the system of values that defined modern 
humanism on such a grand scale. In hundreds of monographs and studies of his 
philosophy, scholars have traced its impact on the thought and history of the 20th 
century. Nietzsche’s refutation of the significance of the past and institutions of 
humanist culture for the Übermensch not only did not lose its power – actually, as 
I shall try to show, today it is stronger than ever.
The “care of the self,” to which Foucault devoted the third volume of The 
History of Sexuality and which came as such a surprise to his readers, accus-
tomed to the vision of the “end of man,” may perhaps be seen as a Nietzschean 
attempt to reconstruct the significance of an independent “I” in face of the post-
structuralist destruction of the subject. This “I” would no longer be an issue of 
abstract post-Cartesian philosophical discourse, but would actually be shaped in 
a real project, a script for existence laid out by the ancient Stoics.210 In the time of 
 209 Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound grasps the essence of the motif of Prometheus. Cf. Carl 
Kerenyi, Prometheus: Archetypal Image of Human Existence, trans. by R. Manheim 
(Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1991); Louis Sechan, Le mythee de 
Promethee (Paris: P.U.F., 1951). The theme of Faustus (from the German folk lit-
erature, through Marlowe and Goethe, to Thomas Mann and very abstract philo-
sophical and discursive works) has been taken up in hundreds of texts; cf. Paul A. 
Bates, Faust: Sources, Works, Criticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969); 
Frank Baron, Doctor Faustus: From History to Legend (Muenchen: Wilhelm Fink, 
1978); Andre Dabezies, Le mythe de Faust (Paris: Armand Colin, 1973); Harold Stein 
Jantz, Goethe’s “Faust” as a Renaissance Man: Parallels and Prototypes (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951); Philip Mason Palmer, Robert Patterson More, 
The Sources of the Faust Tradition from Simon Magus to Lessing (New York: Frank 
Casa, 1936).
 210 Cf. Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, trans. by B. Wing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 






posthumanism – if it ever comes – the “care of the self ” will become a common 
duty, a necessity, as the past, history and cultural tradition, which serve as exis-
tential framework today, will cease to exist. The potential consequences of these 
phenomena are discussed here in Chapters 25 and 26.
“Technologies of the Self,” in: Technologies of the Self: a Seminar with Michel Foucault, 
ed. by L. H. Martin, H. Gutman, P. H. Hutton (London: Tavistock, 1988). Nietzsche’s 
life has been interpreted as a work of art by Alexander Nehamas.
21  What Is Posthumanism?
Transhumanizing could not be expressed
by words; let this case, therefore, him suffice,
for whom Grace holds experience in reserve.
Dante, Paradiso, I, 70–72, trans. by Courtney Langdon
Unlike “autoevolution,” “posthumanism” is a word widely used today. It is ap-
plied to a few different but corresponding intellectual currents: one of them 
born from a discussion of the impact of science and technology of the late 20th 
century on the social life; another from certain threads of the poststructur-
alist thought, while yet another is an ideology built on them. In fact, the entire 
posthumanist discourse is permeated by ideology. Reading posthumanist 
texts from the 1990s and later, it is difficult to distinguish between knowl-
edge and information on one hand, and manifestos and declarations on the 
other. The reason for that is that posthumanism is an intellectual formation 
situating itself somewhere in-between science, philosophy and social critique, 
and its authors and advocates remain nearly completely oblivious of their 
own historical background, which I have discussed here, and generally they 
ignore all past in a manner typical of liberal thought. Posthumanism fulfills 
the criteria of utopianism, which I have described in the context of ST, and 
some of its premises or theses actually look like quotes from Lem. All kinds 
of posthumanism call for autoevolution of one of the three types listed here 
before, but the term “autoevolution” itself never comes up. Posthumanists 
prefer such terms as “post-Darwinian era.” Posthumanism also attracts all 
sorts of believers in pseudoscientific, parareligious and “esoteric” doctrines 
(“cosmism,” “Prometheism,” “transtopia,” “cosmotheism,” “Church of Virus”), 
as well as political radicals (“anarchotranshumanism”)  – these phenomena 
will be omitted here. Again, I  need to emphasize I  will not be interested in 
posthumanism read in the context of contemporary rejection of anthropocen-
tric positions within the academia – so, for example, I will not be referring to 
the many currents of animal studies.
The term “posthumanism” in the sense assumed here has a synonym – “trans-
humanism,” but sometimes the two notions are treated as different, that is when 
authors take transhumanism to be an earlier stage of posthumanism, an interme-
diary period (trans) between humans and a completely posthuman entity. I will 




The word “transhumanism” was first used by Julian Huxley in 1957, when he 
vaguely defined it as a situation when “man remaining man, but transcending 
himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature.”211 In the 
1980s though the definition changed significantly. To illustrate a typical contem-
porary understanding of posthumanism, we can quote Max More, the guru of 
Extropy Institute, who was mentioned in Part Two:
Transhumanism is a class of philosophies that seek to guide us towards a posthuman 
condition. Transhumanism shares many elements of humanism, including a respect for 
reason and science, a commitment to progress, and a valuing of human (or transhuman) 
existence in this life … Transhumanism differs from humanism in recognizing and 
anticipating the radical alterations in the nature and possibilities of our lives resulting 
from various sciences and technologies.
The short quote above shows clearly the main characteristics of the entire 
posthumanist discourse. It is a “philosophy,” but one that “tries to lead us toward 
a posthuman condition,” so it is a philosophy of action – a type of thinking that 
is characteristic of most utopias of change. “It includes numerous elements of 
humanism,” but these elements are “respect for reason and science” and “appre-
ciation for progress,” so it is clearly the humanism of the enlightenment rather 
than, for example, renaissance or neoclassicist humanism – so it is the only type of 
humanism that disregards the past. As all versions of humanism, posthumanism 
places man at the center of the entire system of thought and action, endowing 
him with supreme value, but the similarity will reveal itself as superficial as soon 
as we remember that the main premise of posthumanism is to go beyond the 
humanist understanding of humanity. It is clear that the posthumanist discourse 
is deeply entangled in the dilemmas of its predecessor and that its authors remain 
largely unaware of it. Emphasizing the role of science and technology in the pro-
cess of “transhumanization” is a constant feature of posthumanists’ declarations. 
It brings them closer with the 19th-century positivists, but, again, as was the 
case with the discourse of ST, the resemblance is superficial; not because of con-
stantly distancing itself from its own arguments, as was the case with Lem, but 
because of posthumanists’ conviction that the current psychophysiological shape 
of human beings is neither the only one possible nor the final one.
According to the posthumanists “there is an ethical imperative leading people 
to strive for progress and improvement.” It is an exact, albeit unintentional, copy 
 211 In this context it is telling that Michel Houellebecq refers to Julian Huxley in his 
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of one of the main theses of ST, which I have described many times: that people 
will sooner or later fulfill their entire potential, including in technology. Further 
on we read: “If the human kind enters the post-Darwinian stage of existence, in 
which people will take over the control over their evolution, random mutations 
will be replaced with rational, morally and ethically justified changes.” This in 
turn is a faithful copy of an implicit contradiction in Lem’s work between what 
I called “the Designer’s rationality” and “the pragmatics of the User.” There is no 
necessary reason for autoevolution to follow any rules or ethical imperatives. As 
one would expect of utopian authors, neither Lem nor the posthumanists think 
about issues as prosaic as the impact of the current sociopolitical situation or 
even the mass culture on the practical application of their ideas.
We might be tempted to formulate a generalized proposition here. For Lem 
and the posthumanists, autoevolution above all involves rejecting the random-
ness of biological evolution, on which people have no influence, because it takes 
place outside the realm of human actions and human time, and that is the source 
of our psychophysical incapacities. This is certainly true. However, it entails a 
risk. Introducing autoevolution into the global social system would most likely 
lay it open to the threat of all destructive and random process to which all other 
institutions, as well as scientific and technological endeavors, are subjected. Only 
very naïve people still believe in the independence of science and technology 
from economy, politics and social issues, as well as from the impact of influen-
tial lobbies, provisional solutions and finally from passing fashions. As I have 
tried to show, in ST Lem ignored this entire issue, accepting implicitly that intro-
ducing “pantocreatics” will somehow solve it. This is exactly what posthumanists 
do today. Yet, it is quite certain that if autoevolution ever goes out of the pages of 
utopian musings, it will soon yield to such processes and hence it will become 
a random process, just as Lem described it in “The Twenty-First Voyage.” The 
only difference is that its randomness will not come from the laws of genetics 
and evolution but will have its sources in the laws governing social life, and these 
laws, as history teaches us, override all reforms. On the other hand, it will touch 
not the institutions of our life, but the very material form of our existence, which 
will make it more dangerous than any of the previous “errors and distortions” of 
the civilization. This is the argument of the opponents of biotechnology.
According to Lem (as the author of both ST and Golem XIV) and the 
posthumanists, autoevolution will automatically mend all the evil in the world 
and so there is no reason to fear it. Earlier centuries have seen at least a few 
projects implying similar inevitability and their authors probably had the most 
noble of intentions. Some of them were only confined to libraries, while others 
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have been implemented, taking the lives of millions of people. So it is good to 
retain some skepticism when studying such radical vision.
The historical beginnings of posthumanism in its technocratic version are 
connected with the circle of scholars and visionaries who gathered in the early 
1980s at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA).212 Apart from Max 
More and his extropians other important figures were, for example, Feridun 
M. Esfandiary and Nancie Clark (a couple in their private life), who attracted a 
group of enthusiastic students and followers. Esfandiary (1930–2000), a son of an 
Iranian diplomat, is an emblematic figure for the entire subcurrent of American 
posthumanism. He began as a futurologist and an author of sci-fi novels. He then 
moved on to prophetic reflections on the beautiful future of the human species 
which he laid out in a series of books, including the most famous one: Are You 
a Transhuman? (1989). He adopted a pen name FM-2030 and claimed that he 
feels “a deep nostalgia for the future.” Before he died he asked to be hibernated 
and his body is now in a certain posthumanist center in Arizona, while his ideas 
are being propagated by his widow (known as Natasha Vita-More). Esfandiary’s 
writings, just as those of his fellow posthumanists and many experts in advanced 
technology, are characterized by untamed enthusiasm for rapid technological 
progress of the late 20th century. Again, as 200 years earlier, during the indus-
trial revolution, the swift changes in the technological sphere have produced a 
group of fervent followers, as well as fierce opponents, whose arguments I will 
recount later.
1986 is particularly important in the development of posthumanism. This 
is when Eric Drexler’s book Engines of Creation came out, which included a 
description of the potential of nanotechnology which was just being born at 
the time. For the posthumanists it was proof that it is technically possible to 
fulfill their ideas. We should point out that the entire “Californian” current of 
posthumanism, permeated with a belief in high technology, focused on this 
particular type of autoevolution which I termed “the cyborg autoevolution.” Its 
authors imagined posthuman to be a hybrid of biological body and a variety of 
machines, which is hardly surprising, given that they worked and thought in a 
close proximity to the Silicon Valley at a time when the “dominating technology” 
(using J. David Bolter’s term) was IT, and not yet biotechnology. This was a time 
of intellectual osmosis between the posthumanists from the UCLA and the 
artificial intelligence (AI) experts from Silicon Valley  – distant successors of 
 212 A lot about them can be learned from Erik Davis’s book, TechGnosis, which I referred 
to in the earlier part of the book.
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Turing’s idea. There is therefore a connection of sorts between the “Californian” 
posthumanism and the realm of AI, and it lies in the conviction that it is pos-
sible and sensible for people to create a nonhuman form of intelligence, with the 
one difference (often unnoticed) that for the posthumanists these forms should 
be derived from human bodies213 – and replace them; whereas the theoreticians 
of AI, such as Marvin Minsky or Ray Kurzweil aim for a full autonomy of those 
forms, trying to build “intelligent machines.” The difference is particularly signif-
icant if we take into account the problems with defining consciousness discussed 
in Part One and Part Two of this book. No one would doubt that a posthuman 
being will, at least in the initial stage, have a consciousness similar to ours  – 
because it would be inherited from us. At the same time no one knows for sure 
what kind of – if any – consciousness a computer will have (although authors 
such as Roger Schank believe that they know for sure what it will be like).
 213 It is common among the posthumanists and AI experts to despise or even hate the 
human body as an aesthetically disgusting and nonfunctional lump of easily rotting 
organic matter. This is another thing that is similar with Lem. In AI parlance we often 
encounter terms such as “meatware” and “flashware” – which are again symptoms 
of treating the current physical form as a primitive version or an initial stage of the 





22  Posthumanism as a Theoretical Discourse
In the late 1980s the ideas of the Californian posthumanists permeated some 
of the American postmodern and gender discourses finding there a favorable 
breeding ground. The “inhuman” character of posthumanism seemed to cor-
respond well with the poststructuralist destruction of the subject, bringing 
some fresh breeze of technocracy into the stale climate of academic musings 
about the “death of man.” The deeper implications of these links are analyzed in 
Chapter 25. Here it is enough to briefly discuss the most representative authors. 
Among them, the ones who should most particularly be mentioned are, I believe, 
Donna Haraway, N. Katherine Hayles, Chris Hables Gray and Robert Pepperell. 
Each of them uses the posthumanist ideas in their own ways and connects them 
with different elements of the contemporary intellectual puzzle of the West. Also, 
each of them prefers one of the three models of autoevolution I have listed. This 
means that all these authors are in some sense (usually unintentionally) contin-
uing Lem’s thought, albeit with a difference, as they use the same ideas as the 
ones he presented but for completely different purposes.
The moment when Donna Haraway’s A Cyborg Manifesto214 was published 
in 1985 can be seen as the moment when the idea of cyborgs shifted from the 
realm of technological and “technognostic” musings to the realm of imagery of 
postmodernism and gender studies. Haraway’s text, which lies at the center of 
feminist polemics of the 1980s, uses the word “cyborg” as a metaphor describing 
the fall of the distinction between the Natural and the Artificial in science and 
the humanities, which implied the fall of the system of values and social roles, 
especially feminine social roles, founded on that distinction. According to 
Haraway, “a cyborg” can be a symbol of these changes, as it is a hybrid of the 
“natural” (body) and the “artificial” (machine), and hence, by its very existence, 
it dismantles the divide between these two areas.
 214 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism 
in the Late Twentieth Century,” Socialist Review, no. 90 (1985), 65–108: the essay was 
then included in Haraway’s most famous book Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The 
Reinvention of Nature (1991). Early on, Donna Haraway’s work focused on the imagery 
of biological sciences and links between natural studies and the humanities. Her 
published works include also, for example, Crystals, Fabrics and Fields: Metaphors of 
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What can be said about the idea? Above all, Haraway, just as other authors 
mentioned here, pays no attention to the fact that cyborg as an advanced hybrid 
of a biological body and a machine has so far not gone beyond theory. Her dis-
regard for facts and narrow interest in theoretical concepts is characteristic of 
the entire postmodernist thought. In this particular case, it takes an unusual 
shape as purely theoretical entities – which are expected to become reality in the 
future – are being discussed as if they were real. Moreover, we are dealing here 
with a complex mixture of social theory and political demands, which is also 
typical for many types of postmodernist thought. Yet, at the very beginning of 
the text, Haraway introduces the notion of irony, which implies that she is aware 
of the paradoxical character of her argument and she uses irony to distance her-
self from it.
Such description might suggest that Haraway partly talks about the same thing 
as Lem in ST – especially when it comes to rejecting the distinction between the 
Natural and the Artificial. But it is an illusion. The feminist author is not inter-
ested in either this distinction or the cyborgs for themselves, for the pure intel-
lectual interest of probing the limits of human potential. She has no positivist 
faith in the independence and selflessness of science and technology. Quite the 
opposite: as all authors representing this type of thinking, she sees the practices 
of producing and distributing knowledge primarily as an element of a network of 
social, political and symbolic relationships, and not a leading one either. That is 
why the figure of a cyborg, which is nonhistorical, apolitical, nonbiological and 
nonsexual and free from oppression of norms, is the perfect starting point for 
her discussion of the social situation of women.
It needs to be added that these interpretations do not derive clearly from 
Haraway’s text, which is written in a language that is a peculiar mix of scientific 
terminology and poststructuralist lingo, and most of the notions there are used 
as loose metaphors. These characteristics, which strongly resemble the language 
of social cybernetics which I have discussed in Part One, are typical of nearly all 
texts written by posthumanist theoreticians, and it is possible that the similarity 
has stronger foundations – if we accept that posthumanism plays the same role 
today as cybernetics did half a century earlier, and before that: organicism, evo-
lutionism and scientism. It is a role of a mystical and utopian social ideology, 
based on misread scientific premises.215
 215 A good example of the increasing effects of Haraway’s “blurring” textual strategy in 
the 1990s is the article by Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, Sarah Williams, “Cyborg 
Anthropology,” Cultural Anthropology, no. 2 (1995). “Cyborg anthropology” is to 
be a new incarnation of anthropological theory, located somewhere in-between an 
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N. Katherine Hayles, professor of literary studies at the University of 
California Los Angeles (UCLA), combines posthumanism with a polit-
ical discourse in a completely different manner. In her book How We Became 
Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Information (1999), she 
tries to apply the language of the humanities to analyze the consequences of the 
spread of the imagery of cyberspace in the contemporary intellectual diction, 
especially within postmodernism. As other authors Hayles emphasizes espe-
cially the independence of cyberspace and the type of thinking about reality it 
entails from the methods of understanding the world available so far and devel-
oped by the Western philosophy. She claims that thinking in terms laid out by 
Aristotle, Descartes, Kant and Hegel, which dominated our views on the nature 
of reality until recently, and which was particularly impactful in shaping our 
understanding of our own bodies and their symbolic roles, is losing its function 
in light of the growing domination of thinking in terms of “IT” and “cyberspace.” 
Bolter expressed similar views earlier in Turing’s Man and both these authors 
refer to the same earlier thinkers (Turing, Wiener). But Bolter does not go quite 
as far in designing a new way of thinking, mostly because when Turing’s Man was 
published, there was no notion of cyberspace yet. Unusually for posthumanists, 
Hayles points out that the growth of posthumanism as a theory and social prac-
tice will require rethinking and redefining the notion of humanity. She brings up 
numerous literary examples (and her book was awarded the Rene Wellek award 
for the best work in literary studies).
Chris Hables Gray, a professor of science studies at the University of California 
Santa Cruz, is the creator of “cyborg studies,” one of the editors of the volume 
The Cyborg Handbook (1995) and the author of Cyborg Citizen: Politics in the 
Posthuman Age (2001). His main goal is to create a theory of a cyborg society, 
with the word “cyborg” used more or less the same way as Haraway uses it – as 
a metaphor of a certain possible social option, that is, a society of posthuman 
creatures devoid of historical and political tradition. Gray postulates, among 
other things, compiling a “Cyborg Bill of Rights,” which would define their social 
rights, as well as those of other intelligent creatures, which are not biologically 
human. The idea can be placed in the context of the historical growth of rights 
given to different groups in modern Europe: from the Declaration of the Rights 
academic discipline and social practice; “a cultural project rather than an elite aca-
demic practice.” A Cyborg Manifesto has also become the founding text of a separate 
current on feminism called “cyberfeminism,” which gained some traction at the end 
of the 1990s.
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of Man and of the Citizen through rights of women, people of color, children, 
sexual minorities and animals. If we step beyond theoretical posthumanism for 
a moment, we might notice that the growth of biotechnology, which is gaining 
pace every year, will soon force us to face a discussion of the legal status and 
rights of clones and genetic chimeras.216 It does not take much of an imagina-
tion to see what would be the next stage in that process: machines’ rights, espe-
cially if they can be equipped (even if unintentionally) with some sort of higher 
intelligence.217
It all poses tremendous challenges to our established ways of thinking and 
therefore the ideas of Gray and other posthumanist theoreticians do indeed have 
some value – they may be quite fantastic, but as thought experiments they can 
help us understand situations in which we can find ourselves very soon. Even if 
we will not all become cyborgs.
In 1995 Robert Pepperell (born in 1962), a British multimedia artist, published 
a book titled The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness beyond the Brain, which 
quickly became one of the most important declarations for the entire move-
ment.218 It includes The Posthumanist Manifesto as an appendix and it is worth 
it to quote a few sentences from it here. The first sentence is:  “To understand 
how the world is changing is to change the world.” For a reader acquainted with 
the history of utopian doctrines this will certainly bring to mind Marx’s 11th 
thesis on Feuerbach, and indeed, in its power and concise character Pepperell’s 
Manifesto does not fall far behind the writings of the German philosopher. Its 
content sums up postmodernist views, combining acceptance of extreme cul-
tural and academic relativism with declarations borrowed from theoreticians of 
both “strong” and “weak” versions of artificial intelligence and general system 
theory. In the first part (“General Statements”) it states:
 1. It is now clear that humans are no longer the most important things in the universe. 
This is something the humanists have yet to accept. …
 216 Chimera is a creature that has genes of more than one biological species.
 217 On this subject, see, for example:  James Shreeve, “The Other Stem-Cell Debate,” 
New York Times, April 10, 2005; Erik Baard, “Cyborg Liberation Front,” The Village 
Voice, July 30–August 5, 2003 (article about the World Transhumanist Association 
Conference). The same motif can be found in Lem’s fiction in “The Washing Machine 
Tragedy” (in Memoirs of a Space Traveler: Further Reminiscences of Ijon Tichy), the 
subject of which is a casuist dispute about the legal status of intelligent humanoid 
washing machines.
 218 The book was reprinted twice and excerpts from it are now used in classrooms in 
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 4. Human beings, like gods, only exist inasmuch as we believe them to exist. 
 6. All humans are not born equal, but it is too dangerous not to pretend that they are.
 7. In the posthuman era, machines will no longer be machines. 
The text manipulates elements of philosophical and scientific discourse with great 
liberty. In the following parts of the manifesto, there are numerous statements 
about science and technology articulated in the same tone: they are highly ide-
ologized, while at the same time detached from their own deeper significance. 
The aim of the text as a whole is to prove the main thesis of posthumanism: that 
human beings as products of the process of biological evolution are not the only 
possible form of intelligent life on Earth. Very similar phrases can be found in 
the 1999 Transhumanist Declaration, which also includes some intuitions as to 
the social and legal status of the alleged posthuman creatures:
 (4) Transhumanists advocate the moral right for those who so wish to use technology to 
extend their mental and physical capacities and to improve their control over their 
own lives. We seek personal growth beyond our current biological limitations.
It is hard, however, to find texts written by post- and transhumanists that would 
present a higher awareness of the philosophical and social implications of their 
views. This is probably largely due to their own rejection of the past which is 
implicit to the idea of going beyond what is human. It is also significant that 
nearly all posthumanists are either scientists or represent the humanities, but 
were shaped by the anti-historical version of postmodernism – and the fact that 
nearly all of them are American.219
The authors quoted here are most interested in the “cyborg” autoevolution, 
but there are “mental” autoevolution aficionados among posthumanists too (e.g., 
the extropians). They pay least attention to the “somatic” type of autoevolution, 
probably because in their eyes it does not guarantee complete rejection of the old 
“biological” form of humanity.
An overview of positions ends here. The literature on posthumanism, which 
piled up in the last decade of the 20th century and in the early years of the cur-
rent one, is vast. It includes at least a few dozens of books, hundreds of articles 
 219 The term “posthumanism” comes up in some of the versions of European poststruc-
turalism, but in this case it is always linked with philosophical theories, especially the 
school of Foucault (“death of man”) and Derrida. This version has no connection with 
the ideas I am discussing here and I believe it is altogether a misunderstanding to use 
the term in such contexts. See, for example: Stefan Herbrechter, Ivan Callus, “What’s 
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and many more texts, which refer to the notion of posthumanism only margin-
ally or use it for embellishment. Most of these works have been published either 
in renowned publishing houses or in prestigious (mostly American) journals, 
which should dispel any doubts there may be about the status of ideas and 
doctrines of posthumanism, at least in the American academia. There have been 
numerous conferences held there since the 1990s on posthumanism, cyborgs 
and other similar topics, often combined with theories of new media, gender 
studies, psychology of the Internet, and so on. Only time will tell the real value 
of these intellectual productions.
23  Cyborgs, Androids and Robots
Based on the contemporary use of the word “cyborg,” one could think it has 
always been a vague theoretical concept, a means of utopian and highly abstract 
musings. It would not be true, however. Before posthumanism was born, the 
word signified quite a concrete entity, albeit also theoretical.
As was said before, in the final part of ST, Lem mentions in passing an 
article about cyborgization of man, and he most likely means the founding text 
of the entire “cyborg studies.” It is a short, few-pages-long text penned by two 
American scholars, Manfred E.  Clynes and Nathan S.  Kline, published in an 
issue of the journal Astronautics from September 1960, under the title “Cyborgs 
and Space.” Referring to the laws of cybernetics (which was at its peak of pop-
ularity at the time, we should remember), the authors presented the possibility 
of transforming the body of an astronaut through surgery in a way that would 
allow him to function efficiently during space travel and on the surface of other 
planets. The means to that goal would be to perform surgeries to eliminate 
body parts, which could not function properly outside Earth (e.g., the respira-
tory system) and replace them with machines, which are “normally” outside the 
human organism. Other organs would only be supported mechanically. Let us 
look at this text in more detail now.
The first sentence goes as follows:  “Space travel challenges mankind not 
only technologically but also spiritually, in that it invites man to take an ac-
tive part in his own biological evolution.” The similarity with Lem’s thinking on 
autoevolution is quite clear here, but in this case autoevolution happens for util-
itarian reasons: it is to facilitate space travel rather than to improve human con-
dition, as it is meant to do for Lem. Further on the authors offer a definition of 
a cyborg: “For the exogenously extended organizational complex functioning as 
an integrated homeostatic system unconsciously, we propose the term ‘Cyborg.’ ” 
It is followed by an expert discussion of “psychophysiological problems,” such 
as the functioning of various senses and organs of a cyborg during space travel. 
These issues are largely pertinent to “normal” cosmonauts as well (long periods 
outside earthly gravity, psychoses, changing metabolism, etc.). There is no discus-
sion of possible emotional changes in a cyborg, however. Interestingly enough, 
Lem does not ask that question either, even though the stories about Pirx the 
Pilot prove that he understood well the psyche of a cosmonaut exposed to loneli-
ness in extreme conditions for long periods of time. Lem is very rarely interested 
in how a cyborg or any other form of “artificial life” may “feel in the world.” It 
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may seem odd in the context of the autoevolutionary project, but I have already 
tried in Part Two to show that this is really a grand-scale project. And then, 
Lem is generally against psychologizing, even though there are a few important 
exceptions to this rule.
I will return later to questions raised by psychology of posthuman creatures. 
Here I will only add that they can generally be seen as the opposite of Turing test. 
We are (potentially) in direct contact with a creature about which we know for 
sure that it is self-aware and intelligent. But we cannot know what their profile 
will be like. It will certainly differ from humans more than individual human 
minds differ from each other. Therefore any known standards of psychology 
based on conventions derived from human interactions are bound to fail us.
Clynes and Kline’s article was written in the period of the highest enthusiasm 
about the “conquest of the universe,” which soon faded away. Therefore the text 
became an inspiration not for science and technology but for sci-fi literature and 
then, as we have seen, for posthumanist theories. The evolution of the thinking 
on cyborgs is an interesting example of how a strictly scientific idea, marginalized 
by the growth of science, can gain new vigor in literature and the humanities.220
“Cyborg” is not the same as “android” or “robot.” Cyborg, as is clear from 
above, is a creature combining elements of a biological organism and a machine 
system, and the machine part can consist of macroscopic servomechanisms 
or microchips. The word “cyborg” is a compound of “cybernetic organism.” 
“Android” on the other hand is a machine created in the image and likeness 
of humans – which means it is a peculiar type of “robot” – the term covering 
all machines capable of movements. The word “robot” was first used by Karel 
Čapek in his play R.U.R. from 1920 – and the Czech neologism is now used all 
over the world, thanks to its pronunciation, which is easy for non-Slavs. Cyborgs, 
androids and robots crowd the worlds of sci-fi literature and films, but there is 
no need to go into detail in that regard here, even though their role in mass cul-
ture is huge and one could certainly investigate the links between them and the 
 220 A valuable summary of the history of the theme of cyborgs in science and art can be 
found, for example, in Craig M. Klugman’s article “From Cyborg Fiction to Medical 
Reality,” Literature and Medicine,” no. 1 (2001). The author points out to the importance 
of the idea of cyborgization for medicine, especially prosthetics. He also emphasizes 
that the notion of a cyborg in the philosophical discourse is “non-Cartesian,” which 
means that it is not subject to the duality of body and mind. This thesis, very popular 
among the posthumanists and those interested in cyborg studies, is a clever way to 
neutralize the “mind-body problem,” which, as I have pointed out many times earlier, 
is the main challenge to the entire intellectual field discussed here.
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“serious” posthumanism, especially as the theoreticians of posthumanism are 
very often fans of science fiction.
Frederik Pohl’s Man Plus,221 clearly inspired by Clynes and Kline’s founda-
tional text can serve as an example of the theme of “cyborg in literature.” The pro-
tagonist of the novel is subjected to cyborgization, which is to allow him to live 
freely on Mars, but which also turns him into a monster resembling the medieval 
ideas of the devil. It is a rare version – in most cases, when the aesthetic aspect of 
cyborgization is taken into account, it is presented in a vision of an elegant figure 
of chromed steel. There is a whole separate current of “cyborg art,” which draws 
on just such fetishizing imagery. Pohl, however, models his hero differently, as 
this allows him to emphasize the physical and psychological pain the transfor-
mation causes. The author’s ambition is to create a psychological portrait of a 
man turned into a cyborg. Given the difficulties it entails, he succeed to a signif-
icant degree, even though the main source of Roger Torraway’s internal conflicts 
lies in the fact that his wife is having an affair with his friend, who happens to be 
one of the people carrying out the project of cyborgization. In the end Torraway-
cyborg adapts fully to the conditions on Mars and becomes its first settler, no 
longer missing Earth or people (Pohl hence admits that cyborg becomes a form 
essentially alien to man and vice versa). One interesting aspect of the novel is that 
it turns out that the whole plan to colonize Mars with cyborgs has been devised 
for people by computers, which became intelligent unnoticed, through cumu-
lating of computing power and the growth of network. In terms of its literary 
value, Pohl’s novel does not differ much from most US sci-fi productions, but 
it is an important impulse to understand, how the idea of a cyborg functioned 
in the mass culture of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Soon after cyborgs would 
become big in films, mostly through Terminator and RoboCop. This, however, 
goes beyond the scope of my argument.222
 221 Frederik Pohl, Man Plus (New York: Baen Publishing Enterprises, 1976).
 222 To complete the necessary information, I need to point out that the most famous 
androids of literature and cinema are the characters of Dick’s novel Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968) and its film adaptation Blade Runner (1982) directed 
by Ridley Scott, whereas the fullest picture of a robot was drawn by Isaac Asimov in 
his Foundation Series (1951–1953, and then continued in 1982–1986). In all these 
works the ethical, psychological and social issues connected with the existence of 
nonhuman protagonists are thoroughly investigated. These important texts of the late-
20th-century mass culture featuring cyborgs, androids and robots call for an exhaus-
tive discussion but it would fill a separate book. Between 1980 and 1990, cyborgs often 
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Some scholars differentiate between cyborg in a sense used here before and 
phenomena that we can today describe as cyborgization. If we assume that any 
kind of enhancement of human organism by installing external devices is a form 
of cyborgization (and Clynes and Kline’s definition allows that), then we should 
say every human with a pacemaker, prosthesis or even contact lenses is a cyborg. 
If we treat cyborgization as a form of Hall’s extension – and it is acceptable given 
the broad scope of the latter term – then any man wearing glasses or talking on 
a cell phone would be a cyborg. In order to avoid such absurd conclusions, in 
1995 an American scholar Alexander Chislenko came up with a word “fyborg” 
(a compound of “functional cyborg”), different from a “real” cyborg, and signi-
fying a person who uses technological devices extensively in order to increase 
their own psychological and physical capacities. Many technology aficionados 
embraced the term, declaring themselves as fyborgs.223
Let me finish this topic with a brief discussion of the connection between 
cyborgs and cyberspace. The two terms are frequently uttered together, most 
often by theoreticians and critics of art engaging the modern media, who are 
excited by the new possibilities in that domain. I  believe, however, there is a 
vast difference between the theory and the practice of cyberspace and cyborg or 
somatic autoevolution. It lies primarily in the fact that cyberspace is not tactile. 
Speaking about it, we usually have in mind something resembling a Platonic 
idea224 rather than matter; it is res cogitans rather than extensa. The only material 
thing a cyberspace user comes in contact with, the only sensory experience is 
the keyboard and the interface of the computer, occasionally with other periph-
eral devices, and then, if he or she is in virtual reality, they may interact with a 
number of simulators. Cyborgization on the other hand involves transformations 
 223 Kevin Warwick, a professor at Coventry University (UK), declared himself to be a real 
cyborg, as he had electronic chips implanted a number of times since 1998, allowing 
him to control some devices from a distance. Warwick became quite popular with the 
media and came to be an icon of cyborg studies, but his projects are often criticized as 
scientifically worthless tricks for publicity. His endeavors have little to do with theories 
discussed here. But they can contribute to progress in making the lives of people with 
various impairments easier.
 224 See, for example: Michael Heim, “The Erotic Ontology of Cyberspace,” in: idem: The 
Metaphysics of Virtual Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Heim’s thesis 
that cyberspace is “a practical incarnation” of the notion of idea in Plato’s thought 
can only be treated as a loose metaphor. In another text Heim claims that cyberspace 
fulfills Leibniz’s concept of monadology (strict separation of subjects, communicating 
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of the actual matter, not a simulated transformation. The degree of the subject’s 
autonomy is another issue here. In cyberspace “I” can be misled freely by who-
ever provides the simulation of reality. We could see intuitions about the process 
in Dick’s novels, the precise description in the chapter of ST on phantomatics, as 
well the cinema rendition of this in The Matrix.225 In cyborg utopia on the other 
hand it is the machine that is subordinated to man rather than the other way 
round, and ultimately man and machine are to form a harmonious one.
Given the above analysis of the two phenomena, cyberspace and cyborgization 
should, I believe, be carefully differentiated. The fact that all these more or less 
fantastic projects and ideas tend to get confused with each other comes from all 
of them somehow pertaining to people and having a radical transformation of 
man as their aim. And the most radical variant of autoevolution, which I have 
classified as mental autoevolution, suggests no less than to completely shift 
human mind into cyberspace. All these ideas are internally connected, but many 
authors seem unaware of the complexity of those connections and the huge intel-
lectual difficulties they entail.
 225 Slavoj Žižek offered an interesting philosophical interpretation of cyberspace in his 
essay The Matrix, or, the Two Sides of Perversion (1999). He sees it as a fulfillment of 
Malebranche’s idea of occasionalism: every act of will of a subject is mediated and 
carried out by computer software. This and the previous footnote are examples of how 




24  A Critique of Posthumanism
In the last three chapters, I presented a brief description of posthumanism, its 
premises and how they have been put to work. I will now proceed to the charges 
laid against posthumanism. In Chapter 25, I will reconstruct the implicit prem-
ises of posthumanism and the contradictions they entail.
In 2006 one of the online dictionaries (www.findword.org) defined “trans-
humanism” as: “Transhumanism can be interpreted as a progressive libertarian 
ethics going beyond humanism,” and then the entry continued: “In many ways 
transhumanism aims at fulfilling goals and hopes traditionally articulated by 
religion.” The combination of libertarianism and quasi-religious spirituality226 
(symptoms of which have already come up in previous chapters here) can be 
seen as an extremely dangerous coupling, resembling other social utopias in 
the Western thought of the last two centuries. Undoubtedly, without a second 
thought posthumanists accepted one of the most fateful premises of the modern 
worldview:  that a man can be God to himself. This thought and its possible 
consequences haunted many a philosopher and writer – but it does not seem to 
bear any particular significance for posthumanists. This embracement shows for 
the first time that posthumanism can have something to do with contemporary 
theory and, more importantly, with current social practice. I will discuss that 
connection.
Posthumanists themselves distinguish between two types of criticism of 
their ideas: the practical one, targeting the possibilities of actually achieving its 
declared goals; and the moral one, targeting its sense. There are then two main 
versions of the practical critique. The advocate of the first one, Steve Jones, claims 
that the development of technology will never lead to the kind of potential that 
posthumanists talk about; there will be no such advancement that would turn us 
into cyborgs and transfer our minds into a network; there will not even appear a 
possibility to genetically enhance our bodies. This is the simplest possible charge 
 226 I would rather not devote much attention to the links connecting posthumanism and 
artificial intelligence (AI) with religion here, although there are many. The concept of 
the mind as a computer program, universe as a computer and consciousness “immor-
talized” in a computer network, finally the idea of a human “deified” into a machine 
clearly do tickle the religious instinct in many people. But the effects of such impulses 
(especially textual effects) exceed the realm of this work. The Raëlist sect has been 
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and not a particularly serious one, as given the current level of technological 
development it is equally impossible to prove that the autoevolutionary scenario 
will or will not come true.
In its second version, the practical criticism is much more significant. In 
1989 Max Dublin, a sociologist from the University of Toronto, published a 
book Futurehype: The Tyranny of Prophecy, in which he brought back a number 
of completely failed futurologist predictions about the development of tech-
nology. He claimed that the theses put forward by posthumanists run a risk 
of being equally imprecise. Indeed, there are a lot of similarities between 
posthumanism and futurology of the 1960s and 1970s, and it is quite likely 
that the technological growth in the 21st century will go in a completely dif-
ferent direction than the one outlined in the autoevolutionary scenario. Yet, 
there are important differences between the two intellectual currents as well. 
Laying aside the political applications of futurology, it was essentially a science 
free from ideology. The futurological predictions were not meant to create uto-
pian visions, but merely extrapolate the existing state of things. Futurologists 
never claimed that humanity would make a leap toward posthuman forms. 
There was no talk of autoevolution as means of salvation. There were no 
attempts to combine technological predictions with a social theory (the pur-
pose of the predictions was practical: to regulate the functioning of the social 
system). Technological ideas did not become symbols in cultural and political 
discourse. In brief, the difference lies in intentions, even if the effects are super-
ficially similar.
In the book I have mentioned, Dublin himself emphasizes these differences, 
claiming that transhumanists tend to be fanatic and nihilistic, while their views 
resemble religious ideologies and Marxism. Posthumanists oppose such an inter-
pretation, pointing out that those ideologies are not consistent with rationality, 
which lies at the core of their entire current. Here again it becomes clear that they 
cannot see how rationality itself can easily become an ideology.
Sir Martin Rees, the British Astronomer Royal and the author of many 
splendid popular educational texts on contemporary cosmology, points out in 
his book Our Final Hour (2003) that the development of advanced technologies 
poses as many risks to our civilization as it produces benefits – which echoes the 
theses of the Frankfurt School created several decades earlier. Rees draws a pic-
ture of another stage of the 200-year-old argument surrounding technology. He 
calls for not so much halting its growth (which would be a utopia even less real-
istic than the mental autoevolution), but for a careful consideration of its effects 
and for limiting the openness of the structure of science. Thus he positions 
himself in proximity with “the principle of responsibility” of Hans Jonas and 
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moderate environmentalists, making yet another attempt to somehow level the 
diverging currents of technology and ethics within our civilization.
The one criticism that was certainly the most important for posthumanists 
themselves was presented in 2000 by Bill Joy. It is important not only due to 
the intellectual heavy weight of arguments used, but also because the author is 
not one of those “ignorant” humanists, “loony” environmentalists or academic 
theoreticians – he comes from the very core of technocracy. William N. (Bill) 
Joy is a cofounder of Sun Microsystems, one of the main players of the computer 
industry. He is also the main developer of the very popular Java computer pro-
gramming language. His essay Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us came out in the 
prestigious IT journal Wired (April 8, 2000) and sparked a big discussion, which 
brought the author even bigger fame – albeit somewhat ambivalent in nature. 
Joy’s theses mostly echo the views that many authors expressed in the 1940s and 
1950s, during the discussion around the ethical implications of nuclear research – 
and Joy invokes those arguments directly. Yet, for the posthumanists hypnotized 
by their own bright visions, this resonated suddenly as powerful memento. Joy 
wrote openly that the uncontrolled technological growth of the 21st century may 
lead to the destruction of our species, which will either eliminate itself acciden-
tally, manipulating it like a sorcerer’s apprentice, or it will be eliminated by AI 
(this option, however, is actually met with enthusiasm by many posthumanists 
who seem to hate humanity for many more or less idiosyncratic reasons). Joy’s 
revelations are quite obvious for anyone who is looking at posthumanism and 
technophilia from the outside, but – as is evidenced by the rhetoric of his text – 
they must have seemed quite original to Joy himself. He even quotes Nietzsche 
and one of his attacks on “science” and “truth,” pointing out that it can be reit-
erated with regard to the contemporary world. He also discovers the meaning 
of the notion of social utopia, thanks to Jacques Attali’s books on the ideals of 
the French Revolution. One of the last sentences of the essay is: “This all leaves 
me not angry but at least a bit melancholic. Henceforth, for me, progress will be 
somewhat bittersweet.” What else can we say?227
Joy sees one more thing that none of the authors of utopias saw, not only the 
posthumanists, not even Lem in ST (although he did notice it in his novels). 
Joy writes:  “And even if we scatter to the stars, isn’t it likely that we may take 
our problems with us or find, later, that they have followed us?” This incredibly 
fateful sentence puts all efforts of posthumanists into question. Indeed, even if, as 
 227 In 2003, Joy resigned all of his positions at Sun Microsystems and announced that he 
was withdrawing from the IT industry.
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Lem’s Golem XIV prophesized, we do make the autoevolutionary leap, in order 
to, “by rejecting man, save man,” there is no guarantee, that what is most val-
uable in man, will in fact be saved. This dramatic dilemma will be discussed 
here again.
One more remark from Joy’s essay ought to be mentioned here. At the very 
beginning of the text, the author juxtaposes two names and two figures of people 
who symbolize two opposed extreme viewpoints regarding technological pro-
gress. The first one is Ray Kurzweil, already discussed here. The other one is 
Teodor Kaczynski, better known as Unabomber, a terrorist, who provoked fear 
among US scholars in the last years of the 20th century by sending explosives 
to science labs. Joy claims that both these men have their point – and this must 
have been enough to shock most of Joy’s readers – and he calls Kaczynski and 
other such radical opponents of technocracy “Neo-Luddites” (Kurzweil used the 
term too). This name, which caught on well, points to the fact that the discussion 
around new technologies in the late 20th and early 21st century is yet another 
stage of a process that has been going on for more than 200 years, from the very 
beginning of the industrial revolution, which was the first among many phe-
nomena triggered by modern science and technology and strongly affecting the 
social order. We could list Luddites, humanists such as Matthew Arnold (in a 
polemic with Thomas Henry Huxley), defenders of the classic model of educa-
tion against grammar schools, Frankfurt School philosophers, those opting for 
the “classics” in the two cultures debate, and ideologists of the counterculture 
of the 1960s – all of them opposed the progress of science and technology not 
only because they were fearful conservatives or humanists, but also because they 
saw in it a risk of losing human sovereignty. It is paradoxical that the same fear 
can be caused by posthumanism – a theory and an ideology, which aims to ulti-
mately elevate human beings beyond the randomness of their condition. But it 
is enough to remember the fate of other emancipatory ideologies, to understand 
how noble ideals can become the opposite.
Let us now move on to the moral critique (although Reese and Joy’s criti-
cism included numerous such elements as well). Posthumanists are aware of the 
problem that has been mentioned here many times already when discussing the 
implicit premises of ST. It is the discrepancy in the development of technology 
and ethics. In 2005, a Wikipedia entry on transhumanism included the following 
passage:
Technological solutions may be compatible with other improvements, but some worry 
that strong advocacy of the former might divert attention and resources from the latter. 
As most transhumanists support non-technological changes to society, such as the 
spread of political liberty, and most critics of transhumanism support technological 
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advances in areas such as communications and healthcare, the difference is often a 
matter of emphasis.
It all seems easy then: we speak different languages, but at the end of the day we 
have the same goal: to make people’s lives better. Posthumanists observe that there 
is a difference between the positive value of technological innovations them-
selves and the practical use to which particular people or groups put them. The 
polemic about technology and ethics between technophiles and Neo-Luddites 
is just one of the versions of the debate on human nature between liberals and 
conservatives. The former believe that common sense and untamed entrepre-
neurial spirit can guarantee the right use of technology. For the latter, unlim-
ited technological innovations are like offering a razor to a child. At the heart of 
posthumanism, there lies liberal or even libertarian philosophy – although not 
all posthumanists realize that. Yet, for them it is obvious that technological pro-
gress – just like individual liberty – do not need to be controlled at all; and the 
problem of discrepancy between technology and ethics is a result of a misunder-
standing or an effect of bad will on the part of some people and groups.
Another form of moral critique of posthumanism is the eugenics charge. 
Indeed, autoevolutionary concepts in all their versions might bring to mind the 
20th-century ideas to “improve” man. It should be reminded here that in view 
of eugenics’ creator, Francis Galton, it was meant to be a means of improving 
humanity as a whole. Yet, even this early premise included a seed of the later seg-
regational and racist interpretations. Galton would admit that the aim of eugenics 
is to intensify the most valuable features of the species (as judged by the modern 
industrial society). It automatically necessitated conceptually distinguishing its 
“best” representatives. Does not posthumanism conceal the same risk? Likely so, 
but posthumanists generally reject any such affiliations. Posthumanist texts do 
not pose the question, who would really be subjected to autoevolution. (Perhaps 
posthumanists, too, imagine it to be the entire human kind).228
The third and final example of a moral critique of posthumanism is Francis 
Fukuyama’s Our Posthuman Future,229 which accuses posthumanism of de-
stroying the notion of human nature. Fukuyama claims that posthumanism 
can undermine the ideals of a liberal society, which are the very foundation of 
 228 There are several extremely right-wing subcurrents to posthumanism that embrace 
the heritage of the 20th-century segregational ideologies. But the mainstream group 
is definitely separating itself from such views.
 229 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future:  Consequences of the Biotechnology 
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posthumanism itself, as it calls for reframing both the notion of human nature 
and the premise that all people are equal. He represents a position now known 
as “bioconservatism,” according to which every attempt at transforming the bio-
logical status of people (and thus any attempt at autoevolution, as well as cloning 
and other forms of biotechnology) is by necessity immoral because it has to lead 
to the fall of “human nature.”
Fukuyama’s book merits a closer look, as it is a good example of a degener-
ation of some versions of humanism. Francis Fukuyama and Alvin Toffler are 
seen in the United States and many other countries as great intellectual authori-
ties. Their main books are Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man – an 
attempt to read the 1989 transformation through a vulgar Hegelianism – and 
Toffler’s Future Shock – a book in which data from statistical yearbooks are to 
prove universalist theses on transformations of the human culture as a whole. 
The reasonings applied by the two authors are very similar. They use the sim-
plest sets of notions, including popular received opinions and based on that 
they build interpretations of the most important civilizational dilemmas. While 
most contemporary European thinkers can be rightly blamed for getting stuck in 
academic subtleties and drowning under the burden of their philosophical tra-
dition, Americans Fukuyama and Toffler represent the opposite extreme: their 
writings are depressingly straightforward. This is why Fukuyama’s charges against 
posthumanism are probably the weakest of those invoked here, even though he 
is also the only critic who tries to phrase them using professional philosophical 
diction, which allows him to actually touch upon some truly significant issues.
How does Fukuyama understand the notion of human nature, which is to be 
threatened by biotechnology? For him it is not a product of any type of Western 
philosophy. He writes: “The definition of the term human nature I will use here 
is the following: human nature is the sum of the behavior and characteristics that 
are typical of the human species, arising from genetic rather than environmental 
factors” (130). This definition is taken straight from sociobiology (which, sur-
prisingly for a European, suddenly becomes here an ally of conservatism) and it 
allows Fukuyama to fight posthumanism at its own game. If he defined nature 
the way speculative philosophy does, posthumanism could see it as pointless 
speculation. Choosing sociobiology as his starting point, he makes it seem like 
his counterarguments are backed by science. This, however, is where he is wrong 
because just like his opponents he treats science as if it had the power to deter-
mine the objective truth about humanity.
As I have suggested earlier, one of posthumanism’s main weaknesses is the 
simplified treatment of what it means to “be human,” which derives from naïve 
rationalism. Hoping to beat posthumanism at its own game, Fukuyama repeats 
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the error. Moreover, his attempt to define “human nature” through behavioral 
and quantitative characteristics reveals a more general dangerous weakness of all 
attempts at “scientific” justification of general propositions about “humans” as 
such. We come across such attempts in every press note that starts with “Research 
has shown that…” followed by a thesis such as: “consuming large quantities of 
carrots reduces the risk of colon cancer by 17%.” Fukuyama tries to use similar 
sentences to prove that people have to retain the principles of their existence 
laid out by the liberal and conservative thought of the West in the last 200 years 
(not to mention this is for him the only possible mode of such existence), 
because if they stray from those principles, for instance by allowing cloning or 
autoevolution, they will destroy “the natural order.” He does not understand 
that this line of argument falls apart due to its contradictions. The development 
of science in the 20th century created a situation in which producing general 
unconditional statements about the physical world (and especially man as its 
element) based on experimental facts is no longer possible. There are likely 
links between the functioning of the human organism on the genetic-molecular 
level and the emotional–mental one. But with the current knowledge we cannot 
describe them with any precision. We lack data that would allow us to say how 
exactly phenotype translates into someone’s character and what is the impact of 
the external environment (in the polemic between nativism and environmen-
talism, Fukuyama positions himself as a nativist). We may never be able to find 
that out precisely, given the immense complexity of each human organism and 
the countless reactions and relationships that occur inside it, as well as between 
the organism and world. Scholars who have done research on a random sample 
of a few hundred people and claim that listening to Wagner’s operas has negative 
impact on blood levels of hemoglobin (and the lack of any qualifiers suggests the 
thesis is to pertain to the population at large) are simply ridiculous. Fukuyama, 
who uses similar arguments to support conservative social policies, is just sad. It 
is as if a chef calculated ingredients for dishes in millimoles, hoping such preci-
sion would produce better flavors.
The problem with Fukuyama’s book is that while his arguments are weak, 
the problems he takes up are vital. Fukuyama is better than Silicon Valley 
technophiles at seeing dangers that come with the growing potential for 
implementing autoevolution. In his own naïve and naturalistic way, he is trying 
to warn against the same thing Lem was warning against in his own internal 
polemic with the autoevolutionary project in ST. He sees the utopianism of 
autoevolutionary ideas. He is also right to notice that within the perimeters 
he has himself laid out it is possible to manipulate “human nature” just wish 
pharmaceutics. But by grounding his notion of “human nature” and “dignity” 
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in sociobiological premises, he deprives his own arguments of any value and 
reduces them to the kind of rationalist utopia he was trying to avoid.
Fukuyama’s fear is not merely a conservative’s fear facing the fall of morality 
caused by technocracy and permissiveness. He is asking about humanity not 
only in the context of evolutionarily determined genotype and phenotype. He 
is also interested in historical characteristics, which determine humanism in the 
posthumanist context. He is trying to answer whether autoevolution would turn 
us into the characters from Brave New World or 1984. In brief, again we hear anx-
iety about whether posthumans will retain what is best in people: free will, sub-
jectivity and self-determination. Will they not lose what made their predecessors 
human, once they improve their bodies? In other words, will they become the 
Nietzschean Übermensch? (Fukuyama resents Nietzsche for his bold rejection of 
tradition.) Posthumanists do not ask themselves this strictly philosophical ques-
tion, because even when they do use such old-fashioned terms as “free will,” 
they see it as a product of an oppressive social system, or an old-fashioned meta-
physics at best. Lem on the other hand, who understood the significance of such 
notions much better (and who showed the consequences of “castrating improve-
ment” in Return from the Stars), saw them as always linked with the painful and 
irrefutable dilemmas of the human condition, from which he hoped to liberate 
us. Golem’s message, which I have quoted in Chapter 19, is clear: whatever we 
become, it will be better than what we have been so far, it cannot be any worse. 
Even if we take up a form in which the categories of old anthropology will lose 
their meaning, they will be replaced by a “better existential system,” although we 
may not be able to imagine it now.
We can see here that the discussion about the ethical determinants of human 
and posthuman existence is theoretically unsolvable. Questions about the eth-
nicity of these two forms of existence most clearly show how radically different 
from each other they are. It is easier to produce visions of a cyborg society or a 
humanity “downloaded” to a computer than to answer questions about emotions, 
which will organize their world. It is in fact a matter of faith rather than knowl-
edge, because  – and it needs to be stated clearly  – we are dealing with tran-
scendence here. The posthuman world can be either paradise or hell, but only 
those who enter it will know. This is one of the reasons why posthumanists avoid 
such questions – they realize their “rational” ideas will acquire characteristics of 
religious faith.
25  Hidden Premises Behind Posthumanism
The subject of this chapter has already been started on the final pages of 
Chapter 24. But it is not the hidden similarity between posthumanism and reli-
gious faith that is the most important in order to understand the crucial problems 
of the doctrine. On the following pages, I will further develop the discussion of 
philosophical, social and psychological problems implicit to posthumanism and 
autoevolution.
1  Philosophy
If posthumanists read Kant, or at least Isaiah Berlin, they would probably 
say: “Since the crooked timber of humanity cannot be fixed, it ought to be cut 
down, rooted out, and then new planted. The new one will certainly be straight.” 
The posthumanist utopia is extremely liberal, and its critique is a conservative 
critique. It is obvious and it is equally obvious what are the main characteristics 
of liberal and conservative thinking, seen very clearly in the discussion I have 
just described here. But it is worth it to investigate closer some characteristics, 
which, I believe, are peculiar to posthumanism only, or at least of all the contem-
porary types of thinking about the society here they are most evidently present.
Posthumanism unconditionally rejects historicity of the human condition. It 
rejects the notion of identity of an individual as correlate to tradition and history. 
In brief, it rejects the historical temporality of human existence. In that respect, 
it resembles other liberal currents, but it is more radical in one regard. This is 
because of autoevolution, of course – none of the liberal doctrines assumes that 
people will reject their history so much, that they will cease to be people. What is 
it then that is happening with the earlier definitions of human identity?
The notion of Übermensch in Nietzsche is connected with a rejection of the 
past. Übermensch constructs his identity on his own, with no reference to tradi-
tion, social and moral norms or any kind of models derived from the past. His 
“amoralism” does not imply a lack of rules, but adopting rules he himself sets up, 
independently of the consensually determined social norms. Nietzsche was not 
interested in the possible social consequences of the idea of Übermensch nor in 
the intellectual challenges it poses.
An amoral Übermensch is thus also antisocial, because his rules are not cre-
ated in communication with other people. “A society of Übermensch” is a contra-
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social existence, which would only be a constraint. If culture is to be understood 
as correlate to interpersonal communication  – Übermensch have no culture. 
They are strictly monadic.
Being an Übermensch poses immense intellectual and ethical challenges for 
anyone who would like to become one. An Übermensch needs to create himself 
anew, build his identity with no support from the outside and independently 
from the entire “methodology of identity” so far, based on layers of the past. And 
once he achieves that, all that remains is absolute loneliness. Unless he realizes 
the gravity of these challenges, his self-determination will be merely a caricature 
of Nietzsche’s ideas.
At the end of the 20th century, Pierre Hadot, a French historian of philos-
ophy, suggested an understanding of the ancient philosophy, especially Stoicism, 
as an “existential project.” In his book What is Ancient Philosophy? (2002), he 
claimed that it was only the emergence of Christianity that led to philosophy 
no longer being treated as a “way of life” and becoming an abstract discourse. 
The Hellenistic philosophy, understood in the way suggested by Hadot, offers an 
existential project that is similar to the Nietzschean project of Übermensch. In 
both cases, human identity is understood as task, not a heritage. In Hellenistic 
thought, this detachment from past models was caused by a vast change in the 
condition of existence after the conquests of Alexander the Great and the creation 
of a universalist monarchy, and then of Hellenistic states. These developments 
destroyed the Greek notion of social life, shaped by the classical period, almost 
entirely.
This way Nietzsche and the Stoics are placed on the same continuum: they 
all call for man to design his own identity independently from any external 
circumstances, which could determine it. These philosophies are radically anti-
social and this is the difference between them and the 19th- and 20th-century 
emancipatory doctrines, which were to achieve their goals through rules 
pertaining to the community at large.
What does it all have to do with Lem and posthumanism? I  believe that 
the project of autoevolution is in some ways similar to these philosophies. 
Completely neglecting the past, tradition and historicity makes posthumans 
the equivalent of Nietzschean Übermensch – if they are to have any identity 
other than the physical one, they need to create it themselves, with no ref-
erence to the external factors. I will leave the question whether an ex nihilo 
identity is possible at all unsolved  – it goes beyond the sphere of discourse 
available here.
Posthumanism can then be described as the most radical emancipatory 
project. Through it, not only people are to be liberated from the constraints of 
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history and social norms, but they will also be free from Culture and Nature, 
and eventually from being human altogether. Deification and self-salvation will 
happen through renunciation of humanity. It is implicitly assumed that the only 
way to eliminate the kind of issues that are inherent to human condition is to 
give up on being human. However, as the veracity (or falsity) of this proposition 
can only be determined in actu, the utopian character of posthumanism seems 
all the stronger.
In a famous opening passage of Politics, Aristotle writes that animals and 
gods live in solitude, while people have to live in a group, because this is their 
nature. Posthumanism confirms this view in a peculiar way. As I have tried to 
show posthuman beings will be unable to live in a group, because rejecting tradi-
tion, past and history – and, consequently, rejecting culture and society as well – 
precludes any kind of group mode of existence. This isolation is not caused by 
closing oneself in cyberspace, as it was predicted by some popular thinkers (and 
which Lem describes with more subtlety in his analysis of phantomatics), but by 
the very core principles of posthumanism. It seems, however, that posthumanists 
are unaware of these consequences.
What can we compare this state to? Is Stoic “ataraxia,” the eternal “present” 
without time known to mystics or the Buddhist nirvana something similar? 
I believe such speculations are pointless. We can have no idea what a self-aware, 
rational being detached from any past or community would be like. Our entire 
existence depends on them.
Polish sociologist Jan Strzelecki opens his book Próby świadectwa with the 
following:  “If we were  – ultimately, with no appeal, no chance and no one to 
save us – a product of a meaningless explosion of existence bustling in a thou-
sand forms; if we were pure existence…” Contemporary science led us to just 
such state. This is what we are exactly in science’s light. People thinking in 
terms of science cannot understand what a work on sense is – and this is what 
Strzelecki believed to be the most important goal of our existence. But they do 
understand that man – whether a purely biological creature, or maybe even a 
product of history and its meanings – is certainly imperfect and does not fulfill 
the ideals humanity placed in front of him; a man is torn by contradictions that 
are the essence of humanity. All utopias were born from this perspective. But the 
posthumanist utopia is unique – because it is science that is to lead to salvation; 
the very science that first took away the meaning of our existence. The deifica-
tion is to happen in a machine. Thus scientism becomes mysticism: cyborgs will 
step out on the banks of the river of time. They will forget Homer, Kant and the 
Second World War. Forty centuries will still look down on them, but they will no 
longer be feeling the weight of that gaze.
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2  Society
It would not be true to say that all authors interested in posthumanism agree on 
such radical consequences I have described earlier as entailed by its hidden prem-
ises. They are a result of somewhat irresponsible thinking of some theoreticians 
who treat autoevolution as a process independent from external factors. Many 
authors try to outline those factors. Because of how “fanatic” posthumanism gen-
erally tends to be, most such attempts happen within sci-fi literature. Such writers 
as James Gunn, Greg Egan or Jacek Dukaj think about the possible social strati-
fication autoevolution may lead to. The question is simple: who will be affected? 
What social groups will have the possibility and willingness to subject themselves 
to autoevolution and what social tensions may result from that? The problem can 
be seen as another stage of biopolitics (similar to what Lem describes in parody in 
“The Twenty-first Voyage”). Some such intuitions can be found in Fukuyama as 
well, when he considers the negative economic results of biotechnology.
It seems clear that if autoevolution happens in practice on a bigger scale, the 
first level to be involved will be economy; simply speaking: the costs. At least at the 
beginning it will be a luxury available only to the wealthiest. As there will gradually 
be more and more posthuman beings, there will certainly occur a difficult legal and 
public discussion on their legal status in coexistence with people. All the social pro-
cess that took place when introducing any important technological innovation will 
take place. Autoevolution will shift from a purely rational idea (which it is both in 
ST and in posthumanist texts and which in its pure form could lead to what I have 
described earlier) to the level of social practice, brimming with random difficulties 
I have mentioned.
James Gunn (born in 1923), an admired American sci-fi writer, is the author of 
the novel The Immortals (1964), which develops the theme of advanced somatic 
autoevolution, limited to political and financial elites, isolated from the rest of the 
society. The most sought-after social role is working in the biotechnological and 
medical sectors. As a result of the elites’ isolation, the social order is disrupted and 
individuals mutated through flawed autoevolutionary interventions form a cast of 
outlaws and criminals. At some point in the novel, it turns out that the members of 
the social elite did not achieve any kind of perfection through autoevolution – quite 
the opposite; just like Lem’s H.P.L.D.’s and Borges’s immortals, they became men-
tally and physically degenerated by the feeling of their omnipotence.
Jacek Dukaj presents a completely different version of events in his book 
Perfekcyjna niedoskonałość (2004).230 The complex novel is set in the 29th century 






in the world in which people and posthuman forms coexist in relative harmony 
within a technosphere permeated by nanomatic devices and controlled by com-
puter software. There is a network of connections between living creatures and 
computer programs, which allows for complete virtualization of reality. Dukaj 
gives detailed descriptions of social hierarchies and economic and status com-
petition between the stahs (standard Homo sapiens) and phoebes (posthuman 
being; the names are honorific). Phoebes can program their personality and 
forms of existence at will. There are higher autoevolutionary forms in this world 
as well:  inclusions, similar to the old notion of omnipotent gods. Within my 
typology they correspond to the category of advanced mental autoevolution. 
In the novel it is often emphasized that the consciousness and the experiences 
of the phoebes (not to mention inclusions) are unavailable to stahs. Undergoing 
autoevolution depends on financial capacity, which is only available to a small 
percentage of people, and the conventions governing that reality have been laid 
out 600 years earlier by the industrial and political establishment. Posthuman 
beings do not fulfill the definition of gender, and Dukaj created a special gram-
matical conjugation for them.231 Lem’s influence is clearly visible in Dukaj’s prose, 
including Perfekcyjna niedoskonałość, but there is no place here for a detailed 
textual analysis to prove it. Yet the vision of autoevolution in this novel can be 
seen as a literary rendition of the discursive project of ST; the difference is that 
Dukaj is fully aware how this project is impacted by other factors (i.e., economy, 
rivalry between individual subjects in fight for higher stages of development, the 
politics of symbols, etc.). In Dukaj’s text, the element of the “ultimate” version 
of autoevolution, which I have described earlier, takes up the form of complete 
inaccessibility of the internal life of posthuman beings to people. The problem of 
retaining identity in a situation when it is possible to shape and transfer it with 
no limit is illustrated here by the characters’ meticulous use of proper forms and 
rituals.
Ray Kurzweil also allows for dividing people into humans and posthumans. 
In his The Age of Spiritual Machines, he outlines a scenario of how civilization 
will develop in the 21st century, and under the year 2099, he puts the emer-
gence of a cast called MOSH (Most Original Substrate Human) – as a relic of 
sorts. The 800 years between Kurzweil’s and Dukaj’s versions is no accident. 
The former, in a manner characteristic of American posthumanists, does not 
 231 It brings to mind Lem’s teasing descriptions from “The Twenty-First Voyage,” but the 
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think much about the persisting social issues that have been troubling civ-
ilization from the very beginning. So for him, it is not impossible that we 
will deal with ignorance, poverty and violence within one century. Despite 
appearances, Dukaj is more of a realist and assumes it will take eight times 
longer, and even then for him autoevolution will only apply to a small section 
of the population.
Australian writer Greg Egan (born in 1961)  also elaborates on themes of 
autoevolution in his works. He is currently highly admired in the sci-fi and 
posthumanist circles (accidentally, Dukaj is a fan as well). His fourth novel 
Distress (1995)232 is set in 2055, when as a result of advanced somatic and cyborg 
autoevolution, as well as advanced biopolitics, human population is divided into 
seven biotechnologically modeled sexes. These are: u-, n- and imen; u-, n- and 
iwomen (prefixes meaning, respectively, “ultra,” “normal” and “infra”); the sev-
enth sex consists of asexes – individuals renouncing sexual life to avoid being 
entangled in the “politics of gender,” determining social life. The plot focuses on 
the announcement of the final version of the physical Theory of Everything and 
related cognitive complications. Egan weaves into the plot a number of thor-
ough descriptions of political and social conflicts, which occur in the context 
of advanced biotechnology, “migration of sexes” and possible cultural factors 
impacting science. The image of the struggle of “two cultures,” which I  have 
described in Part Two of the work, is here led to its radical consequences, and the 
author strongly opposes the old humanism. Proponents of “traditional” culture 
are a group of demagogue extremists in Egan’s world. Similarly to posthumanists, 
but with more understanding of the complex nature of the world, Egan is con-
vinced that the forms of humanism, which have framed our understanding of 
ourselves for centuries, fail completely when we gain the possibility to deter-
mine our identity through pharmacology, surgery and nanotechnology. It is 
the exact same problem that Fukuyama warned against, except Egan treats it as 
obvious (just as the rejection of old norms is obvious). In other works, Egan often 
describes the world of mental autoevolution.
I should also mention an author who is far from science fiction in his work, 
but who offers his own version of autoevolution. I  mean Michel Houellebecq 
and his novel The Elementary Particles (Les particules elementaires 1998),233 
 232 Greg Egan, Distress (New York: Harper Prism, 1995).
 233 Michel Houellebecq, Atomised, trans. by F. Wynne (London: Heinemann, 1999); 
published in the United States as The Elementary Particles (New York: Vintage, 2001). 






which triggered a discussion in Europe on a subject that can be described as 
follows: are the ideals of modern Western civilization irrevocably over, or can 
they still be raised from the dead? Houellebecq himself believes the first option 
to be true and that is why one of the protagonists of the novel, a distinguished 
biochemist, is working on a project of a “genetic reform” of the human species, 
after which people would stop reproducing sexually. The project is implemented 
in the epilogue.
Houellebecq’s novel is interesting to me for a number of reasons, although 
the project of autoevolution as such has a marginal role in the plot. The asexual 
utopia of the French writer is a type of cri de coeur, inspired by the complete 
emptiness of the emotional life of the inhabitants of postindustrial Europe; and 
Houellebecq is deeply convinced that this is the state of Europe. The Elementary 
particles is the only case of a literary description of autoevolution (a somatic one 
here, with an emphasis on physiology rather than morphology) that is not set in 
a science fiction environment, but in a tradition of realist novels. The disgust with 
body and sexuality constantly demonstrated by the narrator and the characters 
makes Houellebecq resemble Lem and Turing with their obsession of human 
existence freed of the bodily aspect. (It is no accident that Slavoj Žižek begins 
his 2001 essay “No Sex, Please, We’re Post-human!” by invoking Houellebecq, 
Foucault and Turing. Similarly to my own argument, Žižek emphasizes that 
humanity and human identity are rooted in notions such as historicity, trauma 
and Heideggerian temporality.) A  conversation between two brothers is also 
significant – the two protagonists of the novel – in brothers Julian and Aldous 
Huxley. The former, we should remember, is the author of the term “transhu-
manism,” and the latter – the author of one of the most famous antiutopias based 
on the concept of technological improvement of man. Houellebecq suggests that 
both these thinkers were right in predicting a spiritual crisis in the postmodern 
society and the possibility of overcoming it through autoevolution. In the novel, 
he includes a number of statements on reducing the role of the past and the 
disappearance of the sense of existential and cultural continuity in contempo-
rary society, which is to be a harbinger of the posthuman era. Finally, the epi-
logue tells the story of implementing the project of autoevolution, under the 
aegis of UNESCO, ending with a success in 2029. The posthuman narrator says 
around 2075:
There remain some humans of the old species … Their reproductive levels fall year 
by year, however, and at present their extinction seems inevitable. Contrary to the 
doomsayers, this extinction is taking place peaceably … It has been surprising to note 
the meekness, resignation, perhaps even secret relief with which humans have consented 
to their own passing.
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Having broken the filial chain that linked us to humanity … Men consider us to be 
happy; it is certainly true that we have succeeded in overcoming the forces of egotism, 
cruelty and anger which they could not … Science and art are still a part of our society; 
but without the stimulus of personal vanity, the pursuit of Truth and Beauty has taken 
on a less urgent aspect. To humans of the old species, our world seems a paradise. (263)
All posthumanists would likely second those words that grasp the very essence 
of the utopian dreams of autoevolution.
3  Psychology
We can now ask what psychological premises stand behind posthumanist 
thought? Why some people want to stop being human so much that they write 
books about it and come up with entire theories? What is the psychological back-
ground of posthumanism and autoevolution?
I believe there are at least six possible impulses for the development of such 
thought. I shall list them starting with the ones I deem most important:
 1. Hatred of one’s own species, caused by its imperfect physical and spiritual 
form. I  have tried to trace it in Lem and Turing. It is also visible in many 
authors writing on artificial intelligence (AI) and information technology 
(IT). These are “Turing’s men” in a sense proposed by Bolter, accustomed to 
the precision and “purity” of machines. The “blurriness” of human mind, the 
indeterminate emotions and all bodily experiences (from illnesses, through 
age and death, to everyday soiling and secretions) must seem most disgusting 
to those people, and they often express that. A hundred years ago they would 
not even have theoretical chances to go outside their race and “oppose nature,” 
but the progress of technology, which made the project of autoevolution pos-
sible, also allowed for an “inhuman” plan to free them from the abominable 
“meat machine.” It brings to mind a comparison with the anachorites of the 
late antiquity who tortured their bodies in a way that would have seemed 
pathological to us, because they deemed them an obstacle on their way to 
sanctity. Again, posthumanism becomes an analogue of religious mysticism.
 2. Powerlessness, or a sense of powerlessness rather. It is caused by a Pascalian 
disproportion between our bodies and minds and the scale of the physical 
reality that was unveiled to us by the 20th century science (see Chapter 11). 
This feeling is most visible in authors who draw visions of omnipotence of 
posthuman beings (Jacek Dukaj is among them).
 3. Frustration. The source of it is the sense of ultimate waning of the life force 
in the Western civilization and a conviction that there is no “normal” way out 




with a sense of fatigue with the questions of body and sexuality in the postin-
dustrial era, as for Elfriede Jelinek who “asked whether she would rather have 
a different body [hating her own], responds: ‘No, I wouldn’t want a dick like 
men either. I wish I didn’t have anything. Angels don’t have genitals too.’ ”234
 4. Curiosity – as is well known, it has always been one of the main impulses 
driving the civilization’s growth. Today, too, it pushes authors to think about 
“what will happen, when we stop being human?”
 5. Play. The motif can be found in the writings of some American posthumanists. 
If technology allows us to carry out autoevolution – let us do it, “just for fun.” 
Such thinking comes from a complete ignorance about all the issues related 
to autoevolution, which I have been discussing here. Clearly, the fact that AI 
experts mostly see people as “meat,” as do gender studies authors (to which 
I will return again) is mostly a result of a rejection of historicity.235 If the net-
work of symbols through which we have been explaining our existence to 
ourselves for centuries has no more meaning, all that is left is the body, that 
is, as the poet Sekułowski observed in Hospital of the Transfiguration, “a pile 
of meat.”
 6. Fatigue. This motif is similar to the previous one, but it derives more from 
an unpleasant feeling that people have already fulfilled their entire existential 
potential and, if they do not do something spectacular with themselves, they 
will be facing an eternity of ennui. Such approach is typical for people who 
are constantly hungry for new experiences. This hunger is intensified by most 
 234 Anna Rubinowicz-Gründler, “Elfriede Jelinek. ‘Nie umiem się niczym cieszyć’,” 
Wysokie Obcasy, October 23–24, 2004.
 235 A particularly telling example of such ahistorical (and psychologically ignorant) 
thinking can be found in Kurzweil’s The Age of Spiritual Machines (163–166). He 
writes about “cybernetic poetry,” that is, poems generated by computer programs. 
For Kurzweil such poems are in no way different from poetry written by people. It 
means that he does not understand the role of cultural tradition and the psyche in 
the creative process that goes into producing a work of art (which could ingratiate 
him with extreme structuralists). And Roger Schank, a distinguished expert in AI, 
writes: “I’ve been able to find remarks on the subject by Thomas Aquinas, Montaigne 
and Aristotle… These people have a vague, hand-waving notion of what conscious-
ness is about, with a religious tinge to it. Their work wouldn’t fly at all in modern 
academics” (Third Culture…, 28). Schank’s arrogance is made even deeper by his 
certainty that is it him and his colleagues, for example, Daniel Dennett, have actually 
discovered the essence of consciousness. (By the way, if Schank did not underestimate 
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kinds of contemporary mass culture, which imposes on consumers a desire 
for ever-new experiences.
This list could go on, but I believe that the six psychological motifs are enough to 
answer the question posed.
Why does Lem create the project of autoevolution? I  believe the first four 
motifs are the most important for him, and most particularly the first two. This 
should be clear from the analyses included in Part Two of this book. The ques-
tion about deeper psychological reasons will have to remain unanswered. Lem 
is careful to obliterate traces of his own biography and psyche. Yet, some traces 
can be found in his earliest works and in the novel Wysoki Zamek. His negative 
way of seeing humanity was certainly influenced by his wartime experiences and 
his medical studies.
Here I  end the analysis of the hidden premises behind posthumanism. In 
Chapter 26, I will be showing the links between posthumanism and some types 
of postmodernist thinking.
26  Posthumanism and Gender
In the multitude of contemporary intellectual currents, gender studies are now 
among them most important. As I have suggested a number of times already, 
placing sex, gender and human body at the center of philosophical and social 
thought may be caused by the fall of metaphysics and historicism. “Body,” both 
“sex” and “gender,” as well as “sexuality” are used in this discourse as primary 
terms describing fundamental elements of the human condition. A full account 
of gender studies or even its intellectual genesis, even a brief one, goes beyond 
the scope of this work. By “gender studies,” I mean some types of contemporary 
feminism – LGBTQ+ studies and queer theory. I believe the way these social 
theories conceive of history and identity is very similar to how posthumanism 
understands them. How is it so?
One of the main theses of the gender studies discourse since at least the early 
1990s is the “construction of gender,” best laid out by Judith Butler. The thesis is 
that gender and even biological sex is not a given characteristic we are born with 
(a “core” of our condition), but a product of complicated norms, conventions and 
social roles implemented through performance; it is not an element of “nature” 
and can therefore be modified in all sorts of ways.236 To prove the thesis, Butler 
and other authors focus on those forms of human sexuality which have so far 
never been mentioned or have been treated as odd exceptions because they did 
not abide by those norms, roles and conventions, by violating and confusing 
them. This includes above all some “borderline” forms: androgyny; homo-, bi- 
and transsexuality; hermaphrodites; transvestites; including especially camp 
and drag – as cultural phenomena; and also all “non-standard” sexual behaviors 
described medically as paraphilias. Gender studies’ authors analyze these phe-
nomena in detail on many levels (sociology, psychology, political studies, literary 
studies, media studies, etc.). The fact that “gender games” are the focus of gender 
studies is the inevitable result of making body, sex and gender main instances of 
human identity understood in a Nietzschean way. Just as in posthumanism, we 
are dealing here with the task of constructing an identity without reference to 
 236 This premise implicitly contains the thesis about invalidation of the opposition 
between what is Natural and Artificial – and it may be no accident that it is so (if 
we accept Donna Haraway’s influence on Judith Butler). Thirty years earlier Erving 
Goffman wrote that social being is a perfromance, but it probably never occured to 






tradition, which has been rejected as a source of limitations and repression. If so, 
if identity is no longer determined by cultural past – it cannot be built with the 
existing set of cultural symbols (which was still done by early postmodernists), 
and the only available means of constructing identity is sexuality, especially those 
kinds of sexuality which were forbidden before. Gender studies can be seen as a 
“quest for the limits of humanity,” but the quest only happens in the absolutized 
sphere of sexuality (just as in Sade’s works interpreted by Bataille), because the 
“spiritual” sphere, which had determined the shape of the Western civilization 
for at least thirty centuries, was pronounced to be a construction governed by 
hegemonic discourses, which ultimately boil down to body and sexuality too. In 
light of gender studies, the only reality directly available to us is the materiality 
of our bodies (and especially the surface of our bodies) and sensory experiences; 
and this reality is “most real” when it is vague and is not governed by any norms.
Of all subfields of gender studies, I believe the queer theory is most similar to 
posthumanism. In this theory, first created in the 1990s, mostly through Judith 
Butler’s inspiration, both principal premises of gender – that sexuality determined 
our identity and that sexuality is not conditioned in any way – are developed to 
the limits of their consequences. Queer theory rejects both the notion of hetero-
sexuality and homosexuality – both are equally fictitious and do not represent the 
infinite complexity of the real libido. They are replaced by the concept of identity 
as a continuous process, with final form as its goal. According to theoreticians of 
queer, human identity should be constantly changing, never fully graspable, always 
in statu nascendi. On the discursive level, this is represented by using the methods 
of deconstruction in the analysis of the social reality.
How does such premise translate into practice? Can normative identity be 
truly rejected? It seems that a man who would do that would also face the same 
problem that appeared when we were considering the consequences of the no-
tion of Übermensch and posthuman: how to create oneself anew? How to be 
more than a desiring surface of a body? And just as in the other cases, “a queer 
human” should have an immense intellectual and spiritual potential in order to 
face the existential challenge of a “self-made man” and not reduce their odyssey 
of continuously creating identity to what we see today in mass culture: thought-
lessly adopting the newest ephemeral trends and “serial individualism.” Life as a 
work of art is a much harder task than one would think. Few can afford to fulfill 
this ideal.237
 237 In “The Twenty-First Voyage” by Lem, which I have analyzed here, there is a sentence 
that describes one of the stages of autoevolution of Dichoticans, which expresses the 
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The assumptions behind the queer theory are the same as the theses of the 
noblest liberalism: each individual should have a right to freely search and shape 
their identity. But in a situation when the process of shaping can never end; 
when each individual is to have their very own, unique identity (and blurred at 
the same time); when there is no norm pertaining to many, nor even any scale 
for comparison; finally, when identity is to be constructed based on “blurred” 
bodies and sexes only, then the very notion of identity loses its meaning. The 
protagonist of Dukaj’s Perfekcyjna niedoskonałość talks about just that when he is 
speaking about posthuman forms:
These phoebes, who modify themselves… How does it happen? They decide that they’d 
rather be different and reprogram themselves. And having reprogramed themselves, 
with the new network of fears and desires, they choose yet another type of phren. And 
so on, and so on, with no end; and all very honestly. Can they predict and simulate the 
state of their minds after X modifications? When in the state N they hope for N+1, but 
do they also want N+1-, N+100? … Where is identity in this process? Or maybe it is no 
longer a state but the process itself? (363; translated by OK)
And Greg Egan describes asexes as follows:
Asex was really nothing but an umbrella term for a broad group of philosophies, styles 
of dress, cosmetic-surgical changes, and deep-biological alterations. The only thing that 
one asex person necessarily had in common with another was the view that vis gender 
parameters … were the business of no one but verself ... What a person actually did 
in response to that attitude could range from as little as ticking the ‘A’ box on census 
forms, to choosing an asex name … all the way to full physical and/or neural asexuality, 
hermaphroditism, or exoticism. (34–35)
Theoreticians of queer intended to create a model that would best fit the infi-
nitely complex social reality. But when the authors of queer theory started to 
confuse theory with social activism, they forgot about the difference between 
a description and the phenomenon described, and about Max Weber’s remark 
that no theory can describe any reality in full and thinking otherwise is one of 
the biggest mistakes that can be made in the humanities. Just like gender studies, 
posthumanism and partly like Lem in ST, queer theory forgets that lesson. And, 
as I have tried to show, in all these cases forgetting it has the same effect of con-
fusing theory and practice, thought and a manifesto, philosophy and ideology – 
and with best intentions. This is why the anthropological premises adopted by 
those authors, their belief in the existential independence of an individual, lead 
issue well: “when you can be anyone and have any conviction, then you are no one 
and have no conviction.”
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to such extraordinary consequences. Posthumanism, gender studies and queer 
theory all represent the challenge of absolute egoism: negating all forms of social 
existence combined with fetishism of individual beings. The result is a loose 
group of monads.
Authors such as Dukaj and Egan realize what kind of problems are caused by 
constructing identity independently from all tradition, based only on gender – or 
lack thereof – and biotechnology. But in their novels they carefully avoid describing 
the internal life of posthuman beings, especially those aspects of it which for humans 
are shaped by nonbiological factors. They do not suggest that posthumans are 
determined solely by their physiological qualities, however imaginatively designed. 
Hence they produce an impression in the readers that posthuman identity is just as 
diverse as ours, except it is not revealed in full. But the theoreticians of queer want 
to grasp identity in its totality – and that is how, without realizing it, they contradict 
themselves.
The practical aspect of the queer theory is occasionally reduced to complex 
plastic surgeries today, changing sex or combining male and female features. 
Of course, in many cases, this is a life-saving option for people who are trans-
sexual and whose “body” is tragically unfit for their “soul.” Sometimes, however, 
it is more about manifesting one’s power over one’s body, a liberty in shaping it 
and hence a liberty to shape the most basic elements of identity at will.238 “Self-
creation” even includes sex here (although the word “even” suggests a traditional 
humanist point of view – in light of the queer theory there is not much more left 
to be shaped). Another type of such practice is voluntary castration239 or asexu-
ality – a complete rejection of sexual life caused by a lack of sex drive or a lack of 
a desire to follow it.240 The emancipatory quality of the queer theory invites such 
 238 For example, Pedro Álmodovar’s films illustrate the transgender problematic. Among 
such “manifestations of power over one’s body,” we could also mention plastic surgeries 
in general, especially the radical cases, such as “human lizard” (with green skin and 
split tongue), “human cat” (with moon-shaped pupils and fur) or “human enigma” 
(with skin covered in a checkered pattern). This is probably a passing trend, but the 
very fact it occurred has a lot to do with the theories I am discussing here.
 239 This is the subject of a documentary American Eunuchs, Italy 2003, directed by Gian 
Claudio Guiducci. It shows that a significant number of men are getting voluntarily 
castrated in the United States (a few hundred every year). The main cause is fatigue 
with one’s sex drive.
 240 So far it remains unclear whether asexuality is a psychosomatic disorder, or fourth 
sexual orientation (although the theoreticians of queer would reject both terms and 
would likely see it as just a point on the continuum of sexual identities). Egan describes 
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experiments and it is clear we are dealing with a specific type of autoevolution 
here, limited to surgical and hormonal treatments, and certainly primitive in 
eyes of “serious” posthumanists. It turns out they were not the only ones who 
came to the conclusion that it is time for freedom from the chains of biology.
It may seem somewhat surprising that the technological utopia of Stanisław 
Lem and gender theories have something in common. These two very different 
areas of thought are dominated by the same conviction that, just as Baron von 
Münchhausen, we can pull ourselves by hair from the swamp of humanity.
Philosophical and social theories that have been discussed here have their 
equivalent in visual arts. Body art has existed since the 1960s and the late 1980s 
brought abject art, the “art of disgust.” Human body, body of an artist or dead 
body of an anonymous human is the material of art in these currents. Bodies 
are injured, cut, subjected to all kinds of mechanical and surgical treatments, 
exhibited as anatomic preparations and finally combined with machine 
installations. Art theoreticians emphasize the rich intellectual background of 
such works, derived, among other sources, from accepting body as the only 
foundation of human condition as imposed by gender studies.
Thus we reach an interesting paradox – a strong desire to become independent 
from our “natural” conditions leads to a focus on a body deprived of a cultural 
meaning, treated as a lump of matter – so a focus on this element which is the 
most “natural” in us. The most abstract philosophical discourse takes as its sub-
ject the most material being, rejecting the richness of mediating symbols created 
by the Western culture. Is it not similar to the “wild” autoevolution, deprived of 
any supreme meaning, of the Dichoticans in “The Twenty-First Voyage,” where 
the faith in transcendence was rejected at the beginning?
In the conversations with Stanisław Bereś Lem, lamenting the fall of con-
temporary art, he said that soon galleries would be exhibiting human stomachs. 
described as “frigidity” in the past. J. M. Barrie (the author of Peter Pan), Salvador Dali, 
Glenn Gould, Maurice Ravel, Immanuel Kant, Isaac Newton, John Ruskin, Nikola 
Tesla and Antonio Salazar are among historical figures deemed today to have been 
asexual. “Asexuality” is another term that introduced into discourse a phenomenon 
that had existed in reality for a long time. There are many such terms in contemporary 
social discourse, including “domestic violence,” “sexual harassment,” “pedophilia,” 
etc. A thorough analysis of their evolution, similar to what Foucault did for the 18th 
and 19th centuries, could give us a valuable image of the mutual influence between 
social and theoretical reality of the late 20th century, of how new notions “discover” 
previously unnoticed phenomena, and of the extent to which these “discoveries” are 
projected back on history, impacting the social theory as well.
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As usual, this was a correct prophecy. He did not take into account the truly 
shocking fact that these stomachs will be a result of premises not very different 
from his own. We may only wonder where the deep belief in our own power of 
self-creation may lead us.241
 241 Another possible interpretation of these phenomena is that they signify finally 
accepting the body as the last element of “nature” in the context of the “artificial” 
world, or treating it as a sphere of struggle between Nature and Culture. The problem 
of the body in the Western philosophy dates back, of course, at least to Descartes, and 
becomes particularly poignant in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. However in this 
continuum, “body” is the link between the external and the internal world of man, 
not the center of human identity.
 
 
27  Posthumanism and Bioethics
There are a number of dilemmas in the contemporary social theory and practice 
that can be read through the terms proposed by posthumanism. They are ethical 
issues related to euthanasia, cloning and all other forms of genetic engineering, 
as well as gay marriages, and, to some extent, abortion and suicide (although 
these are much older than the other ones and, like gay marriages, are not a result 
of technological growth).242 All these practices imply a deep intervention into 
human identity, as it has been understood in the Western philosophy so far. 
Following the debates between proponents and opponents of cloning people, 
one can notice that the main arguments against these practices focus on the 
question whether people are entitled to determine who is human. Conservative 
humanists such as Fukuyama claim that the very possibility that such a line 
could be drawn should be rejected, because human identity is a given deter-
mined by the supreme laws of biology. The discussion about abortion is similar 
in that regard, although the question is somewhat narrower in this case and it 
is as follows:  when does a human embryo receive an individual identity (the 
extreme position is that it happens the moment a spermatozoon enters an egg 
cell). In the case of euthanasia243 and suicide, the discussion is whether people 
can decide when to end the life of other people (or their own) – it again touches 
on the issue of individual human identity, as it entails assuming that at some 
point in life, as a result of physical or spiritual suffering, the existence itself (i.e., 
continuing an individual’s identity) loses its supreme value. Gay marriages on 
the other hand (as opposed to civil unions) undermine sexual identity in a way 
similar to what I  have described in Chapter  26, because their very existence 
deprives the traditional understanding of it and its meaning as a union of two 
people of opposite sexes.
I have already mentioned here that some of these issues arise from the jux-
taposition of new technologies with traditional ethical norms rooted in the his-
torical process. In an article that was quoted here at the end of Chapter 19, Lem 
described this juxtaposition as a “collision between faith and empiricism.” It is 
 242 I am treating all these issues only peripherally here. Therefore I am not going into any 
more specific distinctions (e.g., between passive and active euthanasia).
 243 For an overview of various perspectives on the subject, see: Marta Zimniak-Hałajko, 
“Bez bólu. O dobrej śmierci,” in: Ból (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2004), 271–276 








probably best seen in the cases of euthanasia and cloning. Now these problems 
can also be described in terms of posthumanism: procedures such as cloning or 
euthanasia radically undermine the meaning of identity as known so far. One 
could even claim that the entire cultural heritage does not provide us with clues 
on how to classify them. And this is not because we do not have enough exempla 
of these procedures  – they are abundant in both history and literature  – but 
because they undermine the very categories this culture has come up with. The 
“prefigurative” quality of our culture (in a sense proposed by Margaret Mead) 
touches on the most fundamental categories here:  What is a human? Who is 
human? What does it mean to be human? Of course, those questions have always 
been asked – but only in a purely philosophical way. These were often decided in 
practice too – but always arbitrarily. Now, we are expected to answer them prac-
tically in a democratic and liberal discussion and procedure. And history cannot 
help in that, because in the first two centuries of its existence liberal democracy 
has never taken up those issues either as a philosophy or in policy.
I would suggest that the ethical dilemmas discussed here are a result of the 
collision of humanism and posthumanism. The default understanding of human 
identity presented by the supporters of cloning, euthanasia and gay marriages 
(as well as suicide conceived as a morally neutral deed) is in my view fully 
posthumanist. The implicit assumption is that individual’s identity is self-cre-
ated, that it is independent from external factors (and especially from social 
and moral norms) and that autarchic identity can be freely shaped, created or 
destroyed with arbitrary convention or individual will – without looking back 
on the group, intersubjective or social sphere.
I do not wish to limit these issues to pure theory though. In the recent years, 
there have been many cases when euthanasia was not just a matter of conser-
vative or liberal understanding of identity, but of an actual deep suffering. For 
example, in 2000, a 20-year-old French fireman Vincent Humbert was paralyzed 
as a result of a car crash; he also lost sight and ability to speak. However, he 
remained completely conscious (apart from a few months in a coma). With his 
right-hand fingers (which were the only ones he could still move), he wrote a 
book Je vous demante le droit de la mort,244 in which he was arguing for his right to 
terminate his own life. The authorities refused to allow this, but in 2003 Humbert 
was killed by his own mother (who was subsequently treated in a psychiatric 
hospital), which sparked a national discussion in France on the admissibility 
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of euthanasia. This case, as many other similar situations, shows that the tech-
nological advancement of medicine as an art of keeping people alive is actually 
in conflict with its own ethical principles – and it has been so for a long time, 
but up until a few years ago, such cases were not a subject of a broad discussion, 
because, as with asexuality, there had been no term that would make the discus-
sion of the phenomenon possible.245 Perhaps it is a temporary situation and we 
will soon achieve the kind of knowledge that will allow us to return power over 
their bodies to people who suffer from paralysis (but will we return youthful-
ness to the elderly without stepping on the way toward cyborg autoevolution?). 
But even then the dilemmas born on the borderline between humanism and 
posthumanism will not disappear. They are not just connected to the state of 
technology, but are a result of how we understand our existence and its limits.
For Aristotle, an object combining categorial features of a few different 
objects was monstrous. The mythological chimera was an example of such a 
monster for him  – but so was woman. We can now observe this monstrosity 
on other examples: cyborgs, transgenders, clone, genetic chimeras – the entire 
posthumanism in theory and in practice is about constantly mixing categories 
hoping for new better ones to emerge. I will invoke Dukaj here again. His other 
novel Inne pieśni (2002) is set in a world governed by Aristotelian ontology. The 
protagonists of the novel start a war with adynatoses  – creatures combining 
opposite categories in a way inconceivable for “regular” people (hence their 
name: “adynatos” in Greek means “impossible”). Is it not a grand metaphor of the 
conflict between humanism and posthumanism? James Shreeve, an American 
writer in biotechnology, wrote in an article about genetic chimeras: “When we 
start to blend the edges of things, we’re uneasy.”246
Here I  finish this overview of the possible links between posthumanism 
and social problems connected with postmodernist thought and bioethics. It is 
merely an outline of the problematic that can direct further interpretations.
 245 Even this drama can be found reflected in Lem’s works (although it may seem cynical 
to look for literary expressions of the issue). In Memoirs of a Space Traveler: Further 
Reminiscences of Ijon Tichy, there is a story of a scholar who, hoping to achieve immor-
tality for his dead wife, put her “soul” in a small box. Ijon Tichy, mortified by the idea 
of an active consciousness petrified in eternal immobility and darkness, destroys this 
monument. (Philosophically, it is a reductio ad absurdum of the idea of immortality 
of the soul.)






28  Final Remarks
I started this part of the book by discussing the vision of autoevolution in Lem’s 
works (the project as laid out in the final chapter of ST and in two pieces of fic-
tion: the “serious” Golem XIV and the “grotesque” version in “The Twenty-first 
Voyage”). I  then tried to read this project as an example of a liberal rational 
utopia. The following chapters were devoted to discussion and critique of 
posthumanism – a social and scientific theory and ideology that emerged in the 
1980s. I was arguing that the premises behind posthumanism are very similar to 
the ones adopted by Lem in ST. In the final chapters, I offered an interpretation 
of posthumanism and other contemporary emancipatory ideas as fulfilling the 
Nietzschean motif of Übermensch, who rejects the past and the norms derived 
from it in order to create a brand new identity. I also showed the contradiction 
and difficulties entailed by radical consequences of such ideas. Most of my anal-
yses were based on revealing hidden premises of these concepts.
The discussion of premises, consequences and affinities of Lem’s project of 
autoevolution led me toward various peculiar areas, but also to some of the 
major problems of contemporary civilization. I  have tried to prove the thesis 
laid out at the beginning of this part: that Lem’s essays, especially Dialogues and 
Summa Technologiae, are devoted exactly to these issues, even though they are 
not explicitly the subject of discussion.
Was Lem a posthumanist? No, but unwillingly he became a precursor of the 
current. Compared with ST, the entire posthumanist discourse is very simple 
and entangled in social ideologies, which Lem managed to avoid by carefully 
separating his project from social issues. Lem and posthumanists are very gen-
eral in their musings on the human condition. Despite planning to change, they 
are not in the least bit interested in current problems; there is only a rejection 
of those issues with one swiping move as problems that posthumanism and 
autoevolution will immediately solve – as utopias do. I need to emphasize that 
both Lem and posthumanists have the best intentions. They all honestly hope to 





One plump schoolgirl (she looked about fifteen), peering 
inquisitively over her spectacles abruptly asked: “And what 
is it for?”
Solaris, chapter “The Monsters”
Humanists ought not hide behind a distaste for ideaologies 
to avoid participating in the processes of creating, shaping 
and fading of ideologies, unless they wish these processes to 
turn again them and their values.
Leszek Kołakowski, “Wielkie i Małe Kompleksy Humanistów,”  
in: Kultura i Fetysze
In his once controversial essay “Tragizm i maski tragizmu,” Jan Kott described the 
works of Conrad and Malraux in terms of tragedy that is defined by characters 
facing a world devoid of meaning. Kott claimed that tragedy is overcome when 
individuals enter the world of communal values. The characters in Lem’s novels 
are tragic in a very similar sense, but they do not find a similar solution. They are 
unable to find meaning in culturally sanctioned activities because culture barely 
exists in their world. Culture as a reservoir of the past, history and their symbols 
cultivated in social communication has no place in Lem’s novels. That is why their 
protagonists are absolutely lonely. Their only haven is science, reason and – espe-
cially in his early works – the ethos of male friendship rooted in the former two. 
But Lem frequently undermines all these sources of meaning. It seems that the very 
possibility of communication between people, based either on shared symbols or 
simple empathy, is highly problematic in his eyes. Perhaps this is why it was easy 
for him to come up with plans of autoevolution and was so eager to dive into the 
world of machines. For Lem, technology neutralizes culture and history.
Who is Lem as the author of “technological” essays? Is he really a positivist, as 
many of his critics see him? To answer this question, we should look at the four 
basic characteristics of positivist thinking, as laid out by Leszek Kołakowski247:
 1. The rule of phenomenalism. “This may be briefly formulated as follows: there 
is no real difference between ‘essence’ and ‘phenomenon’ … We are entitled 
 247 Leszek Kołakowski, “An Over-all View of Positivism,” in: The Alienation of Reason. 
A History of Positivist Thought, trans. by N. Guterman (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 






to record only that which is actually manifested in experience; opinions 
concerning occult entities of which experienced things are supposedly the 
manifestations are untrustworthy. Disagreements over questions that go 
beyond the domain of experience are purely verbal in character” (3).
This is, of course, about ridding the discourse of unnecessary speculative terms, 
following the principle entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. 
Does Lem follow this rule? When reading Dialogues and ST superficially, it 
may seem so, especially if we believe his own declaration of loyalty to it and 
hostility toward speculative metaphysics. But a problem occurs when we ask 
whether the subject of his own inquiries abides by this principle. If we assume 
that the main topic of ST is the project of autoevolution, seen as correlate to 
human rationality (and I have devoted much of the present work to argue that 
it is indeed so), then we should also accept that among Lem’s implicit prem-
ises there is also at least one that refers to a notion that cannot be empirically 
verified – the idea of rationality itself. Moreover, in Lem’s theoretical writings 
there are a number of statements that allow for a possibility of there being an 
element of human existence that could not be reduced to empirical notions, 
and some of his novels (Solaris, His Master’s Voice) actually have this pos-
sibility as their main theme. It violates the rule of phenomenalism. I would 
rather say then that the whole of Lem’s thought is more of a proof that he may 
have intended to be faithful to the rule, but he was not able to fulfill that inten-
tion, because throughout most of his creative biography he was struggling 
with his own “metaphysical temptation.”
 2. The rule of nominalism. “[It] comes down to the statement that we may 
not assume that any insight formulated in general terms can have any real 
referents other than individual concrete objects” (5).
Lem breaks this rule all the time. In ST there are a number of terms that 
are used as general terms, even though they have no concrete referents, even 
though they play a vital part in the book’s argument. It is enough to mention 
“Nature,” “Science” or “Designer.” At the beginning of Part Two, I showed how 
Lem mixes elements of an academic text and an informal essay. The tendency 
to use such terms is among those characteristics of his writings that qualify 
them as informal essays.
 3. The rule “that denies cognitive value to value judgments and normative 
statements” (7). In ST there are dozens of such statements (and I have quoted 
many of them here). It is hard to say with absolute certainty whether Lem 
sees any cognitive values in them. It is clear, however, that he uses them as 
arguments. The validity of the project of autoevolution is based on them.
Conclusion 231
 4. The rule of unity of the scientific method. It is about “the belief that the 
methods for acquiring valid knowledge, and the main stages in elaborating 
experience through theoretical reflection, are essentially the same in all 
spheres of experience” (9). Practically it entails subordinating the humanities 
to science, which we know well from the history of these two fields. Lem does 
not share such approach at all. In Dialogues and ST, which are the subject of 
my inquiry here, humanities are omitted altogether. They include no method-
ological declarations on acquiring knowledge of the non-physiological sphere 
of human existence (except cybernetic sociology in Dialogues, but even that 
is treated with some skepticism). I see this absence as a proof that Lem real-
ized that positivism was helpless in that regard. In The Philosophy of Chance 
and Science Fiction and Futurology, Lem tried to build a theory of literature 
based on scientific premises, but he admitted the effects of those attempts 
were fruitless (that is the content of those books does not constitute a sci-
entific theory in a strict sense). It is another proof of the difference between 
Lem’s declared positivism and his concrete thinking on human and biological 
reality. We should also remember that structuralism, which was originally 
meant to be a “scientific” theory of culture, was strongly criticized by Lem 
from the very beginning for its senseless use of scientific terms for the analysis 
of works of literature and art.
So Lem does not follow any of the four main rules of positivism. Or, to be more 
precise, he does not follow any of them unconditionally. His writings are so rich 
and diverse that there is enough material in it to prove the opposite thesis too. 
I have quoted Lem’s sentences that any genuine scientist could claim as theirs. 
But I think it would not be fair to see Lem merely as a positivist, as it would 
require omitting many themes of his works which I deem the most important. 
As a writer he was aware that there is a sphere of human existence which cannot 
be reduced to positive knowledge.248 The thing is that he opposes the existence 
of this sphere, as he believes it to be the source of insufferable and unavoidable 
contradictions of our condition. In that sense Lem, just as Tolstoy, is a fox who 
wants to be a hedgehog in Isaiah Berlin’s terms. He knows about the irreducible 
diversity of the world, but despite his better judgment, he wants to find a Grand 
Rule that would govern and explain it. As I have pointed out a number of times 
 248 Jerzy Jarzębski emphasizes this duality in his essay Przypadek i wartości [“Chance 





already, the project of autoevolution is a means to overcome these contradictions, 
and as such it is among many noble utopias that present a vision of man who saved 
himself from his own flaws. In Lem’s version (and in its simplified version that 
is posthumanism), posthuman beings achieve such level of perfection that the 
entire struggle between Nature and Culture, which plagues our current social and 
mental existence, becomes as distant as the polemics between Monophysites and 
Monothelites. In Lem’s view, autoevolution is to give us the opportunity to tame 
the horses in the Platonic chariot and achieve a dream balance of existence, even 
if it requires rejecting the heritage of a few dozen centuries of culture, philosophy, 
art and religion, the achievements of which are but a testimony to this hope-
less struggle. In this uncompromising vision, humanity is but a sad episode. The 
autoevolutionary utopia is only a dream of liberation from “the terrible burden 
of being human.”249
We could shrug it off and just say: what kind of fantasies are these? Would it not 
be better to do something useful? Probably, yes. But I believe – and I am highly 
aware this judgment is not particularly significant – that the work of Stanisław 
Lem is one of the most beautiful adventures of human mind.
 249 Maria Janion uses this phrase when discussing Zbignier Kubiak’s Mitologia Greków i 
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